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INTRODUCTION.
A.

Real Estate Owners and Family Businesses.
1.

Real estate owners share all of the problems of the family business owner,
in addition to the unique problems of owning real estate. However, real
estate presents some opportunities that other family businesses do not
share.

2.

There are three basic goals of estate and gift tax planning for real estate:
(1) the reduction of estate and gift taxes upon transfer; (2) the deferral of
the estate and gift tax burden; and (3) the provision of the necessary
liquidity to pay the taxes imposed on an illiquid asset.

3.

Furthermore, while taxes cannot be ignored when planning for real estate,
additional goals for the real estate owner, which can be as important as tax
planning, include (1) creditor protection, (2) retention of control over the
real estate by the client, (3) management succession, and (4) economic
support of the family.

B.

Valuation Discounts. The estate planning goals means that the planner for a real
estate owner will be grappling with the discounts in valuation available to limited
partnerships and limited liability companies, since the real estate owner will
already be using these entities for business purposes. These discounts are much
more easily obtained for the real estate owner, in light of the real estate assets held
in the entity (as opposed to stock portfolios), but the extent of these discounts will
still be subject to attack by the Service.

C.

Management Succession. The issue of management succession is complicated for
the real estate owner because the management and investment of real estate calls
for knowledge and experience that many family members, other than the real
estate owner, often do not possess. In addition, there are not many outside
professionals with such knowledge and experience to whom the family can turn,
upon the death or retirement of the real estate owner.

D.

II.

Lack of Diversification and Liquidity. Finally, clients who own real estate
usually own only real estate. It is what they know and understand and they
generally put any cash flow they receive from their properties back into their
properties (or into new properties), to the extent they don't need it for personal
consumption purposes.

VALUATION BASICS.
A.

Introduction.
1.

The applicability and amount of valuation discounts (and premiums) are
some of the most frequently litigated areas in estate and gift tax planning.
The inherently subjective nature of valuation lends itself to frequent
disputes between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service (the
"Service").

2.

In Estate ofAuker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-185 (1998), Judge
Laro wrote:
Disputes over valuation fill our dockets, and for good reason. We
approximate that 243 sections of the Code require fair market
value estimates in order to assess tax liability, and that 15 million
tax returns are filed each year on which taxpayers report an event
involving a valuation-related issue. It is no mystery, therefore, why
valuation cases are ubiquitous. Today, valuation is a highly
sophisticated process. We cannot realistically expect that litigants
will, will be able to, or will want to, settle, rather than litigate, their
valuation controversies if the law relating to valuation is vague or
unclear. We must provide guidance on the manner in which we
resolve valuation issues so as to provide a road map by which the
Commissioner, taxpayers, and valuation practitioners can
comprehend the rules applicable thereto and use these rules to
resolve their differences. Clearly articulated rules will also assist
appellate courts in their review of our decisions in the event of an
appeal.

B.

Fundamental Concepts of Transfer Tax Valuation.
1.

Fair Market Value. Fair market value is the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts. United States v. Cartwright,411 U.S. 546
(1973). See also, Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1(b) and 25.2512-1.

2.

Willing Buyer - Willing Seller.

3.

4.

a.

The willing buyer and the willing seller are hypothetical persons,
rather than specific individuals or entities, and the individual
characteristics of these hypothetical persons are not necessarily the
same as the individual characteristics of the actual seller or the
actual buyer. See, e.g., Estate of Bright v. US., 658 F.2d 999 (5th
Cir. 1981); Propstrav. UnitedStates, 680 F.2d 1248 (9t Cir.
1982).

b.

The "willing buyer-willing seller" principle is an objective test
rather than a subjective test. The court in Estate of Watts v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1985-595 (1985), explained that the
test requires the transaction be analyzed from the viewpoint of a
hypothetical seller whose only goal is to maximize his profit on the
sale of his interest.

c.

In Morrissey v. Commissioner,243 F.3rd 1145 (9t' Cir. 2001),
rev 'g Kuafinan v. Commssioner, T.C. Memo 1999-119 (1999), the
Ninth Circuit held that the Tax Court erred in not considering the
price at which stock in a closely held company was sold in sales
occurring 2 months after the decedent's death. Even though the
sales were among related parties, they were not closely related and
had little incentive to make a gift.

d.

In Mitchell v. Commissioner, 250 F.3 d 696 (9' Cir. 2001), the
Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's determination of value for
shares of stock owned by John Paul Mitchell in a hair care
products company. The Tax Court used the company's acquisition
value (which implied control), as opposed to the company's
publicly traded value (which would imply a lack of control
discount).

Gift Tax Valuation.
a.

Code § 2512 discusses the valuation of gifts. It provides that "if the
gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of the gift
shall be considered the amount of the gift."

b.

Gift transfer taxes are imposed only on what is received by the
transferee, not on what was owned by the transferor. See, Tech.
Adv. Mem. 9449001.

Estate Tax Valuation.
a.

Code § 2031 discusses the valuation of assets held in the gross
estate. It provides that ."[t]he value of the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including to the extent provided

for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all property,
real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated."
b.

C.

Estate transfer taxes are imposed on what was held by the decedent
at his date of death and passed to his estate, not on what is
transferred to the beneficiaries.

5.

Sum of the Parts is Generally Less Than The Whole. The value of a
partial interest in a corporation or partnership rarely equals the pro rata net
asset value of the entity in its entirety due to the legal rights and
relationships that are established in the entity's organizational documents
and the application of state law to the interests being valued.

6.

Burden of Proof. The taxpayer generally bears the burden of proof in
valuation cases. In Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 100 AFTR 2d
2007-5792 (2d Cir. August 23, 2007), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Court is not required to accept the taxpayer's position of
valuation when the Service has the burden of proof under Code § 7491
and the Court rejects the Service's valuation approach. Instead, the Court
may fashion its own valuation methodology. In Thompson, the decedent
owned a 20% interest in a closely held corporation. The estate valued the
interest at $1.75 million whereas the Service valued the interest at $32
million. The parties stipulated that the Service bore the burden of proof on
the valuation issue under Code § 7491. The Tax Court rejected the
Service's valuation methodology; however, rather than simply finding for
the estate, the Court also rejected the estate's valuation approach. Instead,
the Tax Court adopted its own valuation approach and determined a value
of $13.5 million for the estate's interest in the company. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's authority to adopt its
own valuation approach and held that the Court is not required to accept
the taxpayer's position even after the Court rejects the approach of the
Service. Notwithstanding section 7491, the Court reasoned that the Tax
Court "is not bound by the formulas or opinions proffered by expert
witnesses. It may reach a determination of value based on its own analysis
of all the evidence in the record."

Valuation Methodology.
1.

General Methodology. The valuation of a business interest or real estate
interest is typically a three-step process:
a.

First, the value of 100% of the underlying asset is determined.

b.

Second, the fractional ownership interest is applied to the value of
the underlying asset to determine the aliquot value of the
ownership interest.

c.

2.

Third, valuation discounts or premiums are applied to the
ownership interest to determine its fair market value.

Determination of Underlying Asset Value. The first step in valuing an
interest is to value the whole asset. The valuation of the whole asset
depends on the nature of the asset involved.
a.

For certain assets where there is a readily available market, such as
publicly-traded securities, the mean between the highest and
lowest quoted selling prices on the date of the gift is the fair
market value per share or bond. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(b)(1).

b.

For other assets, such as stock in a closely held business or a
limited partnership interest in a limited partnership, there are
numerous valuation methodologies to determine the value of the
underlying asset. The most frequently used valuation
methodologies include the following:

c.

i.

Capitalization of Earning Power;

ii.

Capitalization of Cash Flow;

iii.

Capitalization of Dividends;

iv.

Capitalization of Gross Revenue; and

v.

Asset or Book Value.

Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, is the most authoritative
pronouncement by the Service as to the approach, methods, and
factors to be considered in valuing shares of closely held business
entities for estate and gift tax purposes. Rev Rul. 59-60
acknowledges that opinions as to value may differ widely and each
case is unique, such that no generally applicable valuation formula
or approach can be devised. Among the factors to be considered
are the following:
i.

The nature of the business and the history of the enterprise
from its inception.

ii.

The economic outlook in general and the condition and
outlook of the specific industry in particular.

iii.

The book value of the stock and the financial condition of
the business.

iv.

The earning capacity of the company.

v.

The dividend-paying capacity.

vi.

Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other
intangible value.

vii.

Sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be
valued.

viii.

The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the
same or a similar line of business having their stocks
actively traded in a free and open market, either on an
exchange or over-the-counter.

d.

The Service extended the application of Rev. Rul. 59-60 to
partnership interests in Rev. Rul. 65-192, 1965-2 C.B. 259.

e.

Real estate interests are typically valued based on one or more of
the following valuation methodologies:
i.

Market approach;

ii.

Income approach; and

iii.

Cost approach.

3.

Determination of Aliquot Value. The next step is simply accomplished by
apply the percentage ownership interest to the value of the underlying
asset. For example, if John owns 25% of a business whose underlying
value is $1,000,000, the underlying value of a 25% aliquot interest is
$250,000.

4.

Application of Discounts or Premiums. The last step is to apply valuation
discounts or premiums to the underlying asset. The applicability of
valuation discounts is recognized by Rev. Rul. 59-60 which states that
once the value of the underlying asset is determined, discounts should be
applied to minority ownership interests for lack of control and lack of
marketability.
a.

The most frequently discussed valuation discounts include:
i.

Fractional interest discounts;

ii.

Minority interest discounts;

b.

c.

III.

iii.

Lack of marketability discounts;

iv.

Capital gains or General Utilities discounts;

v.

Blockage discounts;

vi.

Key person discounts; and

vii.

Securities laws discounts.

The most commonly discussed valuation premiums include:
i.

Control premiums;

ii.

Voting premiums; and

iii.

Swing-vote premiums.

Each of these discounts and premiums will be discussed in greater
detail, infra.

FRACTIONAL INTEREST DISCOUNTS.
A.

Introduction.
I.

A fractional interest discount is the discount applied to the ownership of
an undivided interest in an asset. Because of the lack of immediate control
and the problems associated with dealing with co-owners, the hypothetical
willing buyer would discount the fractional interest being acquired. Each
co-tenant or co-owner of the property has the right to possess and use the
joint property, so long as the rights of the other co-owners are not
adversely affected.

2.

Unlike owners of closely held businesses that do not have the unilateral
right to realize their pro rata share of the underlying value of the business's
assets by causing a dissolution of the business, owners of undivided
interests in real estate generally do have the power to partition. However,
partitioning property is expensive and, depending upon the location of the
property, partitioning may be unavailable due to the local zoning laws.
Typically, the fractional interest discounts range from 10% to 25% of the
pre-discount value of the underlying property.

3.

In determining the value of the real estate, particular attention must be
paid to the specific type of property involved. For example, in Estate of
Williams, T.C. Memo 1998-59 (1998), the Court allowed a 44% discount

for an undivided one-half interest in timberland; see also, Estate of Sels,
T.C. Memo 1986-501 (1986) (60% discount applied to timberland
interest). By contrast, in Estate ofBrocato v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo
1999-424 (1999), a 20% discount was applied to fractional interests in 9
apartment buildings in San Francisco.
B.

Analyzing the Fractional Interest Discount.
I1.

2.

C.

The are a number of factors that support a fractional interest discount. See
Hall, "The New Paradigm: Life After the Elimination of Valuation
Discounts," Vol. 76, No. 5, Taxes, 43, May 1998. These factors include:
a.

Owners of undivided interests have unlimited liability.

b.

Undivided interests require unanimous consent for all decisions.

c.

It is difficult to use an undivided interest as collateral for a loan
because creditors are reluctant to accept such an interest as
collateral.

d.

Each owner has the right to use the property, subject to the rights
of the other owners, although profits, if any, are shared and
distributed in proportion to ownership interests.

e.

Each owner has the right to sue for partition.

Problems Associated with Partition Suits.
a.

Usually a partition suit takes from two to five years, which would
discourage an investor who contemplated suing for a partition after
purchasing an interest.

b.

There is no guaranty that the sale of the property would be at its
true fair market value.

c.

The sale price may be affected by the fact that it is a court sale.

3.

In 54 documented undivided interest transactions, one study found the
average discount to be 35%. Patchin, "Market Discounts for Undivided
Minority Interests in Real Estate," 3 Real Estate Issues 14 (Fall/Winter
1988).

4.

In a more recent study, the average discount in 24 transactions was 47%.
See Humphrey and Humphrey, "Unsyndicated Partial Interest Discounts,"
The AppraisalJournal (July 1997).

Case Law SupDortina Fractional Interest Discounts.

1.

Estate ofHenry v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 423 (1944). The Tax Court
awarded a 10% discount for a fractional 1/3 interest in undeveloped farm
land. The Tax Court noted that fractional interests in highly improved
downtown property, located in an urban area will, in forced sales, seldom
bring an amount equal to the value of the whole.

2.

Estate ofCampanariv. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 488 (1945). The Tax Court
allowed a 12.5% discount for a 1/3 interest in real estate. The Tax Court
based the award on the fact that the purchaser of a minority interest subjected
himself to the wishes of other owners and had no control in the management,
operation, or leasing of the properties. Furthermore, it was difficult to find a
buyer of a minority interest and could only do so when they could obtain all
of the fractional interests making up the whole parcel.

3.

Estate ofEggleston v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. 400 (1947). Tax Court
allowed a 36% discount for a 1/7th interest in commercial real estate located
in Pittsburgh.

4.

Estate of Tishman v. Commissioner, 59-1 U.S.T.C. Par. 11875 (E.D. Va.
1959). Decedent owned V2 interest in real estate located in Richmond,
Virginia. Taxpayer's expert said that a discount of 15% to 50% was merited.
District Court held that a 15% discount was applicable.

5.

Estate of Whiteheadv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1974-53 (1974). The
decedent owned a /2interest in a ranch. The estate put on evidence as to the
chilling effect of sales of a fractional interest, testimony regarding legal costs
involved in partition suits, testimony from an engineer regarding surveying
costs, and testimony from a real estate broker, appraiser and rancher
regarding the effect on the market value of undivided interests in Texas
ranch land. The Court awarded a 20% discount.

6.

Propstrav. Commissioner, 680 F.2d. 1248 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth
Circuit held that the value of decedent's undivided one-half community
interest in real property should be discounted by 15% to account for
relative unmarketability of the fractional interest. Propstrais particularly
significant because the Court rejected government's "unity of ownership"
theory that estate must prove that interests in property were likely to be
sold separately. The Court did not assume that the decedent's interest
would be sold together with the other undivided interest held by surviving
spouse. Therefore, the decedent's interest was valued at less than one-half
of the value of the entire parcel of real property.

7.

Estate ofSels v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 1986-501 (1986). The Tax
Court awarded a 60% discount for fractional interests in 11 tracts of
timberland.

8.

Mooneyham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1991-178 (1991). Taxpayer
gave an undivided one-half interest in real estate located in Sunnyvale,
California to her brother. Taxpayer's attempted to disavow her first
valuation and use a second valuation. The Tax Court applied a 15%
discount to the one-half interest as found in taxpayer's first appraisal.

9.

Pillsbury v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1992-425 (1992). A majority
interest in real estate was entitled to a discount since its holder would still
need the consent of the minority owner to exercise all ownership rights.
Thus, the Tax Court allowed the 15% discount used on the estate tax
return in valuing a decedent's 77% undivided interest in real property.
Pillsbury represents a good planning opportunity because the 77% interest
in the real estate was held by a marital trust, while the other 23% interest
was held in a credit-shelter trust. Cf, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9050004.

10.

Lefrak v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1993-526 (1993). The court applied a
combined 20% minority discount and 10% lack of marketability discount,
after holding that the transfers were transfers of fractional interests in real
estate and not partnership interests because of the formalities in the case;
i.e., the partnership was created after the real estate was transferred to
family members, apparently to avoid local taxes on the transfer. The court
also rejected the Service's position that no discount was available because
the owners were family members.

11.

Cervin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1994-550 (1994), rev'dandrem'don
other issue, 79 AFTYR2d 97-2487 (1997). The court allowed a 20%
discount for an undivided 50% interest in a 657.3 acre farm and
homestead in Texas. The court noted a partition of the real estate would
involve substantial legal costs, appraisal fees, and delay, and any partition
would require an agreement among interest owners as to the relative value
of the land.

12.

Barge v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-188 (1997). The court allowed
a 27.8% discount for a gift of a 25% interest in 44,972 acres of timberland.
The court determined the discount by taking into account the delay a
partition suit would involve, the present value of the income that would be
generated from the property during the delay, and the present value of the
proceeds as a result of the partition suit, and deducted from these amounts
the present value of the partition costs.

13.

Estate of Williams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-59 (1998). The Tax
Court adopted the taxpayer's contention that a 44% discount should be
applied to the value of undivided one-half interests in Florida timberland
that were gifted during the decedent's lifetime and that passed at the
decedent's death. The Tax Court accepted the taxpayer's 44% combined
discount based upon a lack of marketability discount of 20% and a lack of

control discount of 30%. The taxpayer witnesses included a real estate
appraiser who appraised the underlying assets, a business appraiser who
determined the applicable discounts, a real estate attorney who testified
about the partition issues and costs associated with fractional interests, and
a banker who testified about the unwillingness of banks to provide
financing for loans secured by fractional interests.

IV.

14.

Estate ofBrocato v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 1999-424 (1999). The Tax
Court applied a 20% fractional interest discount to 9 multiple-dwelling
properties in San Francisco's Marina district. Interestingly, the Court also
allowed an 11% blockage discount for 7 of the 9 properties because they
competed with each other and the simultaneous sale of all 7 properties
would artificially depress the market.

15.

Estate of Busch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-3 (2000). The Tax
Court applied a 10% fractional interest discount to an undivided one-half
interest in real estate located in Alameda County, California.

16.

Estate of Bairdv. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 2001-258 (2001). The Tax
Court applied a 60% discount to 16 undivided fractional interests in
timberland. Court recognized limited market, lack of control, under
Louisiana law, over exploitation of timberland interest less -than 80%, and
delay in selling a partial interest.

17.

Estate of Forbes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2001-72 (2001). QTIP
trust holding a 42% undivided interest in real estate received a 30%
discount.

MINORITY INTEREST AND LACK OF MARKETABILITY DISCOUNTS.
A.

Minority Interest Discounts.
1.

A lack-of-control discount, also referred to as a minority interest discount,
is appropriate when valuing an interest in an entity that does not give the
holder of the interest the right to decide when distributions of earnings will
be made, when the entity will be liquidated, and other issues that affect the
financial benefits of ownership in the entity.
a.

In an operating business, lack of control may also mean the interest
holder will not be assured of being an officer or employee of the
entity.

b.

In the context of a family limited partnership or LLC, which
usually involves passive investments, the lost opportunity to be an
employee of the entity may not be financially significant.

2.

The rights associated with control have been more particularly stated as
follows:
a.

Elect directors and appoint management.

b.

Determine management compensation and perquisites.

c.

Set policy and change the course of business.

d.

Acquire or liquidate assets.

e.

Select people with whom to do business and award contracts.

f.

Make acquisitions.

g.

Liquidate, dissolve, sell out, or recapitalize the company.

h.

Sell or acquire treasury shares.

i.

Register the company's stock for a public offering.

j.

Declare and pay dividends.

k.

Change the articles of incorporation or bylaws.

S. Pratt, Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held
Companies, 55-56 (1989), cited in Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 1990-472 (1990).
3.

For many years, the Service challenged a minority interest discount
because of the theory of family attribution - i.e., minority interests held by
a family should be aggregated to form a controlling block because the
family is more likely to act as one unit. The Service consistently lost on
this issue. See, e.g., Propstrav. US., 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982);
Estate of Bright v. US., 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); Estate ofAndrews
v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); and Estate of Lee v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 860 (1978).

4.

In Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202, the Service abandoned the family
attribution theory. Rev. Rul. 93-12 involved a gift by a 100% shareholder
of a corporation of 20% of his stock to each of his five children. The
Service ruled that the family's control of the entity would not be
considered in valuing the 20% interests. The Service stated:
For estate and gift tax valuation purposes, the Service will
follow Bright, Propstra,Andrews and Lee in not assuming
that all voting power held by family members may be

aggregated for purposes of determining whether the
transferred shares should be valued as a part of a
controlling interest. Consequently, a minority discount
would not be disallowed solely because a transferred
interest, when aggregated with interests held by family
members, would be a part of a controlling interest. This
would be the case whether the donor held 100% or some
lesser percentage of the stock immediately before the gift.
B.

Lack of Marketability Discount.
I1.

A lack-of-marketability discount takes into account the fact that an owner
of an interest in a non-publicly traded entity will have more difficulty than
an owner of an interest in a publicly traded entity in finding a willing
buyer and, in order to sell the interest, may incur expenses, such as legal,
accounting, and syndication fees. The fact that there is not a readily
accessible market to sell interests in a closely-held business substantially
increases the risks of ownership due to the inability to achieve liquidity
within a short period of time.

2.

In Mandelbaum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1995-255 (1995), Judge
Laro of the Tax Court listed the following elements of value as factors that
have to be taken into account in determining the appropriate discount for
limited marketability:
a.

The value of the corporation's privately traded securities vis-a-vis
its publicly traded securities (or, if the corporation does not have
stock that is traded both publicly and privately, the value of a
similar corporation's public and private stock);

b.

An analysis of the corporation's financial statements;

c.

The corporation's dividend-paying capacity, its history of paying
dividends, and the amount of its prior dividends;

d.

The nature of the corporation, its history, its position in the
industry, and its economic outlook;

e.

The corporation's management;

f.

The degree of control transferred with the block of stock to be
valued;

g.

Any restriction on the transferability of the corporation's stock;

C.

h.

The period of time for which an investor must hold the stock to
realize a sufficient profit;

i.

The corporation's redemption policy;

j.

The cost of effectuating a public offering of the stock to be valued,
e.g., legal, accounting, and underwriting fees.

3.

The price of shares of stock or other publicly traded interests already
reflects a lack-of-control discount, but does not reflect a lack-ofmarketability discount because they are sold on a recognized exchange
and by definition are marketable.

4.

Minority interest and lack of marketability are often applied at the same
time. However, a lack of marketability discount may be applied to a
majority or controlling interest in an entity. See, e.g., Estate of Colley v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1980-107 (1980) (25% lack of marketability
discount applied to 100% interest); Estate of Bennett v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 1993-34 (1993) (15% lack of marketability discount applied to
100% interest); Estate ofLuton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1994-539
(1994) (20% lack of marketability discount applied to 78% interest); Gray
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-67 (1997) (15% lack of marketability
discount applied to 82.49% interest). Cf, Estate of Cloutierv.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1996-49 (1996) (no marketability discount).

5.

Similarly, where a controlling block closely held stock is transferred, a
lack of marketability discount may be applied simultaneously with a
control premium. See, e.g., Estate of Desmond v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 1999-76 (1999) (30% lack of marketability discount and 25%
control premium applied to decedent's 81.93% interest in closely held
stock).

Case Law Supporting Minority Interest and Marketability Discounts.
1.

The Northern Trust Company v. Commisioner, 87 T.C. 349 (1986). In
valuing closely-held stock held in trusts of a corporation engaged in
various businesses, the Tax Court discounted the stock value by a 25%
minority position discount and another 20% discount for lack of
marketability. The Tax Court refused to increase the minority position
discount to 35% on the basis of the taxpayers' statistical showing that, on
the average, investors pay a 35% premium for stock representing control
of corporations.

2.

Estate of Campbell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1991-615 (1991). The
Decedent owned one-third of the common stock of a corporation engaged
in raising crops and cattle and making fertilizer. In addition, the

corporation had substantial real estate holdings. The Tax Court applied a
35% marketability discount and a 34% minority interest discount, which
combined to equal a 57% overall discount.
3.

Estate of Berg v. Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1992). A 20%
minority interest and a 10% lack of marketability discount was applied to
the decedent's 26.92% interest in a real estate holding company.

4.

Estate of Lauder v. Commissioner.,T.C. Memo 1994-527 (1994). In
valuing the stock in a family-owned cosmetics company, the Tax Court
applied a 40% discount to reflect lack of liquidity of the stock. In a prior
decision, the Tax Court ignored restrictions contained in a buy-sell
agreement; therefore the Tax Court determined the fair market value of the
stock to be significantly more than the amount paid to the estate and
reported on the estate tax return. Experts testifying on behalf of the estate
suggested discounts ranging up to 90%. However, the court said such
discounts are better suited to investments that pose enormous financial
risks and present no market, public or private, for liquidating the
investment. In contrast, the decedent had enjoyed long-term financial
success and was positioned as an industry leader.

5.

Estate of McCormick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1995-371 (1995). The
Tax Court applied 18% to 32%% minority interest discounts and 20% to
22% lack of marketability discount to general partnership interests in two
general partnerships holding real estate used for ranching and farming
activities. The Court allowed such discounts, notwithstanding the fact that
the general partner, under North Dakota law, could have caused a
dissolution of the partnership.

6.

Estate of Barudin v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 1996-395 (1996). The
Tax Court applied a 19% minority interest discount and a 26% lack of
marketability discount to a 1/48 th limited partnership interest in a limited
partnership holding encumbered rental real estate in Manhattan.

7.

Furman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-157 (1998). The Tax Court
applied a combined 40% discount for lack of marketability and lack of
control to gifts of stock in a Burger King franchisee. The Court also
allowed a 10% key-person discount discussed, infra.

8.

Estate ofBrookshire v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-365 (1998). The
Tax Court applied 40% lack of marketability discount to date-of-death
value of decedent's minority share of closely held family grocery business
stock subject to stock-purchase agreement. The Taxpayer used two
experts. The first expert considered the corporation's increased
competition and decreased income in fiscal year preceding decedent's
death in determining stock's value before discount. The second expert's

discount figure was supported by lack of ready market on which to sell
stock, restrictive buy-sell agreements, lack of transactions involving large
blocks of stock similar in size to decedent's, and fact that decedent's stock
reflected minority interest.

D.

9.

Estate of Marmaduke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-342 (1999).
The Tax Court applied a 30% marketability discount to decedent's 22%
interest in closely-held business. No mention of minority interest discount.

10.

See also, Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35 (2000); Shepherd
v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 30 (2000); Estate of Dunn v. Commissioner
2000 T.C. Memo 2000-12 (2000); Estate of Weinberg v. Commissioner,
2000 T.C. Memo 2000-51 (2000); Estate ofKlauss v. Commissioner,T.C.
Memo. 2000-191 (2000); Janda v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2001-24
(2001); Estate of Jones v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 11 (2001); Wall v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2001-75 (2001); Estate of Paul Mitchell v.
Commisioner, 87 AFTR2d 2001-881 (9h Cir. 2001).

Pulling It All Together - Astleford, TCM 2008-128.
1.

On 8/1/96, Mrs. Astleford formed the Astleford Family Limited
Partnership ("AFLP") to facilitate the continued ownership, development,
and management of various real estate investments and partnership
interests she owned and to facilitate gifts that she intended to make to her
three adult children. On the same day, Mrs. Astleford transferred to AFLP
ownership of an elder care facility. Also on the same day, Mrs. Astleford
gave each of her three children a 30% limited partner interest in AFLP and
retained for herself a 10% general partner interest.

2.

On 12/1/97, Mrs. Astleford made additional capital contributions to AFLP
by transferring to AFLP a 50% interest in Pine Bend Development Co.
("Pine Bend"), a general partnership, and her interest in 14 other real
estate properties. The Pine Bend general partnership agreement did not
contain any provisions relating to the transfers of interests in Pine Bend or
whether such transferred interests would be general partner or assignee
interests. Pine Bend owned 3,000 acres of land of which 1,187 acres
consisted of agricultural farmland ("Rosemount property").

3.

As a result of the additional capital contributions made on 12/1/97, Mrs.
Astleford's general partner interest in AFLP increased significantly, and
her children's respective limited partner interests in AFLP decreased
significantly. However, also on 12/1/97, Mrs. Astleford gave to each of
her three children additional limited partner interests in AFLP. These gifts
had the effect of reducing Mrs. Astleford's AFLP general partner interest
back down to approximately 10% and increasing the children's AFLP
limited partner interests back up to approximately 30% each.

4.

On audit of the 1996 and 1997 gift tax returns, the IRS increased the fair
market value of a number of the properties that were transferred to AFLP
and also decreased the discounts for lack of control and lack of
marketability that were applied to the interests transferred.

5.

There were three issues before the court: first, the value of the Rosemount
property; second, whether the 50% Pine Bend interest should be valued as
a general partner interest or as an assignee interest; and third, the amount
of the discount for lack of control and lack of marketability that should
apply to the gift of the 50% Pine Bend general partner interest and to the
gift of the AFLP limited partner interests.

6.

With respect to the Rosemount property, the valuation expert for Mrs.
Astleford applied an absorption discount based on his opinion that a sale
of the entire Rosemount property would flood the local market for
farmland and would therefore reduce the per-acre price at which the
Rosemount property could be sold. Believing that the Rosemount property
would sell over the course of four years and would appreciate 7% each
year, the expert performed a cash flow analysis using a present value
discount rate of 25%.

7.

The IRS's expert did not apply an absorption discount since he concluded
that the entire Rosemount property likely could be sold in a single year
without an absorption discount based on the fact that in 1970, the 3,000
acres of land (including the Rosemount property) had been purchased by
Pine Bend in a single transaction. The IRS's expert also concluded that
even if an absorption discount was appropriate, the 25% present value
discount rate used by Mrs. Astleford's expert was excessive. The IRS's
expert argued that the present value discount rate should track the 9.2%
rate of return on equity which farmers in the area actually earned.

8.

The court believed that due to the size of the Rosemount property in
relation to the number of acres sold each year in the area, it was unlikely
that all 1,187 acres of the Rosemount property would be sold in a single
year without a price discount. However, the court also believed that the
present value discount rate of 25% used by Mrs. Astleford's expert was
unreasonably high because it relied on statistics relating to developers of
real estate who expect greater returns given the greater risks involved in
development. Since over 75% of the Rosemount property was leased to
farmers, these rental payments would provide a source of future income to
a prospective purchaser. The court found that given this low level of risk,
a 10% rate of return would be sufficient to induce a purchase of the
Rosemount property.

9.

With respect to Pine Bend, the parties disputed the nature of the interest
transferred by Mrs. Astleford to AFLP and therefore the appropriate
amount of the discount for lack of control and lack of marketability that
should apply. Because the other 50% general partner of Pine Bend did not
consent to Mrs. Astleford's transfer of her general partner interest in Pine
Bend to AFLP, Mrs. Astleford's expert treated the 50% Pine Bend interest
transferred to AFLP as an assignee interest and applied a 5% discount.
The position of Mrs. Astleford's expert was based on applicable state law
that provided that a holder of an assignee interest has only a profits
interest but no influence on management.

10.

The court agreed with the IRS that the substance-over-form doctrine
applied to treat the interest in Pine Bend that Mrs. Astleford transferred to
AFLP as a general partner interest. The court based its conclusion on its
finding that since Mrs. Astleford was the sole general partner of AFLP,
she was essentially in the same management position relative to the 50%
Pine Bend interest whether she is to be viewed as having transferred to
AFLP a Pine Bend assignee interest (and thereby retaining Pine Bend
management rights) or as having transferred those management rights to
AFLP as a result of the transfer of a Pine Bend general partner interest (in
which case she reacquired those same management rights as sole general
partner of AFLP). The court also noted that the transfer documents treated
Mrs. Astleford's Pine Bend transfer as a transfer of all of her rights and
interests in Pine Bend, thereby suggesting that a general partner interestnot an assignee interest-was transferred.

11.

Next, the court addressed the amount of the discount for lack of control
and lack of marketability that should apply (1) to the limited partnership
interests in AFLP given to Mrs. Astleford's three children, and (2) to the
50% Pine Bend general partnership interest she transferred to AFLP. In
determining these discounts, Mrs. Astleford's expert relied on data for real
estate limited partnerships ("RELPs") while the IRS's expert relied on data
for real estate investment trusts ("REITs"). The court did not believe that
either the RELP data or the REIT data was superior to the other.
According to the court, RELPs more closely resembled AFLP, and the
RELP secondary market is not so low as to render the available RELP data
unreliable. However, the court also said that that the large number of REIT
sales transactions tended to produce more reliable data compared to the
limited number of RELP sales transactions. In addition, the court stated
that the differences between REITs and AFLP may be minimized given
the large number of REITs from which to choose comparables. But REITs
sometimes trade at prices higher than net asset value. The court recognized
that this fact does not mean that a lack of control discount is nonexistent
but suggests that a REIT's share price is in part affected by two factors,
one positive (the liquidity premium) and one negative (lack of control).
Therefore, in analyzing REIT comparables and their trading prices, the

court found it is appropriate to quantify and then to reverse out of the
trading prices, any liquidity premiums that are associated with REIT
comparability data. The court stated that this calculation results in a REIT
discount for lack of control that can be applied to the partner interests
gifted.
12.

To determine the appropriate liquidity premium to apply to the REIT, the
court examined the difference in average discounts in private placements
of registered and unregistered stock-reasoning that the difference
represents pure liquidity concerns since a public market is available to
owners of registered stock but not to the owners of unregistered stock.
After performing these calculations, the court applied a lack of control
discount of 16.17% for the 1996 gifts and a discount of 17.47% for the
1997 gifts of AFLP by Mrs. Astleford to her children.

13,

With respect to the discount for lack of marketability, the expert for Mrs.
Astleford applied a discount of 15% and the IRS expert applied a discount
of 21.23% for the 1996 gifts. The court, without any discussion, used the
higher discount applied by the IRS expert. For the 1997 gifts, the court
applied a lack of marketability discount of 22%. In valuing the 50% Pine
Bend general partner interest, the IRS's expert concluded that because the
Pine Bend partner interest was simply an asset of AFLP, the discounts he
applied at the AFLP level obviated the need to apply an additional and
separate discount at the Pine Bend level. The court disagreed and held that
a 30% combined discount for lack of control and lack of marketability was
appropriate. In a footnote, the court mentioned that the Tax Court has
rejected multiple discounts in the context of tiered entities where the lower
level interest constituted a significant portion of the parent entity's assets.
However, in this case, the 50% Pine Bend interest constituted less than
16% of the net asset value of AFLP and was only one of 15 real estate
investments that were held by AFLP.

V.

CAPITAL GAIN DISCOUNT
A.

B.

Introduction.
1.

A prospective buyer of shares of stock in a C corporation whose fair
market value is based on the value of its underlying assets rather than its
going concern value, such as a C corporation that owns passive real estate
or marketable securities, will take into consideration in determining what
he or she is willing to pay for the shares the potential capital gains that the
C corporation will recognize when it disposes of assets that have
unrealized appreciation (built-in gains).

2.

Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, it was possible to liquidate the assets
of a C corporation without recognizing gain at the corporate level through
a 12-month tax-free liquidation, under the so-called General Utilities
doctrine.

3.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the General Utilities doctrine, so
that it is no longer possible to exit a C corporation without having the
built-in gains subject to tax at the corporate level.
a.

However, if the C corporation makes an S election and disposes of
the appreciated assets after the election has been in effect for ten
years, the built-in gain tax no longer applies.

b.

In the case of a S corporation that holds passive investments, the S
election may be terminated after three years unless it distributes all
its C corporation earnings and profits before the end of its third S
corporation year.

Case Law before Davis.
I1.

In the cases decided before 1998, taxpayers were unsuccessful in having
the value of an interest in a C corporation reduced because of the potential
capital gains tax on unrealized appreciation.

2.

In most cases, the rationale of the Court was that the liquidation of the
corporation or the disposition of the appreciated assets was speculative
unless there was evidence that the corporation was going to be liquidated
or the assets were going to be sold in the near future. In addition, if the
corporation decided to dispose of its assets, it could do so in a tax-free
liquidation.

3.

After the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in 1986, Courts continued
to deny discounts for potential capital gains tax because the liquidation of
the corporation was not likely to occur in the near future or an S election
could be made.

C.

Davis and EisenbergCases.
In Davis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 35 (1998), the Tax Court, held that,
even though no liquidation of the corporation or the sale of its assets was
planned or contemplated on the date that shares of stock in a closely-held
corporation were gifted, a hypothetical willing seller and a hypothetical
willing buyer would have taken into account the corporation's potential
built-in gains tax.
a.

Over 87% of the corporation's assets consisted of highly
appreciated Winn Dixie stock.

b.

Even the Service's expert agreed that a 15% discount was
appropriate to take into account the built-in capital gains tax.

2.

On August 18, 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
remanded a case that had been decided by the Tax Court before the Davis
decision holding that no discount was appropriate for the built-in capital
gains. Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50 (2 nd Cir. 1999), rev'g T.C.
Memo. 1997-483 (1997).

3.

Finally, in AOD 1999-001, 1999-4 I.R.B, issued February 1, 1999, the
Service acquiesced in the Eisenbergcase and stated:
We acquiesce in this opinion to the extent that it holds there is no
legal prohibition against such a discount. The applicability of such a
discount, as well as its amount, will hereafter be treated as factual
matters to be determined by competent testimony based upon the
circumstance of each case and generally applicable valuation
principles.

D.

Beyond Eisenbergand.Davis.
1.

In Simplot v. Commissioner, 249 F3d. 1191 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'g 112 T.C.
130 (1999), a case involving the appropriate premium to be added to the
voting shares of common stock when the corporate capital structure
included voting and nonvoting common stock, the experts for both the
taxpayer and the government reduced the value of publicly traded stock
the corporation owned in another company by the capital gains tax on the
unrealized appreciation and the estimated expenses the corporation would
have incurred in disposing of the publicly traded stock.

2.

Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner, 267 F.3rd 366 (5' Cir. 2001), vac'g
and rem'g T.C. Memo 1999-43 (1999), was the first case to require the
use of a hypothetical (not specific) buyer for valuation of the built-in
capital gains discount. The Executor filed suit in Tax Court to dispute the
Commissioner's assertion that no built-in capital gains discount was

necessary in valuing the stock left by decedent to his son. The stock was
in a company named Johnco, which had its principal assets in 5,000+
acres of timber property in Louisiana. The appraiser of the estate argued
that a discount of 20-30% was necessary to discount the built-in capital
gains tax in case of liquidation. The Commissioner argued, and the Tax
Court agreed, that the timber property would not be liquidated if sold
because it was far more valuable while in operation. On appeal, the court
held that the Tax Court should have used hypothetical, not actual, buyers
and sellers to determine the fair market value of the property. Using this
basis, the court concluded that a hypothetical purchaser "would have to
take into account the consequences of the unavoidable, substantial built-in
tax liability on the property." Id. at 372. The court did not pinpoint which
percentage would be appropriate for this discount, but remanded the case
to the Tax Court for further review.
3.

Estate of Dunn v. Commn'r, 301 F.3d 339 (2002), was the first case to
require the value of the corporation to be reduced by 100% of the built-in
capital gain taxes, regardless of the corporation's potential liquidation.
The Executor filed suit in the Tax Court to dispute Commissioner's
valuation of decedent's stock in Dunn Equipment, Inc. without a discount
for its built-in tax liability. The appraiser of the estate argued for a
discount of 34% as the actual rate that Dunn Equipment would have
incurred on sale to a hypothetical buyer. The Commissioner argued for no
discount because liquidation not imminent. The Tax Court applied a 5%
discount. On appeal, the estate argued that "like advertising and
transportation costs, commissions, and other unavoidable expenses of
disposition of these assets accepted by the Tax Court, the assets' gross
value must be reduced by their built-in gains tax liability to reach their fair
market value." Id. at 352. The court agreed, lambasting the Tax Court for
its continued reliance on the probability of liquidation in determining the
appropriate built-in capital gains discount. The court unequivocally
stated: "The process of determining the value of the assets or this facet of
the asset-based valuation methodology must start with the basic
assumption that all assets will be sold ... when the starting point is the
assumption of sale, the 'likelihood' is 100%! . . . Bottom Line: The

likelihood of liquidation has no place in either of the two disparate
approaches to valuing this particular operating company." Id. at 353-54.
In conclusion, the court affirmed the estate's 34% discount because a
hypothetical buyer would demand such a reduction for the built-in gains
tax liability of Dunn Equipment. As the Eleventh Circuit said years later,
"An era of valuation certainty had begun." Estate of Jelke v. Commn 'r,
507 F.3d 1317, 1329 (2007).)
4.

Estate of Jelke v. Commn'r, 507 F.3d 1317 (2007) was the first case to
affirm Dunn by requiring the value of the corporation to be reduced by
100% of the built-in capital gain taxes, regardless of the corporation's

potential liquidity. The estate filed a tax return that reduced the value of
his Commercial Chemical Company (CCC) shares by 100% of the built-in
The Commissioner
capital gains tax liability, or dollar-for-dollar.
determined that the estate owed over $2 million for undervaluation. The
Tax Court agreed that the discount was available, but disagreed that it
should be dollar-for-dollar. Rather, it held that the discount should reflect
the fact that CCC would probably not be liquidated for sixteen years. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "the rationale of
the Fifth Circuit in the Estate of Dunn eliminates the crystal ball and the
coin flip and provides certainty and finality to valuation as best it can,
already a vague and shadowy undertaking. It is a welcome road map for
those in the judiciary, not formally trained in the art of valuation ...this
100% approach settles the issue as a matter of law, and provides certainty
that is typically missing in the valuation arena." Id. at 1332-33. Although
the court did not provide an exact amount for the discount percentage to
be followed in the future, it states in a footnote: "Given the maximum
capital gains tax rate at this writing of 15 for future cases, one can only
speculate that the maximum capital gains tax rate will not again approach
the 34 range seen in previous cases." Id. at n.45.
E.

VI.

Code § 754 Discounts?: The Partnership Analogy to the Capital Gain Discount.
I1.

Under general principles of partnership law, a partner's outside basis is
stepped up in connection with a taxable sale or at death, but the partner's
inside basis in partnership assets is not stepped up unless the partnership
(and not the partner) makes an election, under Code § 754, to step the
inside basis of the assets under Code § 734 and 743.

2.

In Jones v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 11 (2001), the Tax Court considered
and rejected the taxpayer's argument that a discount should be applied to
the partnership interests being valued. The Tax Court did not allow a
Code § 754 discount because the court found that, a seller/purchaser of the
interest (a 83.09% limited partnership interest) would, in all likelihood be
able to prevail upon the general partner to make the election.

OTHER DISCOUNTS - BLOCKAGE, SECURITIES LAWS, AND KEY PERSON.
A.

Blockage or Market Absorption Discount.
1.

When valuing publicly traded securities, reference is typically made to the
market price at the time of valuation. When a large block of property is
being valued, the proper approach is to value the block as a whole as if all
the items were offered for sale at the moment of transfer, and not on an
item-by-item basis. The law of supply and demand supports the
application of a blockage discount where the sale of an exceptionally large
block of one type of property may generate less proceeds than if the seller

were to sell each piece of that block separately at the market price. The
market may only handle so many pieces of one type of property in a
limited time, and, when the tendered number of a single type of property is
greater than the number that the market can absorb, the market is unable to
handle the exceptionally large block at that time. Thus, a seller desiring to
sell such a large block at that time may be forced to sell the block at a
price per piece that is less than the quoted price for each piece.
2.

Blockage discounts are specifically addressed under Treas. Reg. §§
20.2031-2(e) and 25.2512-2(e); however, the regulations suggest a very
limited role for blockage discounts by stating that they are only available
in "certain exceptional cases." The case law is substantially more liberal
and accepts blockage discounts where the taxpayer adequately
demonstrates the appropriateness of the discount. See, e.g., Helvering v.
Maytag, 125 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942);
Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1941); Richardsonv. Commissioner,
151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946);
Havemeyer v. US., 59 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. Cl. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
759 (1945); Standish v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1204 (1947), acq., 1947-2
C.B. 4; Rushton v. Commissioner,498 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974); Estate of
Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), affd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Robinson v. Commissioner, 50
T.C.M. 89 (1985); Gillespie v. U.S., 23 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1994).

3.

Most recently, in Estate of Foote v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-37
(1999) the Tax Court applied a 3.3% discount applied to a 2.2% block of
Applied Power, Inc., a publicly traded stock.

4.

A "blockage" discount is typically used to describe the discount applied to
the sale of a large block of stock, whereas a "market absorption discount"
is typically used to refer to the sale of other types of property. For
example, market absorption discounts have been applied to artistic and
literary items including the following:
a.

Calderv. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713 (1985) (market absorption
discount applied to gifts of a large number of works of art created
by one artist);

b.

Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.650 (1972) (market
absorption discount applied to 425 works of art created by and kept
in sculptor's collection), affd. on other grounds 510 F.2d 479 (2d
Cir. 1975);

c.

Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-2 10
(market absorption discount applied to approximately 400 works or
groups of works of art);

5.

d.

Rimmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-215 (market
absorption discount applied to charitable contribution of collection
of sheet music containing approximately 85,000 pieces);

e.

Jarrev. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 183 (1975) (market absorption
discount applied to charitable contribution of large collection of
original music manuscripts and other related material);

f.

Skripak v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285 (1985) (market absorption
discount applied to charitable contribution of large collection of
books);

g.

Epping v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-279 (market
absorption discount applied to charitable gift of mainly animal
mounts); and

h.

Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-515 (market
absorption discount applied to donation of animal trophies), affd.
withoutpublished opinion 983 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1993).

Market absorption discounts have also been applied to real estate,
including the following cases:
a.

Estate ofSturgis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-415 (20%
market absorption discount applied to 11,298.86 acres of
undeveloped land);

b.

Carrv. Commissioner,T.C. Memo. 1985-19 (30% market
absorption discount applied to 175 developed lots; no discount
applied to 437.5 undeveloped lots);

c.

Estate of Folks v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo. 1982-43 (20%
market absorption discount applied to five leased lumberyards with
the same tenant and in the same geographical area);

d.

Estate of Grootemaat v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-49 (15%
market absorption discount applied to undeveloped lots totaling
302 acres);

e.

Estate ofAuker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-185 (1998)
(6.189% market absorption discount applied to apartment
complexes); and

f.

Estate ofBrocato v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-424 (1999)
(In addition to 20% fractional interest discount, 11% blockage

discount awarded for 7 of 9 multiple tenant dwellings in San
Francisco's Marina District).
B.

Securities Laws Discount.
I1.

The Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the sale of any securities which are
not registered, unless a specific exemption applies. In general, any security
which has not been registered is referred to as a restricted security.
Pursuant to Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Rule 144(a)(3),
securities are considered restricted if they are acquired from: (1) an issuer
or an affiliate of the issuer in a non-public transaction; (2) an issuer in an
offering exempted from registration pursuant to Rule 505 (certain
offerings not exceeding $5 million), Rule 506 (certain offerings permitted
without regard to dollar amount offered), Rule 701 (certain issuances in
connection with employee compensation plans), or Rule 1001 (certain
offerings of up to $5 million that are exempt under §25102(n) of the
California Corporations Code); or (3) an affiliate or a non-affiliate in a
transaction qualifying for exemption from registration under Rule 144A
(certain sales of restricted securities to qualified institutional buyers).

2.

Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319. The Service addressed the proper
valuation of securities restricted from immediate resale under the federal
securities laws. In determining the appropriate amount of discount, the
difference between the fair market value of registered, actively traded
common stock and stock of the same class which cannot be publicly
traded should be measured. The Service concluded that, while no
automatic formula can be used to determine discounts for restricted
securities, such discounts are generally: (1) related to the size of the
issuing corporation measured by its sales (companies with the lowest
dollar amount of sales get the highest discounts); (2) the size and pattern
of its earnings; (3) a function of the trading market for the equivalent
actively traded stock (discounts on the "over the counter" (OTC) market
were the greatest followed by the American Stock Exchange (ASE), while
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) discounts were the least); and (4)
a function of the resale agreement provisions affecting the restricted
security (e.g., an option to require registration at the seller's expense,
"piggyback" registration rights). The Ruling also clearly states that the
costs of registering the shares, but not the costs of underwriting, may be
included in valuing the discount.

3.

The Tax Court has largely adopted the approach found in Rev. Rul. 77287. See, e.g., Estate of Little v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1982-26
(1982) (Combined 60% discount was allowed by the court for the total of
the securities law restrictions, restrictions placed on the stock by virtue of
a voting proxy and escrow agreement, and blockage discounts); Estate of
Brownell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1982-632 (1982) (33% discount

applied to shares that could only be sold through a private placement);
Estate of Stratton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1982-744 (1982) (a large
block of was permitted a 25% discount to reflect the price it would bring
in a private placement); Estate of Sullivan v. Commissioner T.C. Memo
1983-185, (1983) (14.6% of the outstanding stock of Eckerd Drugs was
discounted by 15% to reflect the price it would bring in a private
placement); Estate of Gilfordv. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38 (1987)
(decedent's block was sold in a private placement six months after the
decedent's death as part of a merger; nevertheless, the court allowed a 33%
discount for the Rule 144 restriction which burdened the stock);
4.

C.

Estate ofMeClatchy v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 1089 (1998), rev 'g 106
T.C. 206 (1996). The decedent owned unregistered stock that was subject
to restrictions under Rule 144. Although the decedent was an affiliate of
the corporation for securities law purposes, his estate and his personal
representatives were not collectively an affiliate of the corporation,
causing the stock to be released from the Rule 144 restrictions at his death.
Nevertheless, the estate discounted the value of the stock on the estate tax
return, arguing that the reportable value of the stock was its value in the
decedent's hands at his death.
a.

The Tax Court, however, concluded that the stock must be valued
at the moment of death, taking into account any change in
valuation that occurred as a result of death. Since the decedent's
death removed the restrictions, the court found that the stock must
be valued without consideration of them.

b.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, finding that
the value of the stock in the hands of the decedent was controlling.
The Ninth Circuit held that the estate tax is imposed on the value
of property passing at death; therefore, the removal of the
restrictions was caused not by the decedent's death, but by the
receipt of the property by his personal representative, who was not
an affiliate for purposes of Rule 144. The court also concluded that
the value of the stock should not depend upon the identity of the
recipient, in this case the decedent's estate.

Key Person Discount.
1.

Where a corporation is substantially dependent upon the services of one
person, and where that person would no longer be able to perform services
for the corporation by reason of death or incapacity, an investor would
expect some form of discount below fair market value when purchasing
stock in the corporation to compensate for the loss of that key employee.

2.

Rev. Rul. 59-60 explains that in valuing the stock of a closely held

business, the loss of a key person may have a depressing effect upon the
value of such business. The ruling also states that the loss of the key
person and the absence of management succession potentialities should be
taken into consideration in analyzing the future expectancy of the
business. However, the ruling further explains that consideration must be
given to whether the business is of a type that will not be impaired by the
absence of the individual and whether the loss to the business is either
adequately covered by life insurance or mitigated by the ability to employ
competent management for the same consideration that was paid to the
decedent.

VII.

3.

The Tax Court has rejected the Service's assertion that the loss of a key
person can be offset by life insurance proceeds and other factors. In Estate
of Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1989-13 (1989), the court
rejected the Service's assertion that no adjustment was necessary merely
because the business held a life insurance policy on the key person's life.
In the court's opinion, this understated the importance of the key person.

4.

In Estate of Feldmarv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-429 (1988), the
Court rejected the Service's assertion that no key person discount should
be applied because the loss of the decedent's services were more than
compensated by insurance, on the basis that insurance proceeds are more
in the nature of a non-operating asset and thus would not enter into a going
concern valuation. The Feldmar court held that an investor would expect a
35% discount for the loss of a key employee "because (the business)
suffered a serious loss when (the) decedent took to his grave his
considerable expertise." The Court reduced the discount to 25% to account
for the possibility of the business finding a new leader to replace the
decedent.

5.

Other cases involving the application of a key person discount include:
Estate of Huntsman v. Commissioner,66 T.C. 861 (1976); Estate of
Mitchell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-461 (1997); Estate of Yeager
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-448; Furman v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 1998-157 (1998).

SWING-VOTE PREMIUM, VOTING PREMIUM, AND CONTROL PREMIUM
A.

Swing Vote Premium
1.

A swing vote premium may be applied in cases where, as a result of the
ownership percentages of other shareholders, the holder of the subject
shares is able to combine his voting power with another shareholder and
effectively control the corporation. A swing vote premium has not been
addressed in the context of limited partnerships, but it is likely that the

analysis applicable to voting shares of a corporation will be equally
applicable to general partner interests in limited partnerships.
2.

3.

4.

B.

One of the first cases to address the issue of a swing vote premium in the
context of a corporation was Estate of Winkler v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 1989-231 (1989). In Winkler, the Tax Court found that a 10%
block of voting stock had special characteristics that enhanced its value
when 40% of the stock was owned by the transferor's family and 50% by
members of another family. The 10% block of stock was subject to a 10%
premium instead of a minority interest discount as argued by the estate.
In Tech. Adv. Mem. 9436005, the Service ruled that a swing vote
premium should be applied to gifts of 30% interests in a corporation to the
children of the donor. The Service reasoned that the block of stock
enabled the transferee to join with another related owner of an interest in
the entity to form a majority interest.
The application of the swing vote concept has been broadly criticized for
two reasons.
a.

First, pursuant to the willing buyer-willing seller concept, it is
difficult to conceive that an arms-length buyer without any
prearranged agreement, would attach additional value to a minority
interest.

b.

Secondly, the use of this concept totally ignores the concept of the
transfer tax that valuation applies to what is being transferred, not
the speculative value of what is created following the event of
transfer.

Voting Premium - Estate of Simplot, 112 T.C. 13 (1999), reversed, 249 F3d.
1191, 2001 (9' Cir.)
I1.

The corporation had two classes of stock: Class A voting (of which there
were 76.445 shares outstanding) and Class B nonvoting (of which there
were 141,288.584 shares outstanding). The decedent and two of his
siblings each owned 18 shares (or 23.55%) of voting stock each, and a
fourth sibling owned the remaining 22.445 shares. If a Class A voting
shareholder wanted to sell his Class A voting stock, the stock first had to
be offered to the corporation for a period of 180 days, and then (if the
corporation declined to exercise its right to purchase the stock) to the other
Class A voting shareholders for an additional 180 days.

2.

The Tax Court valued a decedent's voting stock of a closely held
corporation by adding, to each voting share's pro rata share of the equity
value of the corporation, a voting rights premium expressed as 3% of the

corporation's total equity value (including both voting and nonvoting
stock). In so holding, the court rejected the estate's argument that the
premium, if any, to be accorded to the voting rights should be expressed in
terms of a percentage of the nonvoting stock only. The Tax Court said that
the Class A shares, on a per-share basis, were far more valuable than the
Class B shares because of the former's inherent potential for influence and
control of the corporation. Through ownership of the decedent's voting
shares, a hypothetical buyer would gain access to the "inner circle" of the
corporation, and, by having a seat at the Class A shareholders' table, over
time, the hypothetical buyer potentially could position itself to play a role
in the corporation. The court agreed with IRS's expert that, on the
valuation date, a hypothetical buyer would consider the likelihood that one
day the decedent's block of voting shares potentially could become the
largest block of voting shares because the record revealed that the
decedent's siblings intended, upon their deaths, to pass their Class A
shares to their children, and thereafter no shareholder (other than the
hypothetical buyer) would own 18 shares of voting stock. Moreover, it
was foreseeable on the valuation date that, after the deaths of the
decedent's siblings, younger generation family members would be more
likely to sell their voting shares to outsiders than their parents would. At
that time, the hypothetical buyer would benefit from the right of first
refusal restriction on the voting stock.
3.

The Tax Court also noted that the corporation had an extreme ratio of
nonvoting to voting shares: 1,848.24 to one. The court agreed with IRS's
expert that the disparate ratio of nonvoting to voting stock in this case was
particularly important because it dramatically increased, on a per-share
basis, the value of the Class A shares.

4.

The Tax Court stressed that it was not valuing a premium for controlling
voting power, but rather a premium for voting rights. The court said that
the premium for controlling voting power would be substantially greater
than the premium it determined for voting rights.

5.

The Ninth Circuit reversed.
a.

The Ninth Circuit believed that the Tax Court departed from the
hypothetical willing buyer standard because the Tax Court
believed that "the hypothetical sale should not be constructed in a
vacuum isolated from the actual facts that affect value." The Ninth
Circuit believed the Tax Court relied on "imagined facts" and said,
"In violation of the law the Tax Court constructed particular
possible purchasers."

b.

The Ninth Circuit also determined that the Tax Court's premium
calculation was incorrect. The Tax Court calculated the premium

that all the Class A shares as a block would command and then
divided this premium by the number of Class A shares. The Ninth
Circuit said, "... the Tax Court valued an asset not before it -- all
the Class A stock representing complete control. There was no
basis for supposing that whatever value attached to complete
control a proportionate share of that value attached to each fraction
of the whole ....
"

C.

c.

The final error was that even a controlling block of stock is should
not be valued at a premium for estate tax purposes, unless the IRS
can show that a purchaser would be able to use the control in a
manner that assured an increased economic advantage worth
paying a premium for. The Ninth Circuit noted, "No seat at the
table was assured by this minority interest; it could not elect a
director. The Commissioner points out that Class A shareholders
had formed businesses that did business with Simplot. If these
businesses enjoyed special advantages, the Class A shareholders
would have been liable for breach of their fiduciary duty to the
Class B shareholders."

d.

The Ninth Circuit said that much of the IRS' argument was devoted
to speculation as to what might happen after the valuation date,
noting, "Speculation is easy but not a proper way to value the
transfer at the time of the decedent's death. [citation omitted]. In
Richard Simplot's hands at the time of transfer his stock was worth
what a willing buyer would have paid for the economic benefits
presently attached to the stock. By this standard, a minority
holding Class A share was worth no more than a Class B share."

Control Premium.
1.

If shares of a block of stock constitute actual voting control of the
corporation, those shares may possess an additional measure of value
because the shares in the block control the corporation. "Control means
that, because of the interest owned, the shareholder can unilaterally direct
corporate action, select management, decide the amount of distribution,
rearrange the corporation's capital structure, and decide whether to
liquidate, merge, or sell assets." See, Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner,
94 T.C. 193, 251-52 (1990), nonacq., 1991-1 C.B. 1. As such, determining
the fair market value of a controlling interest may require adjustment to
reflect a "control premium."

2.

The gift and estate tax regulations maintain, in both the publicly traded
and closely held contexts, that the degree of control represented by a block
of stock is relevant to valuation. Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2031-2(e) and (f) and
25.2512-2(e) and (f). Rev. Rul. 59-60 states that states that "[t]he size of

the block of stock itself is a relevant factor to be considered. Although it is
true that a minority interest in an unlisted corporation's stock is more
difficult to sell than a similar block of listed stock, it is equally true that
control of a corporation, either actual or in effect, representing as it does
an added element of value, may justify a higher value for a specific block
of stock."
3.

4.

Case Law Involving the Application of a Control Premium to More Than a
50% Interest.
a.

Estate ofSalsbury v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1975-333 (1975).
The Tax Court applied a 38.1% premium for control in valuing a
52% voting interest in a family corporation engaged in
manufacturing animal health products. This percentage was based
on an expert witness's research of premiums paid in mergers and
acquisitions in the valuation year.

b.

Estate of Desmond v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-76 (1999)
The Tax Court applied a 25% control premium applied to
decedent's 81.93% interest in closely held corporation.

c.

Estate of Feldmar v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1988-429 (1988).
The Court concluded that investors would be willing to pay a 15%
premium for a controlling block of shares. However, the court also
correctly concluded that the control premium should be offset by a
discount for loss of a key person.

d.

Oman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1987-71 (1987). The Court
determined that a control premium of 20% should be applied when
valuing a 75% interest in a closely held corporation because a
purchaser would have been able to liquidate the company and
control the management and policies of the company.

e.

Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860 (1978). The court
determined that a control premium was not appropriate in valuing a
block of 80% of the outstanding stock that was held by the
decedent and her husband as community property. The court based
its conclusion on its opinion that the State of Washington, where
the decedent was domiciled, followed the "item theory" of
community property, which provides that each spouse has an
undivided interest in each community asset as opposed to an
undivided interest in the community property as a whole, which is
the case in an aggregate theory state.

Case Law Involving a 50% Interest.

5.

a.

Wheeler v. United States, (1995, DC TX) 77 AFTR 2d 96-1405,
rev'd on other issue (1997, CA5) 80 AFTR 2d 97-5075, 97-2
USTC. A federal district court allowed a 10% minority discount
for a decedent's shares of voting stock in a closely held
corporation. The Each of the sons had owned 25% of the voting
stock and 50% of the non-voting stock. Although a minority
interest is generally thought of as being less than 50%, the minority
discount for tax purposes is given based on lack of control. A
shareholder with 50% of the stock can block action by other
shareholders but does not have a sufficient interest to control
corporate affairs. Where indications of value are based upon
control or complete ownership, a discount must be applied to
provide indications of value for a minority or less-than-controlling
interest.

b.

Obermer v. UnitedStates, 238 F. Supp. 29 (HI 1964). The value of
a husband's 50% share interest in a corporation owned 50-50 by
him and his wife was discounted 331/3 % partly because his 50%
interest couldn't force liquidation of the corporation.

Case Law Involving Less Than a 50% Interest.
a.

Estate of Schneider-Paasv. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 1969-21
(1969). The Tax Court applied a control premium where a 39%
ownership in a German close corporation, under the charter and
bylaws, assured the owner of at least the vice-chairmanship.

b.

In Estate ofNewhouse v. Commissioner,94 T.C. 193, 251-52
(1990), nonacq., 1991-1 C.B. I., the decedent's ownership interest
was less than 50%. The Tax Court held that a control premium was
not supportable even though the decedent owned the largest block
of stock (44.44%). The decedent did not have effective control
because he could not accomplish any of the following: unilaterally
direct corporate action; select management; decide the amount of
distributions; rearrange the corporation's capital structure; or
decide whether to liquidate, merge, or sell assets.

c.

Estate of Wright v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-53 (1997).
The Tax Court rejected the Service's argument that a control
premium should be where the decedent owned 23.8% of the
outstanding stock of a closely held corporation, with 9.4% being
the most shares owned by any other shareholder. The Service
argued that a control premium was justified, because the decedent's
block of stock could control one member of the board of directors
and thereby "substantially influence" corporate action and cause
the sale of the corporation's assets. But the Tax Court, relying on

its decision in Newhouse, said that more than "substantial
influence" is required before a control premium may be applied.
The Court also noted that IRS, in treating the decedent's holding as
part of a hypothetical 51% controlling interest, had effectively
ignored the requirement in the corporation's articles of
incorporation of a 66-2/3 % super majority for decisions regarding
the merger, consolidation, dissolution, or sale of all or substantially
all of the corporation's assets.
VIII.

VALUATION DISCOUNT PLANNING OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS.
A.

Valuation for Gift Tax Purposes v. Valuation for Estate Tax Purposes.
I1.

Although the estate tax and the gift tax are generally construed in pari
materia,there are some material differences in the administration of the
two taxes.
a.

The estate tax is an excise tax on the aggregation of all of the
assets in the decedent's estate.

b.

By contrast, the gift tax is imposed on the property passing from
the donor to each donee; it is the value of that property passing
from the donor to the donee that is the basis for measuring the tax.
Thus, where a donor makes simultaneous gifts of property to
multiple donees, the gift tax is imposed on the value of each
separate gift.

c.

Accordingly, the value of property that is the subject of multiple
simultaneous gifts may be different from the value of that same
property if that property were included in the donor's gross estate
at his death.

d.

For example, X owns 100% of the stock of ABC Corp. X wants to
transfer 25% of the stock to each of his four children. If X gifts the
stock to each of his children, each 25% block of stock should be
entitled to a minority interest discount and possibly a lack of
marketability discount. If X bequeaths 25% of his stock to each of
his four children, X is treated as owning 100% of the stock and no
valuation discounts are available.

e.

There is ample case law supporting this principle. See, e.g.,
Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 93 (5th Cir. 1974), affg. 60
T.C. 272 (1973); Calderv. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713, 720- 721
(1985); Standish v. Commissioner,8 T.C. 1204, 1209 (1947);
Clause v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 647, 649-650 (1945), affd. per
curiam 154 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1946); Avery v. Commissioner, 3

T.C. 963 (1944); Phipps v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 1010 (1941),
affd. 127 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1942); Adair v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1987- 494 (1987); and Hipp v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1983-746 (1983).
2.

The Sliver Gift Cases - Murphy and Frank.
a.

Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1990-472 (1990).
For many years, the decedent owned and controlled (through a
general power of appointment) 51.41% of the stock of a closely
held corporation. Eighteen days before her death, the decedent
transferred shares representing 0.88% of the stock to each of her
children. After her death, the remaining 49.65% of the stock was
distributed to her children. The Tax Court denied a minority
discount because the decedent had transferred shares shortly before
her death in order to reduce her interest below 50%. The Tax Court
found that the decedent had a controlling interest in the corporation
and that the pre-death transfer lacked substance because there was
a clear understanding between the decedent and her children to
maintain family control of the business. The Tax Court observed:
The rationale for allowing a minority discount does not
apply because decedent and her children continuously
exercised control powers. For example, decedent remained
as chairman of the board after the transfer of stock to her
children. A minority discount should not be applied if the
explicit purpose and effect of fragmenting the control block
of stock was solely to reduce Federal tax.

b.

Estate of Frankv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1995-132 (1995).
Anthony Frank owned 50.3% of the stock of Magton, Inc. a closely
held corporation in the hotel business in New Jersey. His wife,
Margaret owned 13.57% of the stock. Two days before Anthony's
death, his son, Anthony, Jr., acting pursuant to a power of attorney,
gifted 18.16% of the stock owned by Anthony to Margaret.
Margaret died 15 days after Anthony. At the time of their
respective deaths, Anthony owned 32.14% of Magton and
Margaret owned 31.73% of the stock of Magton.
i.

The Tax Court held that the transfers of stock were valid
transfers and each of decedents died possessed of only a
minority interest in Magton. The Court then applied
successive 30% lack of marketability and 20% minority
interest discounts, thereby discounting the collective
64.87% block of stock owned by Anthony and Margaret by
45%.

ii.

In a twist on the adage "Pigs get fat and hogs get
slaughtered", the Court observed that "[i]f tax avoidance
was the sole motive, a substantially smaller number of
shares could have been transferred. We find it unnecessary
to decide this dispute over the motive for the transfer...
As a general rule, we will respect the form of a transaction.
We will not apply substance over form principles unless the
circumstances so warrant." The "pigs" in Murphy did not
fare nearly as well as the "hogs" in Frank

Query whether Rev. Rul. 93-12, which was promulgated in
the interim made a difference? In that Ruling, the donor
owned all of the single outstanding class of stock in a
corporation and transferred all of the shares by making
simultaneous gifts of 20% of the shares to each of the
donor's five children. The ruling holds that the shares of
other family members will not be aggregated with the
transferred shares to determine whether the transferred
shares should be valued as part of a controlling interest.
See also, Estate of Cidulka v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1996-149
iii.

c.

(1996).
3.

Gifts and Swing Vote Premium.
a.

Tech. Adv. Mem. 9449001. The donor owned 100% of the X
Corporation stock.. The corporation had only one class of common
stock outstanding. The donor subsequently transferred all of the
stock in the corporation by making equal gifts of the stock to each
of his 11 children. After the transfer, the corporation stock was
owned by 11 individual shareholders, each of whom owned less
than 10% of the outstanding stock. The Service concluded:
Whether the donor owns 100% of the corporation or owns a
lesser controlling interest prior to the transfer, and whether
the donees are family members or various third parties, are
not determining factors in valuing a block of stock
transferred to a donee or in deciding whether a separate gift
is subject to a minority interest discount. The percentage of
control represented by the block transferred to the donee
(includingpotentialswing-vote value) as well as other
financial data and factors effecting the fair market value of
the transferred stock must be included in the valuation for
gift tax purposes. (Emphasis supplied).

b.

4.

5.

See also, Tech. Adv. Mem. 9436005 and the discussion, supra,
regarding the application of a swing vote premium.

Gifts and the Effect on Blockage Discounts.
a.

Tech. Adv. Mem. 9719001. The donor created three trusts for the
benefit of his children. Each trust was further subdivided into three
more trusts. Therefore a total of nine trusts were in existence. The
donor contributed a block of stock in a publicly traded company to
the trusts. The donor argued that this was a gift of one block of
stock, or in the worst case, a gift of 3 smaller blocks of stock. The
Service ruled that, although the trusts could have been structured
so that there was a total of only three separate gifts, one trust for
the benefit of each grandchild, the donor chose the form of
transfer, thereby creating nine separate trusts and nine separate
gifts. Consistent with the form chosen, the donor reported nine
separate gifts on the gift tax return. The Service concluded that, for
purposes of applying the blockage discount in valuing the gifts, the
transfers by the donor will be treated as nine separate gifts, each
consisting of 1/9th of the block of stock. Each separate 1/9 th gift of
shares is considered separately as to its effect on the market to
determine whether any discount is applicable.

b.

Treas. Reg § 25.2512-2(e) provides that, if several gifts of blocks
of the same stock are made to different donees on the same day,
the blockage discount rule must be applied separately to each
block, and not to the total of shares given away that day. Thus, the
blockage discount rule is applied separately to each block, and not
to the total of shares given away that day. The Service ruled that
gifts to an individual, and to a trust for that individual, may be
aggregated in applying the blockage discount rule. See, Priv. Let.
Rul. 8049015.

Estate of Bosca v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-251 (1998). The
decedent owned 50% of the voting stock of a closely held corporation.
The decedent's two sons each owned 25% of the voting stock and 50% of
the non-voting stock. The corporation's capital structure was recapitalized
and the father exchanged his 50% voting stock for non-voting stock. As a
result of the recapitalization, the two sons owned 100% of the voting
stock. The Tax Court held that the father's exchange of the voting stock
for non-voting stock was a "deemed" gift of the difference in value
between the voting stock transferred to the corporation and the non-voting
stock received. The silver lining to the dark cloud of Bosca is that the Tax
Court correctly ruled that the "deemed" gift should be valued as two
separate 25% gifts, as opposed to a gift of a 50% block.

B.

Valuation for Inclusion Purposes v. Valuation for Deduction Purposes.
1.

Assets are valued for estate tax inclusion purposes based upon the value of
the assets included in the decedent's estate. Assets are valued for estate
tax deductiblity purposes based upon the value of the property interest
passing in a manner that qualifies for the estate tax marital or charitable
deduction. The often cited example of this principle is the decedent who
owns 100% of the stock of a closely held business worth $10,000,000. The
decedent leaves 50% of her estate to her husband in a manner that
qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction under Code § 2056 and 50%
of her estate to a charity which qualifies for the estate tax charitable
deduction under Code § 2055. The stock is included in the decedent's
estate at $10,000,000; however, for estate tax deduction purposes, each
50% interest may be discounted for lack of marketability and lack of
control. Assuming a combined 35% discount, the value of the marital
deduction is determined as follows: (50% x $10,000,000) x (1 - 35%)
$3,250,000; the charitable deduction is determined similarly. Therefore,
with a gross estate of $10,000,000 and combined estate tax marital and
charitable deductions of $6,500,000 ($3,250,000 + $3,250,000), there is a
taxable estate of $3,500,000. See, Pennell, "Valuation Discord: An
Exegesis of Wealth Transfer Tax Valuation Theory and Practice", 1996 U.
Miami Philip E. HeckerlingInst. Est. Planning§ 9.02.

2.

Ahmanson Foundationv. United States, 706 F.2d 1424 (7t Cir. 1983).
The decedent owned 100% of the stock of a holding company with I
voting shares and 99 non-voting shares. The decedent left the 1 voting
share to his son and the 99 non-voting shares to a charity. The Court
refused to value the voting and non-voting stock separately in the gross
estate. The Court found that 100% of the stock should be valued for
inclusion purposes, and then a 3% reduction should be applied to the value
of the non-voting shares passing to charity. The reduction in the value of
the assets passing to charity had the effect of reducing the charitable
deduction and increasing the taxable estate.

3.

Chenoweth v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1577 (1987). The decedent owned
100% of the stock of a closely held corporation. The decedent specifically
bequeathed 51% of the stock to his wife, with the balance passing to his
daughter from a prior marriage. The decedent's estate claimed a 38.1%
control premium applied to the 51% block of stock, which under Florida
law, gave the surviving spouse complete control over the corporation.
a.

The Court was persuaded by the reasoning in Ahmanson and
concluded that a control premium should be applied to the value of
the 51% block of stock passing to Mrs. Chenoweth.

b.

Interestingly the court noted the following:

While we would tend to agree that the sum of the parts
cannot equal more than the whole -- that is, that the
majority block together with the control premium, when
added to the minority block of the company's stock with an
appropriate discount for minority interest, should not equal
more than the total 100% interest of the decedent, as
reported for purposes of section 2031 -- it might well turn
out that the sum of the parts can equal less than the whole - that is, that the control premium which is added to the
majority block passing to decedent's surviving spouse
might be less than the proper minority discount to be
attributed to the shares passing to decedent's daughter.
4.

Tech. Adv. Mem. 9005004. This Ruling is essentially the reverse of
Chenoweth. In this case, the decedent left 49% in trust for his wife and
51% in trust for his son. The Service ruled that the value of the interest
passing to the marital trust should be valued as a separate interest in
property and could, therefore, be subject to a minority interest discount.
This will have the effect of reducing the marital deduction and increasing
the value of the taxable estate.

5.

Tech. Adv. Mem. 9403005. At the time of his death, the decedent owned a
block of 400 preferred shares in a closely held corporation and a block of
37,728 common shares. Together, the two blocks of stock represented
control of the corporation; separately they represented non-controlling
interests. The decedent left the preferred stock to his wife and the common
to his children. The Service ruled that "[i]f, as in the present case, a
minority interest block of stock passes to the surviving spouse, a marital
deduction may be taken for only for the value of the block as such.
However, in accordance with the holdings in the Ahmanson and
Chenoweth cases, the value of the same property for purposes of inclusion
in the gross estate under Code § 2031 may be different if the decedent, at
the time of death, possessed a controlling interest block of stock.

6.

Estate ofDiSanto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-421 (1999). The
decedent owned a controlling interest in a closely held corporation that he
left to his wife. His wife disclaimed her right to inherit a certain amount of
the stock, the result being that the only asset in the decedent's residuary
estate that the wife could inherit was a minority interest in the stock. The
Tax Court, relying on Chenoweth, held that the estate must compute the
value of the marital deduction based on the minority interest the spouse
was entitled to receive after she executed the disclaimer, not based on the
value of the controlling interest he willed to her.

7.

C.

Schwan v. Commisioner,T.C. Memo 2001-174. Alfred Schwan, founder
of a frozen food company, left 2/3rds of the voting and non-voting stock to
a private foundation. The shares were subject to a redemption agreement
with the Company. The Tax Court held, at a summary judgment hearing,
that while the interests may be aggregated for inclusion purposes, for
deduction purposes, the interests may be valued separately. Consequently,
there may be a mismatch between valuation for inclusion and deduction
purposes and additional tax may be due.

Aggregation of Interests.
1.

In some cases, property may be included in the gross estate under separate
estate inclusion provisions. For example, a decedent may own 30% of the
stock of a closely held business in a revocable trust and 30% of the stock
outright. The stock held in the decedent's revocable trust is includible in
her estate under Code § 2038. The 30% interest owned outright is
includible in her estate under Code § 2033. The question that arises is
whether the two interests, includible under two separate provisions of the
Code, should be valued separately or aggregated for valuation purposes.
If the two 30% blocks of stock are valued separately, a minority interest
discount way be warranted. If the two 30% blocks of stock are aggregated
to form a 60% block, a control premium may be warranted.

2.

The aggregation of interests theory is typically applied in the estate tax
context. Nevertheless, practitioners should be cognizant of its application
when planning gifts to family members and structuring the ownership of
assets during lifetime.

3.

Aggregation of Non-QTIP Property.
a.

In Rev. Rul. 79-7, 1979-1 C.B. 294, the Service ruled that (i) a
30% stock interest transferred by the decedent within three years of
death (includible in the gross estate under the former provisions of
Code § 2035) and (ii) a 30% stock interest owned by the decedent
at the time of his death (includible in the gross estate under Code §
2033) should be aggregated for valuation purposes, thereby
disallowing a minority interest discount.

b.

In Tech. Adv. Mem. 8330004, the Service ruled that the decedent
was granted a general power of appointment in a trust when he was
granted the option to purchase the stock from the trust on extremely
favorable terms. The Service, relying on Rev. Rul. 79-7, also ruled
that the stock includible in his estate under Code § 2041(a)(2) must
be aggregated with the stock of the same corporation includible in his
estate under Code § 2033 in determining its fair market value.

c.

4.

In Tech. Adv. Mem. 9403002, the Service ruled that (i) a block of
stock held in the decedent's revocable trust and includible in his gross
estate under Code § 2038 and (ii) a block of stock owned by the
decedent outright and includible in his gross estate under Code §
2033 should be aggregated for valuation purposes. See, also, Estate
of Babbitt v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1270 (1986).

Aggregation of QTIP Property and Other Property.
a.

Estate of Bonner v. Commissioner, 84 F.3d 196 (5' Cir. 1996).
The decedent died owning fractional shares in several pieces of
real property with the remaining ownership interests being held in
a QTIP trust established by his wife at her death. The executor of
the decedent's estate applied a 45% discount in valuing the
separate fractional interests. The Commissioner argued that the
fractional interests in the real property should be aggregated for
valuation purposes. The Fifth Circuit, relying on its prior holding
in Estate of Bright, concluded that the fractional interests in the
assets should not merge into a 100% fee ownership by the estate.
The court stated that "the statute does not require, nor logically
contemplate that in so passing, the QTIP assets would merge with
other assets." The court also relied on the decedent's lack of control
over the disposition of property. The Bonner court stated:
The estate of each decedent should be required to
pay taxes on those assets whose disposition that
decedent directs and controls, in spite of the
labyrinth of federal tax fictions. . . . Mrs. Bonner
controlled the disposition of her assets, first into a
trust with a life interest for Bonner and later to the
objects of her largesse. The assets, although taxed
as if they passed through Bonner's estate, in fact
were controlled at every step by Mrs. Bonner,
which a tax valuation with a fractional interest
discount would reflect. At the time of Bonner's
death, his estate did not have control over Mrs.
Bonner's interests in the assets such that it could act
as a hypothetical seller negotiating with willing
buyers free of the handicaps associated with
fractional undivided interests. The valuation of the
assets should reflect that reality.

b.

Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner,112 T.C. 4 (1999). At the time
of her death, the decedent owned 27.8671% of the issued and
outstanding stock of Frederick's of Hollywood, Inc. The decedent
predeceased husband established a QTIP trust for her benefit that
also contained 27.8671% of the issued and outstanding stock of

Frederick's of Hollywood, Inc. Mrs. Mellinger's estate valued the
two blocks as minority interests and applied a 31% discount. The
Service attempted to aggregate the two blocks of stock in Mrs.
Mellinger's estate to form a 55.7342% controlling block. In an
extremely well-written and well-reasoned opinion, the Tax Court
found nothing in the statute or the regulations that (i) the decedent
should be treated as the owner of QTIP property for valuation
purposes or (ii) that QTIP assets should be aggregated with other
property in the estate for valuation purposes. The Tax Court noted
that such a result would be inconsistent with the general system of
estate tax inclusion since, unlike the provisions of Code §§ 2035,
2036, and 2041 which require estate tax inclusion where the
decedent retains the power of disposition or control over the assets,
at no time did Mrs. Mellinger possess, control, or have any power
of disposition over the Frederick's of Hollywood shares in the
QTIP Trust. The Tax Court reviewed the legislative history of
Code § 2044(c) and found nothing to suggest that the surviving
spouse should be treated as the owner of QTIP property or that
such QTIP property be aggregated with any other assets included
in the decedent's estate under Code § 2033.
c.

Estate of Nowell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-15 (1999). On
the same day that the Tax Court decided Estate of Mellinger, the
Tax Court ruled in Estate of Nowell v. Commissioner. The issue
in Nowell was virtually identical to the issue in Mellinger whether certain partnership interests included in the gross estate
pursuant to Code § 2044 should be aggregated, for valuation
purposes, with partnership interests in the same partnerships
includible in the decedent's gross estate under Code § 2038. The
Tax Court, relying on its decision in Mellinger, rejected the
Commissioner's arguments and did not aggregate the interests.

d.

Estate of Lopes v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 1999-225 (1999). The
Commissioner attempted, as it did in Mellinger and Nowell, to
argue that the fractional interests in real estate held in a QTIP
Marital Trust should be aggregated with the fractional interests in
the same parcels of real estate includible in the surviving spouse's
estate. The Tax Court, in a motion for summary judgment,
observed that it had already "rejected the same aggregation
argument advanced by [the Commissioner] in Estate of Mellinger
and in Estate of Nowell v. Commissioner. We find no factual or
legal distinction that would result in a different conclusion in this
case."

e.

Action on Decision 1999-006, 1999-35 I.R.B. 314. Given the
strong analysis and logic employed by the Mellinger court, followed

by the rapid-fire succession of Nowell and Lopes, it was not
particularly surprising that the Commissioner acquiesced in the
decision in Mellinger. In Action on Decision 1999-006, the
Commissioner acquiesced in the result of Mellinger. The AOD
states:
[W]e agree with the Tax Court's opinion that closely-held
stock held in a QTIP trust should not be aggregated, for
valuation purposes, with stock in the same corporation held
in a revocable trust and includible in the decedent's gross
estate. The Tax Court's decision in this case is consistent
with the Service's position regarding the valuation of
minority interests passing to QTIP trusts. The proper
funding of the QTIP trust should reflect, for example, the
value of minority interests in closely-held entities or
fractional interests in real estate that are used in satisfying
the marital bequest. Cf. Estate of Chenoweth v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1577 (1987); see also Rev. Rul. 84105, 1984-2 C.B. 197.
f.

IX.

For a more detailed discussion, see, Aghdami, "Valuation Discount
Opportunities After Mellinger,Nowell and Lopes", Probate &
Property,March/April 2000.

USING ENTITIES TO MAXIMIZE VALUATION DISCOUNTS.
A.

Introduction.
I1.

One of the publicized benefits of using a limited partnership or limited
liability company (LLC) to transfer wealth to younger family members is
the potential reduction in the value for transfer tax purposes of the assets
being transferred because of valuation discounts for lack of control and
lack of marketability.

2.

For example, if an older family member desires to transfer to a younger
family member 10% of his or her IBM stock worth $1,000,000, a direct
transfer of the actual shares to the younger family member or to a trust for
his or her benefit would be a taxable gift of $100,000.

3.

On the other hand, if the older family member transferred the $1,000,000
worth of IBM stock to an LLC and received all the LLC interest in
exchange (assuming the LLC is formed in a state that recognizes a singlemember LLC) and he or she then gives a 10% interest in the LLC to the
younger family member, the value of the gift for gift tax purposes may be
less than $100,000. How much less will depend on the lack-of-control and

lack-of-marketability discounts a business appraiser would attribute to a
10% interest in an LLC owning IBM stock worth $1,000,000.
4.

The following example illustrates the difference between the value of an
interest in an entity whose going concern value is higher than its
liquidation value and an interest in an entity for which the opposite is true:
Assume there are two limited partnerships with the same liquidation value:
one owns an interest in an office building that has a fair market value of
$1,000,000 and the other owns a hardware store that could sell its assets
for $1,000,000. The office building produces an annual cash flow of
$50,000, after taking into account expenses, including interest and
principal payments. The hardware store produces $200,000 a year of cash
flow. If an investor is seeking a 10% return on investment, he or she
would be willing to pay $50,000 for a 10% interest in the office building,
even though 10% of the value of the underlying assets would be $100,000.
Absent any right to cause an immediate liquidation of the entity or to
redeem his or her interest for a pro rata share of the asset value, the greater
liquidation value of the office building is less important than its going
concern value to the purchase decision. Of course, the actual price paid
will also reflect the investor's expectations regarding the likelihood that
the entity would be liquidated, entitling him or her to 10% of the
appreciated value of the office building. On the other hand, an investor
would not likely pay $200,000 for a 10% interest in the entity operating
the hardware store, even though such an amount would generate the
desired return based on the store's cash flow. The actual amount the
investor would pay would turn on the minority owner's lack of control
over liquidation and distribution decisions and the interest's lack of
marketability.

5.

B.

In most estate planning situations involving real estate and other passive
investments, including marketable securities, the value of the underlying
assets is usually worth more than the value of the entity as a going
concern. Therefore, a restriction on the right of an owner to cause a
liquidation of the entity or to have his or her interest redeemed at a price
equal to a pro rata share of the value of the entity's assets will be important
in ensuring that the interest is entitled to a lack-of-control discount,
assuming the restriction is not disregarded for federal transfer tax
purposes.

Valuing Interests Held in Specific Entities.
I1.

Desirable characteristics for claiming lack-of-control discounts include:
a.

The lack of management or voting rights;

2.

C.

b.

The absence of a right to require the entity to redeem the owner's
interest (a put right); and

c.

Restrictions on the owner's ability to transfer ownership rights to a
third party.

The applicable sections of the Code that impact on the ability to take a
lack-of-control discount or that affect the ability to qualify for the annual
gift tax exclusion or to avoid inclusion in the transferor's estate include:
a.

Code § 2503(b), which allows the annual exclusion only if the
gifted interest is a present interest;

b.

Code § 2036(a)(1), which requires the inclusion of property in the
transferor's estate if the transferor retains the possession or
enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property;

c.

Code § 2036(a)(2), which requires the inclusion of property in the
transferor's estate if the transferor has retained the right to
designate the persons who will possess or enjoy the property or the
income from the property;

d.

Code § 2036(b), which requires inclusion of shares of stock in a
closely held corporation in the estate of the transferor who retains
the right to vote the shares;

e.

Code § 2038, which requires the inclusion of property in the
transferor's estate if the transferor has retained the right to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate the transferred interest;

f.

Code § 2701, which applies special valuation rules when an older
family member transfers a junior or residual equity interest to a
younger family member and retains a senior or preferred equity
interest;

g.

Code § 2703, which ignores a right or restriction for valuation
purposes if it is not commercially reasonable;

h.

Code § 2704(a), which treats a lapse of a voting or liquidation right
as a taxable gift, if the lapse occurs during the transferor's life, or
as part of the gross estate, if the lapse occurs at death; and

i.

Code § 2704(b), which ignores an applicable restriction (a
limitation on the right of an owner to liquidate his or her interest if
it is more restrictive than state law) for valuation purposes.

Corporations.

1.

D.

The amount of valuation premium or lack-of-control discount attributable
to an interest in a corporation is directly related to the percentage of voting
stock one owns and the rights such ownership percentage carries under
state law.
a.

For example, for a corporation whose going concern value exceeds
its liquidation value, a higher premium will apply to the ownership
of more than two-thirds of the voting stock than to the ownership
of less than two-thirds if state law requires a vote of more than
two-thirds of the shares to liquidate the corporation. See, Virginia
Code § 13.1-742.

b.

Furthermore, a premium will apply to the ownership of more than
50% of the voting stock if the owner can thereby control the
election of the corporation's board of directors. See, Virginia Code
§ 13.1-669.

2.

If the value of the underlying assets of a corporation exceeds the going
concern value, there should be no premium applied to a majority or
controlling interest. However, a minority or non-controlling interest will
be entitled to a valuation discount.

3.

A shareholder of a corporation does not have a right to have his or her
interest redeemed under state law unless there is an agreement giving him
or her such a right.

4.

A shareholder of a corporation has the right to transfer his or her interest to
a third party without any restriction unless there is an agreement imposing
restrictions on transferability.

Limited Partnerships.
I1.

In the case of a limited partnership, valuation issues will differ for general
and limited partners.
a.

An individual who owns only a limited partnership interest will
have no right to participate in the management of the partnership,
regardless of how much of an interest he or she holds. See,
Virginia Code § 50-73.24.
i.

For example, in a limited partnership with a 1% general
partner and a 99% limited partner, the general partner has
the sole legal right to control the day-to-day affairs of the
partnership. However, as a practical matter, an individual
who owns 99% of the partnership interests as a limited
partner may be in a position to exercise effective control
over the 1% general partner. As the limited partner's
percentage of the partnership declines and the number of

other limited partners increases, his or her effective control
may also diminish.

2.

b.

A limited partner in a limited partnership, depending upon state
law, also may not have a right to have his or her interest redeemed
until the end of the term of the limited partnership as set forth in
the certificate of limited partnership. Setting such a term in the
certificate of limited partnership could therefore trigger a lack-ofcontrol discount for limited partnership interests. There is a
possibility, though, that the Service could view the term as an
"applicable restriction" under Code § 2704(b) (although this would
be an extreme expansion of the section's reach) and ignore it for
valuation purposes. Some states have avoided this issue by
specifically depriving a limited partner of a right to withdraw from
the partnership, thereby ensuring that the restriction will be
factored into the limited partnership interest's value. Code §
2704(b)(3)(B). See, Virginia Code § 50-73.38 (1999).

c.

A limited partner does not have the right to transfer all his or her
ownership rights in the partnership to a third party without the
consent of some or all of the other partners, depending upon state
law. See, Virginia Code § 50-73.45 (2000).

A general partner may be entitled to have his or her interest redeemed by
the partnership at any time, although he or she may be subject to liability
for a premature withdrawal.
a.

However, in a family-controlled limited partnership, the potential
liability may be disregarded as an applicable restriction under
Code § 2704(b) for purposes of valuing the general partnership
interest.

b.

In partnerships with more than one general partner, any one
general partner would no longer have control, but would still have
the right to have his or her interest redeemed.

c.

If a general partner in a limited partnership also owns a limited
partnership interest, the issue arises as to whether he or she can
cause the partnership to redeem both his or her general partnership
interest and limited partnership interest.

d.

A general partner does not have the right to transfer all his or her
ownership rights in the partnership to a third party without the
consent of some or all of the other partners, depending upon state
law.

E.

F.

Limited Liability Companies (LLCs).
I1.

In a member-managed LLC, a member will have control under the default
rule of most state LLC statutes if he or she owns more than 50% of the
membership interests entitled to vote. See, Virginia Code § 13.1-1022.

2.

However, in most states voting and nonvoting membership interests can
be created so that nonvoting membership interests can be given to younger
family members to achieve the same lack-of-control reduction in value
achievable in a corporation through nonvoting stock.
a.

Because the special valuation rule in Code § 2704(b) applies only
to liquidation rights, and not to voting rights, giving nonvoting
membership interests to younger family members should depress
the value of the membership interests for transfer tax purposes.

b.

In a manager-managed LLC, a non-member-manager's interest
should be worth proportionately less than a member-manager's
interest because only the managers have a right to participate in the
management of the LLC.

3.

A member of an LLC may or may not have a right to have his or her
interest liquidated depending upon state law. See, Virginia Code § 13.11032.

4.

In most states a member of an LLC cannot transfer all his or her
ownership rights to a third party without the consent of some or all of the
remaining members, depending upon state law. See, Virginia Code §§
13.1-1039 and 13.1-1040.

Entities Holding Marketable Securities.
I1.

Assuming that the entity has been formed properly under state law, a
limited partnership (or an LLC taxed as a partnership) should be
recognized as a valid entity for transfer tax purposes even though the only
assets it holds are marketable securities.
a.

The family partnership rules under Code § 704(e) may disregard
for federal income tax purposes a partnership that is valid under
state law if certain criteria are not satisfied.

b.

For transfer tax purposes, however, state law determines the
property rights that are being transferred unless a specific
provision in the Code mandates a different result. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Est. of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), Aquilino v.
U.S., 363 U.S. 509 (1960), US. v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958),
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).

2.

3.

Congress recognized that a partnership owning only marketable securities
was valid for federal tax purposes when it amended Code § 731(c) in 1994
to address the tax treatment of partnership distributions of marketable
securities. Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. VII, § 741(a), 108 Stat. 5006 (1994).
a.

Before its amendment, Code § 731 generally provided that a
partner did not recognize income when he or she received property
in kind as a distribution from the partnership; instead, his or her
basis in the distributed property was the lower of the partnership's
basis for the property or his or her basis in the partnership.

b.

On the other hand, a partner did recognize income if cash was
distributed and the cash exceeded his or her basis in the
partnership.

c.

Because marketable securities are now treated as cash when
distributed to a partner, a partner receiving marketable securities
may recognize taxable income when he or she receives marketable
securities in a distribution. Code § 73 1(c)(1)(A).

d.

Marketable securities will not be treated as cash if the partnership
never held any assets other than marketable securities, indicating
that Congress recognized that a partnership that owned only
marketable securities was still a partnership for federal tax
purposes. Code § 731(c)(3)(C)(i). See also H.R. Rep. No. 103826(I), at 446 (1994), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773. ("It is
acknowledged that certain partnerships are formed for the purpose
of holding marketable securities for investment or for sale to
customers.")

In addition, the Code defines a partnership as including a syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by
means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on.
Code § 761(a).
a.

A partnership holding only marketable securities should qualify as
a financial operation.

b.

The Code allows an unincorporated organization to elect out of
partnership treatment if the only purpose of the entity is investment
and not the active conduct of a business. Code § 761 (a).

c.

Such an election would be unnecessary if an unincorporated
organization holding nothing but marketable securities could not
be treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes in the first
place.

G.

4.

Estate of Winkler v. Commissioner suggests that the Tax Court may find
that a valid partnership exists for tax purposes, regardless of the type of
assets it holds. T.C. Memo 1997-4 (1997). In Winkler, parents and five
children purchased lottery tickets from time to time that were placed in a
bowl in the family's home. When a ticket purchased by the mother bore
the winning number, the family applied for the winning proceeds as a
partnership. Because state law required that the partnership have a written
agreement in order to receive the proceeds, the family went to an attorney
to have a written agreement prepared. The agreement provided that the
mother and father were each entitled to 25% of any winning lottery
proceeds and that the five children were each entitled to 10%. The Tax
Court held that a partnership existed for federal tax purposes based on an
analysis of the facts under the family partnership rules and the broad
definition of partnership that appears in Code § 761 (a). Finally, Treasury
Department regulations under Code §§ 701, 704, and 761 include
discussion of partnerships that are created solely for investment purposes.
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.701-1(a); 1.704-3(a)(3); and 1.761-2(a).

5.

Estate ofJephson v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 18 (1986). The decedent
owned all of the shares of two investment companies whose assets
consisted of two unleveraged portfolios of bonds, common stocks, and
certificates of deposits. The cost of liquidating the companies on the
valuation date would have been some $94,000. The stock was valued for
estate tax purposes by applying discounts to reflect lack of marketability.
The discount was determined by reference to the net asset value of 10
publicly traded closed-end investment funds with similar portfolios. The
Tax Court determined that the values of the companies were their net asset
values, less liquidation expenses. The Court based its finding on the fact
that all of the companies' assets were liquid assets, that neither corporation
had any significant liabilities, and that the decedent's 100 percent interests
gave her the unqualified right to liquidate the companies. The court
rejected the estate's attempt to claim a minority interest discount by
analogizing the companies to publicly traded, closed-end investment
companies. The court noted that in contrast to the instant case, an investor
in a publicly traded firm "has little or no say" in the company's choice of
an investment advisor or portfolio.

6.

Dailey v. Commissioner, T.C Memo 2001-263 (2001). The decedent
formed a family limited partnership that was funded with $1,000,000 of
Exxon stock. The Tax Court rejected the IRS's arguments and allowed a
40% discount based on lack of marketability, lack of control, liquidity, and
unrealized capital gains.

Investment Company Rules.

Transfers of property to certain entities considered "investment
companies" can result in income taxation to the transferor. To avoid the
recognition of gain on a transfer of appreciated securities to a partnership
or LLC, the transfer must not be treated as a transfer to an investment
company as described in Code §§351 or 721(b). Under Code §351(e)(1)
transfer of property will be considered a transfer to an investment
company if: (i) the transfer results directly or indirectly in diversification
of the transferor's interest; and (ii) the transferee is a corporation,
partnership or LLC where more than 80% of the value of the assets are
held for investment and are cash, stocks or securities (whether or not
readily marketable).
2.

A corporation or partnership will be considered an investment company if:
a.

The contribution had the effect of diversification of the investor's
assets (diversification generally results if two or more persons
contribute non-identical assets to the same entity); and

b.

The transferee was (i) an entity classified as a regulated investment
company, (ii) an entity classified as a real estate investment trust,
or (iii) an entity in which more than 80% of the value of the assets
were held for investment and were marketable securities.

3.

For example, assume "A" and "B" form a partnership. "A" contributes
$100,000 of a publicly traded stock in one corporation and "B" contributes
$100,000 of stock in a different publicly traded company. Here, both tests
would be met and the partnership would be considered an investment
company. First, diversification of the partners' investments is deemed to
have occurred through combining their assets in an entity in which they
each now have a right to 50% of the partnership's various assets rather
than a right to the individual stocks that they contributed. Second,
marketable securities constitute greater than 80% of the assets contributed.
As a result, "A" and "B" must recognize gain as if their respective stocks
were sold by them to the partnership at the stock's fair market value.

4.

Prior to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA '97), marketable securities
were defined as stock in securities traded on a securities exchange or
regularly traded or quoted on the over-the-counter market. Under new
Code §351 (e), contributions of property to a corporation and partnerships
that were non-taxable under pre-TRA '97 may now result in taxable gain
due to the expansion of the definition of "securities". The term
"marketable securities" has now been replaced with a term "stock and
securities." Instead of limiting the 80% test to marketable securities,
additional classes of property are now treated as "stock and securities" for
purposes of this test. Under the new definition, items such as money,
closely held stock, debt instruments, options, future contracts, foreign

currency and interest in precious metals are considered together with
marketable securities in determining whether an entity is an investment
company.
5.

Under the Treasury Regulations for Code §351, there are exceptions to the
general rule that diversification results when non-identical assets are
transferred to an entity by one or more persons. Under one exception, if
the amount of non-identical assets contributed constitutes an insignificant
or de minimis portion of the total value of the assets contributed, the
insignificant securities are disregarded in determining whether
diversification has occurred. Although the regulations do not specify what
exact amount will be considered "insignificant" or "de minimis", the
example provided in the regulations indicates that less than 1% constitutes
a de minimis amount.

6.

For example, taxpayers A and B contributed $10,000 worth of the same
class of stock in a publicly traded corporation in exchange for 50 shares
each of a new corporation. Taxpayer C then contributed $200 of other
marketable securities in exchange for one share of the new corporation.
C's contribution of securities worth $200 represents a 0.99% of the total
assets contributed. While it is true that A and B have had some
diversification to their investment through the contribution by C, the
regulations indicate that C's contribution of less than 1% is considered
insignificant and, thus no diversification would result. The regulations do
not say whether diversification would have been present if C's
contribution had equaled or exceeded 1%.

7.

The diversification issue may also be avoided if marketable securities
contributed to an entity are already diversified in the hands of its
contributors. This is often referred to a "multi-stock exception." For
example, the multi-stock exception would apply if partners form a new
partnership to which each partner contributed mutual funds. Since these
securities are already in a diversified portfolio, diversification would not
occur upon funding of the partnership. A portfolio will already be
diversified if (i) not more than 25% of the value of the assets contributed
by each transferor are securities of one issuer; and (ii) not more than 50%
of the assets contributed by each transferor are securities of five or fewer
issuers.

8.

This new definition of "securities" may have a serious impact on the initial
funding of FLPs and FLCs. Prior to the passage of TRA '97, transferors
could avoid the investment company status by transferring real estate or
closely held business interests with marketable securities so that the
marketable securities constituted less than 80% of the entity's assets.
However, under the new definition of securities, closely held business
interests will constitute a "security" under the 80% test. If the family does

not own significant non-securities, such as real estate, then forming a
family partnership without incurring income taxation may be a challenge.
One option is to qualify for the de minimis exception by having one
family member contribute more than 99% of the assets and for the others
to contribute a total of less than 1%. Likewise, the multi-stock exception
should be considered. The change in the expansion of the definition of
securities will apply to all transfers made after June 8, 1997.

X.

C.

IRS Initiates Attacks On Family Limited Partnerships. In 1997, the Service
initiated its attack on FLPs and LLCs through a series of Technical Advice
Memoranda. See, e.g., TAM 9842003 (July 2, 1998); TAM 9736004 (June 6,
1997); TAM 9735003 (May 8, 1997); TAM 9730004 (Apr. 3, 1997); TAM
9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); TAM 9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); TAM 9719006 (Jan. 14,
1997). The TAMs involved situations where (a) liquid assets, such as marketable
securities, were transferred to a limited partnership or LLC; (b) the transferor was
elderly; and (c) the transfer was carried out by third parties (such as children) as
agents under a power of attorney or as trustees.

D.

The Service's Arguments. The Service has advanced the following arguments in
challenging the use and validity of FLPs, each of which will be discussed in
greater detail, below:
1.

Disregarding the entity.

2.

Code § 2703.

3.

Code § 2704.

4.

Gift upon formation.

5.

Code § 2036.

6.

Gift of a future interest.

7.

Indirect gifts.

TAXPAYER VICTORIES.
A.

Disregarding the Entity.
1.

The Service's Argument. The Service claimed that the formation of an
FLP should be treated as a single testamentary transaction and therefore
disregarded for transfer tax purposes. The Service cites the Tax Court case
of Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner,in which the court held that a
minority interest discount was not applicable to stock of a closely held
corporation owned by the decedent although the decedent owned slightly

less than 50% of the stock at her death. T.C. Memo 1990-472. At the
urging of her accountant, Mrs. Murphy had transferred a 1.76% interest to
her children 18 days before her death specifically to reduce her interest
below 50%.
2.

Church v. United States 268 F.3rd 1063 ( 5th Cir. 2001), aff'g per curiam 85
AFTR2d 2000-804 (W.D. Tex. 2000) suggests that threshold for a validly
formed partnership is extremely low. The taxpayer formed a limited
partnership two days before her death.
a.

The corporate general partner had not been formed prior to her
death, the limited partnership certificate had not been filed with the
state, and assets had not been validly transferred to the partnership.
Mrs. Church transferred $1.5 million of assets (real estate and
marketable securities) to the partnership; her partnership interests
were valued at $617,600.

b.

The Service argued that Church did not effectively convey the
securities to the partnership before she died. Alternatively, the
Service also argued that Church made a taxable gift when forming
the partnership, represented by the difference between the value of
the assets she contributed and the value of the partnership interest
she received.

c.

The District Court ruled in the estate's favor, rejecting the
government's arguments. As to the securities, the court found that
Church did not hold legal title; she had an equitable beneficial
interest because legal title was held by a brokerage house. Further,
the court found that Church clearly expressed her intent to
relinquish her beneficial interest when she executed the partnership
agreement. On the gift issue, Judge Garcia wrote that the
government's argument "confuses the market value of the assignee
interest passing at death with the value of the Partnership interest
Mrs. Church received in return for her contribution. The two
interests are not comparable. More importantly, the Government
ignores the fact that this was a pro rata partnership that did not
confer a financial benefit on, or increase the wealth of, any
partner." Furthermore, the court found that there was no donee and
no gratuitous transfer. Judge Garcia also held that the partnership
was not a sham as the government contended, finding that the
partnership had bona fide business purposes and was not formed to
reduce estate taxes. The court noted that Church did not have the
unilateral right to amend or revoke the partnership agreement and
that the partners had no express or implied agreement that Church
could continue to use or possess partnership property within the
meaning of Code § 2036.

3.

B.

See also, Kerr v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 490 (5 h Cir. 2002), aff'g 113
T.C. 443 (1999), Strangi 1, 115 T.C. 35 (2000), Jones v. Commissioner,
116 T.C. 11 (2001), and Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 36 (2000).

Code &2703.
1.

Statutory Language. Under Code § 2703(a), for purposes of estate, gift,
and generation-skipping transfer taxes, the value of any property is
determined without regard to any right or restriction relating to the
property. Code § 2703(b) states that a right or restriction will not be
disregarded if the following requirements are met:
a.

The right or restriction is a bona fide business arrangement;

b.

The right or restriction is not a device to transfer the property to
the natural objects of the transferor's bounty for less than full and
adequate consideration in money or money's worth; and

c.

At the time the right or restriction is created, the terms of the right
or restriction are comparable to similar arrangements entered into
by persons in an arms-length transaction.

2.

The Service's Argument. The Service argues that the use of a partnership
structure to hold assets is, in and of itself, a restriction with respect to the
property and should be disregarded. The Service also argues that the
exceptions to Code § 2703(b) should not apply because the use of a
partnership is a "device to transfer property" for a less than full and
adequate consideration.

3.

Strangi I, 115 T.C. 35 (2000), the decedent's son-in-law, acting pursuant
to a power of attorney formed a family limited partnership funded largely
with marketable securities. The decedent owned a 99% limited partnership
interest and 47% of the corporate general partner. The Court found that
the decedent retained effective control over the partnership. Nevertheless,
the Court ruled that the decedent formed a valid partnership and that Code
§ 2703(a)(2) did not operate to disregard the limited partnership. See also,
Church, 268 F3d 1063 (5t h Cir. 2001).

4.

However, consider a recent District Court case from the Western District
of Pennsylvania, Smith, 94 AFTR2d 2004-5283 (W.D.Pa. 2004) which
held that Code § 2703(a) applied to a provision in a limited partnership
agreement which restricted the transferability of the interest. The Court,
however, held that the question of whether the taxpayer could avail itself
of the exception found Code § 2703(b) was a question of fact that required

further inquiry. The Court granted partial summary judgment on the Code
§ 2703(a) issue, but deferred on the Code § 2703(b) issue.
C.

D.

Code § 2704.
1.

Statutory Language. Code § 2704(b) provides that an "applicable
restriction" on the right of a donee to liquidate his or her interests may be
disregarded for gift and estate tax purposes, thereby increasing the value
of the gift or the size of the federal gross estate. An "applicable
restriction" is a limitation on the ability to liquidate or dissolve the entity
(in whole or in part) that is more restrictive than the limitations that would
apply under the state law generally applicable to the entity in the absence
of the restriction.

2.

The Service's Argument. The Service contended that under Code
§ 2704(b) any limitations on the right to liquidate the interests that were
more restrictive than the state's default rule would be disregarded.

3.

Kerr v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 490 (5 'h Cir. 2002), affg 113 T.C. 443
(1999). The Tax Court held that a couple transferred limited partnership
interests, not assignee interests, to two grantor retained annuity trusts
(GRATs), but that they were entitled to apply liquidity discounts in
valuing those interests because Code § 2704(b) did not apply. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed that the Tax Court properly held the dissolution and
liquidation provisions in the partnership agreements were no more
restrictive than the limitations under Texas law, and weren't applicable
restrictions.

4.

Harperv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-202 (2000). The analysis
employed by the Tax Court in Kerr was adopted by Judge Wells in
Harper,a family limited partnership case involving marketable securities,
where the decedent's revocable trust held 99% limited partnership and her
two children collectively held a 1% general partnership interest.

Gift Upon Formation.
I1.

The Service's Argument. The Service has argued that, if valuation
discounts are appropriate in valuing limited partnership interests, the value
that is "lost" by the taxpayer is a deemed gift of an equivalent amount to
the other partners. For example, assume a taxpayer gifts an asset having a
value of $1,000,000 to an FLP. The 99% limited partnership interest is
discounted by 35%. The Service argues that the reduction in value of the
taxpayer's 99% limited partnership interest, as compared to its aliquot
share of the underlying assets, constitutes a gift of $350,000, an amount
equal to the amount of the reduction. See, e.g., Estate of Trenchardv.

Commissioner,T.C. Memo 1995-232 (1995) and Estate of Bosca v.
Commissioner,T.C. Memo 1998-251 (1998).
2.

3.

Taxpayer Arguments.
a.

The gift tax is an excise tax on the privilege of transferring
property; it is an excise tax on the transfer, not on the subject of
the gift. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2 and 25.251 1-1(h)(1). Before the
gift tax can be assessed, a transfer and a transferee must exist. On
creation of a partnership, no person becomes a transferee, and
without a transferee, there is no basis for the assessment of the gift
tax.

b.

Value appears and disappears and that fact does not mean that a
transfer has occurred from one person to another. If A, B, and C
each contribute $100 to form a corporation and receive 1 share of
stock in return, the value of A's stock is presumably valued at less
than $100 because A does not possess the right to liquidate the
corporation and receive a return of his investment. This
diminution in value does not mean that A has made a taxable gift
to his children, B and C. There is no transfer to B and C. B and
C's shares are also valued at less than $100.

The Service has been largely unsuccessful with respect to the gift upon
formation argument. See,e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 11 (2001),
Church v. UnitedStates 268 F.3 rd 1063 (5th Cir. 2001), Kerr v.
Commissioner,292 F.3d 490 (5 th Cir. 2002), Shepherd, 115 TC 376, aff'd
283 F3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002) and Strangi I, 115 T.C. 35 (2000).

XI.

CODE § 2036.
A.

Statutory Provisions. Code § 2036(a) provides as follows:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except
in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or
for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death -

B.

1.

the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from the
property, or

2.

the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.

The Service's Argument Under Code § 2036(a)(1).
1.

The Service has been most successful under Code § 2036(a)(1) involving
the retention of "possession or enjoyment" of property. Retention of
possession or enjoyment may take place by express or implied
understanding, and need not be under a legally binding agreement.

2.

The Service has been successful in cases where the following "bad facts"
were present:

3.

a.

Most of a decedent's assets were transferred to the partnership,
without sufficient assets remaining outside of the partnership for
the decedent's needs.

b.

The decedent's continued occupancy of a residence transferred to
the partnership without contemporaneous payment of rent.

c.

Commingling of personal and partnership assets.

d.

Disproportionate distributions.

e.

Use of partnership funds for personal expenses.

f.

Timing of distributions, where partnership distributions were based
on the decedent's personal needs.

The "Bad Facts" cases are discussed in greater detail in Section IV, infra.

C.

D.

XII.

The Service's Argument Under Code § 2036(a)(2).
1.

In Strangi, the Service argued under Code § 2036(a)(2) that the decedent
retained a right in conjunction with other persons to designate the persons
who will enjoy the property or the income therefrom.

2.

Taxpayers and their counsel, up to that time, relied on the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Byrum to shield them from Code § 2036(a)(2).

3.

Code § 2036(a)(2) and Strangi are discussed in greater detail in Section V,
infra.

The Exception for a "Bona Fide Sale for an Adequate and Full Consideration."
1.

Taxpayers have had mixed results in arguing that the exception for a
"bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration" should shield them
from the application of Code § 2036.

2.

The cases that have considered the bona fide sale exception are discussed
in greater detail in Section VI, infra.

THE "BAD FACTS" 2036(a)(1) CASES.
A.

Estate of Schauerhamerv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-242 (1997).
1.

The decedent formed a separate limited partnership with each of her three
children and transferred a substantial percentage of her interests in the
limited partnerships to family members, using the annual exclusion to
avoid taxable gifts. Afterwards, she deposited income from the
partnerships in her personal account, in which she deposited income from
other sources, and used the account to pay her personal expenses as well
as partnership expenses.

2.

The Service once again argued that the limited partnership interests should
be disregarded based on its Code § 2703 analysis. However, the Tax Court
decided that the transferred interests should be included in the decedent's
estate under Code §§ 2036(a) and 2038 and decided the case in favor of
the Service without invoking Code § 2703.

3.

The Court found that there was an implied agreement that the decedent
would retain the economic benefits of the property and, therefore, because
the decedent had transferred property and retained the right to enjoyment
of the income from the property until her death, the transferred limited
partnership interests were includible in her estate under Code
§ 2036(a)(1). The Schauerhamercase points out the importance of
complying with all the formalities under state law and the terms of the

operative agreements to ensure that the entity will be recognized under
state law and the property transferred to the entity will not be includible in
the transferor's estate under Code §§ 2036(a) and 2038.
B.

Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 9 (2000).
1.

The Tax Court held that property transferred by an individual to a family
limited partnership was includible in his gross estate because he retained
possession and enjoyment of it, and the right to its income.

2.

In June 1993, shortly after having been diagnosed with terminal cancer,
Charles formed a revocable living trust and a family limited partnership.
He appointed himself and his children as cotrustees and authorized each
trustee to act on behalf of the trust. The trust was the partnership's only
general partner. Charles transferred all of his property (except for his car,
personal effects, and a small amount of cash) to the partnership, including
the property in which he had a life interest. He signed deeds individually
and on behalf of his wife's estate transferring property to the trust and then
signed deeds as trustee transferring the property to the partnership. He
deposited over $20,000 of partnership funds to his personal checking
accounts. He lived in one property before and after he transferred it to the
trust and partnership. No rent was paid to the trust or partnership for use of
the residence. Charles gave each of his two children a 30.4% interest in
the partnership on October 22, 1993. He died on August 21, 1994 and his
estate did not include any of the assets transferred to the trust and
partnership. It did include his 34.46% limited partnership interest and his
1% general partnership interest.

3.

The Service determined that the assets transferred to the partnership
should have been included in his estate.

4.

The Tax Court noted that, for purposes of Code § 2036, a transferor
retains the enjoyment of property if there is an express or implied
agreement at the time of the transfer that the transferor will retain the
present economic benefits of the property, even if the retained right is not
legally enforceable. The Tax Court found that Charles did not curtail his
enjoyment of the transferred property after he formed the partnership. It
said that nothing changed except legal title. Charles managed the trust
which managed the partnership. He was the only trustee to sign the articles
of limited partnership, the deeds, the transfer of lien, and any document
which could be executed by one trustee on behalf of the trust. He was the
only trustee to open brokerage accounts or sign partnership checks.
Furthermore, the Tax Court found that Charles commingled partnership
and personal funds. He deposited some partnership income in his personal
account and he used the partnership's checking account as his personal
account. He lived at the same property without paying rent before or after

he transferred it to the trust and to the partnership.
5.

C.

D.

The estate maintained that Charles' fiduciary duties as a general partner
and trustee precluded him from retaining enjoyment of the assets. The Tax
Court disagreed. It said that these duties did not deter Charles from
continuing to possess and enjoy the house in which he lived or the other
assets he conveyed to the partnership. The court also stressed that the
children, as co-trustees, did nothing to preclude him from doing so. This
suggested to the court that Charles and his children had an implied
agreement to allow him to continue to enjoy partnership property for life.
The estate also argued the Charles received full and adequate
consideration for the transferred property. The court disagreed, finding
that the children gave nothing to Charles or the partnership when he
transferred property to the trust.

Harper v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 2002-121 (2002).
1.

The taxpayer formed a family limited partnership. However, the taxpayer
failed to observe all of the formalities of the partnership, commingled
funds, etc.

2.

The Court reviewed four missteps by the taxpayer: (1) commingling of
funds, (2) the delay in transferring assets to the FLP, (3) a history of
disproportionate partnership distributions, and (4) the testamentary
characteristics of the arrangement. The Court concluded that Code §
2036(a) applied and that all discounts should be disallowed.

3.

The Tax Court's view of these cases is instructive: "Hence we are again
met with an example of indifference by those involved toward the formal
structure of the partnership arrangement and, as a corollary, towards the
degree of separation that the Agreement facially purports to establish
we find equally compelling indicia of an implied understanding or
agreement that the partnership arrangement would not curtail decedent's
ability to enjoy the economic benefit of assets contributed to HFLP ...
decedent did not divest himself economically of the contributed assets ...
We additionally take note of decedent's advanced age, serious health
conditions and experience as an attorney."

Estate ofAbraham v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2004-39 (Feb. 18, 2004).
1.

The decedent, received three significant properties from the estate of her
deceased husband. The decedent's children, her guardians and guardians
ad litem entered into a court-approved plan to rearrange the decedent's
financial affairs to reduce estate taxes. The plan required that the three
properties be transferred to three family limited partnerships, each having
a corporate general partner the stock of which would be owned by a trust

for the decedent. The children were not to receive partnership income
until the general partner had set aside sufficient sum to pay for the
partnership's administration and the support of the decedent. The
corporate presidents (the decedent's guardians ad litem), ran the
partnerships, acting in a fiduciary capacity for the decedent, and they had
complete discretion to determine how much money decedent needed from
the partnerships to meet her needs. The decedent initially held a 98percent limited partnership interest in two of the partnerships, the
corporate general partners each held a one-percent interest, and one of the
decedent's daughters each held a one-percent interest. The decedent
initially held a 99-percent limited partnership interest in the other
partnership, and the corporation held the remaining 1-percent. The
decedent later gave 30 percent limited partnerships to three of her
children, two in exchange for cash transfers and the third in exchange for
the settlement of certain claims.

E.

2.

The Service stated that the value of the properties was includible in the
decedent's gross estate under Code § 2036(a), because the decedent had
retained the lifetime income and beneficial enjoyment of those assets. The
court stated that the decedent continued to enjoy the right to support and
maintenance from all the income of the partnerships, because the decree
that authorized the creation of the partnerships stated that the decedent's
needs for support were contemplated first from the partnership income,
and only thereafter, could the children receive their proportionate shares of
income from the partnerships. The decedent's support needs were actually
treated as an obligation of the partnerships. The court also noted that one
of the decedent's children admitted the existence of a pre-arrangement to
maintain the status quo with respect to her mother's financial situation.

3.

The First Circuit recently affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Abraham.

Estate of Hillgren v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2004-46 (March 3, 2004).
1.

The decedent became the limited partner of a family partnership. The
decedent retained a 99.95 percent capital interest in the partnership and a
75-percent profits interest, and she gave her brother, Marc, the remaining
interests as general partner. The decedent contributed seven properties to
the partnership, though she did not actually change the title to the
properties or formally assign to the partnership the leases on the properties
for five months. The agreement allowed the decedent's brother to act for
the partnership without disclosing the existence of the partnership, and he
did, in fact, do so. The partnership was "designed generally to be invisible
to the public and to persons with whom the decedent and [Marc} Hillgren
did business." The partnership agreement stated that the partnership need
not have a separate bank account, and that it could use the accounts of the
decedent's revocable trust and proprietorship. Initially, the partnership

records included among its assets the decedent's residence, and the
partnership paid the mortgage and property taxes on that residence. An
adjusted journal entry posted after the decedent's death removed the
residence and related expenses from the partnership's books. There were
no minutes of meetings of the partners and the certificate of limited
partnership was not filed with the Secretary of State until nearly two years
after the decedent's death. The decedent's brother, as the general partner,
had sole discretion regarding partnership distributions, and during the five
months that the partnership existed during the decedent's lifetime, all
distributions were made to or for the benefit of the decedent; none were
made to the brother. The distributions were made in amounts to enable the
decedent to pay her living expenses, and she was dependent on the
partnership cashflow to cover those expenses. The partnership also paid
the costs of the decedent's estate, including estate tax installments. The
partnership assets were managed by a corporation all of whose business
was managing properties owned by various entities controlled by the
decedent's family. The same person managed the properties before and
after the formation of the partnership. The decedent and her brother did
enter into a business loan agreement covering four of the seven properties
held by the partnership. The agreement was a complex document that
included a contract for services provided by decedent's brother, who
facilitated forbearance and extensions of other loans, an agreement for the
brother's personal guarantee of certain loans, an agreement extending
extended a $1 million line of credit to the decedent, and a security
agreement encumbering three properties. The business loan agreement
gave the brother authority, for 29 years, to determine whether to sell any
of four properties subject to the agreement, and granted him an irrevocable
power of attorney for duration of her ownership of properties. The
decedent's estate reported the decedent's 99.5 percent partnership interest
at $2,266,000, based on an independent appraisal that claimed discounts
for lack of control and marketability.
2.

The Tax Court agreed with the Service that the value of the partnership
assets should be included in the decedent's gross estate under Code §
2036(a), with no discounts for the existence of the partnership itself. In
particular, the court noted that: (a) the proximity of the creation of the
partnership to the death of the decedent (five months), and the fact that the
decedent had earlier attempted suicide and did, in fact, die by suicide,
suggests that the transaction was testamentary in nature; (b) the
management of the assets remained the same both before and after
creating the partnership, suggesting an agreement to retain the beneficial
enjoyment of those assets; (c) the argument that the partnership was
created as a premarital asset protection device fails, because the decedent
broke up with her boyfriend and apparent marriage candidate before the
creation of the partnership [The court also noted that the estate made
"inconsistent representations during discovery and during trial" regarding

whether the boyfriend was even aware of the partnership.]; (d) there was
no solid evidence that the decedent and her brother negotiated at arm's
length over the terms of the partnership or the contributions of services to
be made by the brother; (e) the decedent's brother was both general
partner of the partnership and trustee of the decedent's revocable trust, that
held the decedent's interest in the partnership; (f) the brother ignored the
terms of the partnership agreement when "it suited him"; (g) funds were
commingled; (h) the partnership form was ignored frequently; (i) the
decedent's psychiatrist testified that the decedent had not expected that the
partnership would change her relationship with her brother or her role in
the management of the partnership assets; (j) the decedent had planned to
transfer her residence to the partnership; (k) the decedent received all of
the partnership income distributions. The court held, however, that the
business loan agreement was a bona fide contract that would be taken into
account by any buyer of the four properties to which it related. The
business loan agreement, the court stated, restricted the control over those
properties and reduced their marketability, justifying discounts of 55
percent for one property, 35 to 40 percent for three others, and an
additional five percent for lack of voting rights.
D.

Estate of Wayne C. Bongard, (2005) 124 TC No. 8. The Tax Court held that stock
in an operating company transferred by an individual to a holding company
organized as a limited liability company (LLC) was not includible in his gross
estate under Code § 2036(a) because the transfer was a bona fide sale for full and
adequate consideration. However, the Court then held that membership units in
the LLC transferred by the individual to a family limited partnership (FLP) were
includible in his estate under Code § 2036(a). This transfer did not qualify for the
sale exception and the Court found that there was an implied agreement whereby
the individual retained an interest in the units transferred.

E.

Estate of VirginiaA. Bigelow, TC Memo 2005-65.The Tax Court held that rental
real estate transferred from a decedent's revocable trust to a family limited
partnership (FLP) had to be included in her gross estate under Code § 2036(a)
because she had retained, for her life, the right to the property's rental income and
its economic benefit under an implied agreement that the court found to have
existed.

F.

Estate of Edna Korby, et al. v. Commissioner, (2005) TC Memo 2005-103
Decedent's gross estate included his proportionate share of marital assets
transferred intervivos with wife to FLP: decedent retained lifetime right to assets'
income and economic benefit via implied agreement. Agreement evidence
included facts that transfers left decedent and wife with insufficient income to pay
even basic living expenses at time they were both facing serious ill health and
medical expenses, and that they replaced lost income with partnership payments
funneled through their trust; and, attempt to cast payments as fees for decedent's
asset management services was belied by lack of any management contract or

evidence that any real management activities were performed. Also, bona fide
sale exception didn't apply in light of couple's retained income right and failure to
follow partnership formalities.
G.

XIII.

Estate of Austin Korby, et al. v. Commissioner, (2005) TC Memo 2005-102.
Decedent's gross estate included her proportionate share of marital assets
transferred intervivos with husband to FLP: decedent retained lifetime right to
assets' income and economic benefit via implied agreement. Agreement evidence
included facts that transfers left decedent and husband with insufficient income to
pay even basic living expenses at time they were both facing serious ill health and
medical expenses, and that they replaced lost income with partnership payments
funneled through their trust; and, attempt to cast payments as fees for husband's
asset management services was belied by lack of any management contract or
evidence that any real management activities were performed. Also, bona fide
sale exception didn't apply in light of taxpayers' retained income right and failure
to follow partnership formalities. And, parties agreed that marital deduction didn't
apply.

CODE § 2036(a)(2) - STRANGI
A.

Estate ofStrangi v. Comm'r, 417 F.3rd 479 (5 th Cir. 2005); aff'g T.C. Memo.
2003-145 (May 20, 2003), on rem 'dfrom Gulig v. Comm 'r, 293 F.3rd 279 (5th
Cir., 2002), aff'g in part,rev 'g in part, Estate of Strangi v. Comm 'r, 115 T.C. 478
(2000).
1.

Decedent's son-in-law acting under a durable power of attorney, created a
Texas family limited partnership and transferred to it most of the
decedent's personal and investment assets. Decedent received a 99percent limited partnership interest and 47 percent of the stock of the
corporate general partner. Decedent's family owned 52 percent of the rest
of the stock of the general partner, and an unrelated charity owned one
percent of the stock. Decedent died two months later.

2.

The Tax Court initially held that: (a) the creation of the partnership was
not a taxable gift; (b) the partnership had economic substance; (c) the
terms of the partnership agreement were not restrictions on the transfer the
underlying assets, under Code § 2703(a)(2); and (d) the Service claim that
the decedent had retained control over the transferred partnership assets
was not raised in a timely manner. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court on the substantive issues, but stated that the Service could argue the
application of Code § 2036(a), because its motion was made early enough
to prevent prejudice to the taxpayer.

3.

On remand, the Tax Court held that the partnership assets transferred by
the decedent were includible in his gross estate, because he had retained
their beneficial enjoyment, under Code § 2036(a)(1). The court noted

particularly that: (a) the decedent was in very poor health when he
established the partnership; (b) the partnership paid many of the
decedent's personal expenses, including personal in-home health care,
surgery for the decedent's care-giver, funeral expenses, estate
administration expenses, and related debts of the decedent's estate, and a
specific bequest to the decedent's sister (the court was not swayed by the
partnership having treated these expenses as advances and having made
corresponding distributions to the general partner, because the decedent's
99.43-percent interest meant that no significant distributions were actually
made to anyone else); (c) the decedent continued to live in his residence
after transferring it to the partnership and the decedent only accrued rent
that was not actually paid for more than two years; (d) the decedent's
99.43 percent interest made the arrangement seem testamentary, rather
than a true joint enterprise; and (e) the documents were forms provided by
a private group, with little, if any, input from other family members.
4.

The Tax Court also stated that the partnership assets could be included in
the decedent's gross estate under Code § 2036(a)(2), because he controlled
their beneficial enjoyment. The court noted that the general partner could
(i) unilaterally determine partnership distributions, and (ii) could, acting
with the other partners, terminate the partnership and cause its assets to be
distributed. The court noted that Regulations § 20.2036-1(b)(3) taxes a
decedent with respect to powers that are exercisable only with the consent
of others.

5.

The Tax Court also rejected the estate's reliance on United States v.
Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), because: (a) the control was vested in
someone who was the decedent's son-in-law, his attorney, and his
attorney-in-fact; (b) the partnership held primarily investment assets,
whereas the corporations in Byrum were operating businesses whose
ability to distribute dividends was subject to business exigencies not
relevant to the Strangi partnership; (c) the other stockholders in Byrum
were largely unrelated to the decedent; (d) there was an independent
trustee in Byrum, who could decline to distribute to the beneficiaries any
amounts distributed by the Byrum corporations; and (e) the fiduciary
duties held by directors and shareholders in Byrum were not relevant in
Strangi, because the few holders of other interests were unlikely to enforce
them.

6.

The Fifth Circuit held that the Tax Court properly concluded that Code §
2036 required a decedent's estate to include assets transferred by him
during his life to a family limited partnership (FLP). The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the record supported the Tax Court's conclusion that
Strangi and the other shareholders of Stranco (i.e., the Strangi children)
had an implicit agreement by which Strangi would retain the enjoyment of
his property after the transfer to SFLP because:

a.

SFLP distributed over $100,000 from '94 to '96 to pay for funeral
expenses, estate administration expenses, specific bequests and
various personal debts that Strangi had incurred. The Fifth Circuit
said that these repeated distributions provide strong circumstantial
evidence of an understanding between Strangi and his children that
"partnership" assets would be used to meet Strangi's expenses.

b.

Strangi continued to live in his residence after its transfer to SFLP.
The estate responded by noting that SFLP charged Strangi rent on
the home. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that although the rent
charge was recorded in SFLP's books in '94, the estate made no
actual payment until '97. The Appeals Court said that, even
assuming that the late rent payment was not a belated attempt to
recast Strangi's use of the house, such a deferral, in itself, provides
a substantial economic benefit. Thus, the Tax Court did not err in
considering Strangi's continued occupancy of his home as evidence
of an implied agreement.

c.

Strangi lacked liquid assets after the transfer to pay his living
expenses.

8.

As for the second argument, IRS conceded that the "adequate and full
consideration" requirement was satisfied because Strangi received a
proportional interest in the partnership in exchange for the assets he
transferred to it and partnership formalities were followed. However, it
argued that the transfer was not a bona fide sale and the Fifth Circuit
agreed. The Appeals Court said that a sale is bona fide if, as an objective
matter, it serves a substantial business or other non-tax purpose. In this
regard, the Tax Court found that Strangi's transfer of assets to SFLP
lacked a substantial non-tax purpose. While the estate proffered five
discrete non-tax rationales for Strangi's transfer of assets to SFLP, the Tax
Court rejected each of them as factually implausible. The Fifth Circuit
held that these findings were not clearly erroneous. Thus, it held that the
bona fide sale exception did not apply.

9.

Unfortunately for practitioners, the Fifth Circuit, having resolved the case
on the Code § 2036(a)(1) issue, did not answer the Code § 2036(a)(2)
igsue.

XIV.

BONA FIDE SALE - FULL AND ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION EXCEPTION
A.

Estate of Stone v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2003-309 (Nov. 7, 2003).
1.

The decedents, husband and wife, together created five family limited
partnerships, to hold various businesses and investments that the decedents
owned. The decedents had initially been drawn to the family limited
partnership as a means of settling disputes among their children regarding
the management of various assets, but their estate planning attorney had
later explained to them how these devices could also reduce their estate
tax liabilities. They created the five partnerships, in consultation with
their children. Each of their children became a general partner, together
with the parents, in one or more of the partnerships, and participated
actively in the operations of the partnership. The children each
contributed their own assets to buy their shares of the partnerships, though
some of these assets had originally been given to the children by their
parents. The parents' attorney consulted with the attorneys for the
children in selecting the terms of the partnerships, though the parents'
attorney drafted the agreements.

2.

After both parents died relatively close together, the Service asserted that
the value of the partnership assets should be included in the decedents'
estates under Code § 2036(a)(1), as a transfer with a reservation of
beneficial enjoyment.

3.

The Tax Court disagreed, and held that Code § 2036(a)(1) did not apply,
because the decedents had transferred their assets to the partnerships in
bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration. The court
distinguished its contrary holdings in several other cases, noting that: (a)
all of the partners transferred their own assets to the partnership in
exchange for their proportionate interests, though some of those assets
were the results of prior gifts from the decedents; (b) upon the termination
or dissolution of each of the partnerships, the partners were entitled to
distributions from each such partnership in amounts equal to their
respective capital accounts; (c) each partner was represented in the
decision-making by separate counsel; (d) the decedents retained enough
assets outside the partnership to provide for their own needs and support;
(e) creating the partnership was motivated at least partially by nontax
business concerns; and (f) the decedents' children became general partners
and participated actively in managing the partnerships. Cf. Estate of
Reichardt v. Comm 'r, 114 T.C. 144 (2000), Estate of Thompson v.
Comm 'r, T.C. Memo.2002-246; Estate of Harperv. Comm 'r, T.C.
Memo.2002-121; Estate of Strangi v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo.2003-145.

B.

Kimbell v. United States. (5 h Circuit 2004) 93 AFTR 2d 2004-2400.
1.

Ruth A. Kimbell died in March 1998 at the age of 96. When she died,
Mrs. Kimbell held interests in three entities: (1) the R.A. Kimbell Living
Trust ("Trust"), (2) the R.A. Kimbell Management Co., LLC ("LLC"), and
(3) the R.A. Kimbell Property Co., Ltd. ("Partnership").Trust was created
by Mrs. Kimbell in 1991 and fully revocable by her before her death.
Thus, its interests and Mrs. Kimbell's interests were treated as one for tax
purposes. Mrs. Kimbell and David Kimbell were co-trustees, and David
Kimbell was paid a monthly fee to manage Trust. LLC is a Texas limited
liability company established in January 1998. It was owned 50% by
Trust, 25% by David Kimbell and 25% by his wife (Mrs. Kimbell's
daughter-in-law). David Kimbell was the manager of LLC. Partnership is
a Texas limited partnership created on January 29 1998 (two months
before Mrs. Kimbell's death) by Trust and LLC, which contributed 1% of
the capital of Partnership and was its general partner. Trust contributed
99% of the capital and yet was only a limited partner. Partnership had a
term of 40 years (i.e., until Mrs. Kimbell would have been 136 years old).
As Mrs. Kimbell had a 50% interest in LLC through her ownership of
Trust and a 100% interest in Trust, her real interest in Partnership was
99.5%.

2.

After Mrs. Kimbell died, David Kimbell, as her executor, filed estate tax
returns with the Service, which audited them and found that the value of
Mrs. Kimbell's 99% interest in Partnership was $2.463 million, not $1.257
million as reported. David Kimbell paid the increased taxes and ultimately
went to district court seeking a refund of $837,089, claiming that the
Service had overvalued the estate.

3.

At the District Court, David Kimbell argued that Mrs. Kimbell's transfer
of assets to Partnership was a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth. The district court disagreed. It
said there was no credible evidence that Partnership's formation was the
product of an arm's length transaction between unrelated parties. The
court said that there weren't even two parties because ownership interests
in Partnership were held by two entities: 99% by Trust, which was whollyowned by Mrs. Kimbell, and 1% by the LLC, which was 50% owned by
Trust. The court said that even if Partnership resulted from a bona fide
sale, David Kimbell didn't establish that Mrs. Kimbell received adequate
and full consideration for the sale. Mrs. Kimbell, through Trust,
contributed 99% of the capital for Partnership and in return received a
99% interest in Partnership. Mrs. Kimbell received no consideration other
than the interest in Partnership. David Kimbell, before becoming the
general partner of Partnership, was already managing both Trust, where
99% of the assets of Partnership came from and LLC from where the other
1% came from (of which 0.5% were from Trust). David Kimbell argued

that Mrs. Kimbell "irrevocably" transferred her assets to Partnership and
thus qualified under the retained income or rights exception. The district
court said that this argument didn't fly. Mrs. Kimbell (through Trust),
although formally a limited partner, owned 99% of Partnership, and an
additional 0.5% of Partnership through her 50% interest in LLC. Under
the partnership agreement, Mrs. Kimbell, as a limited partner with a 99%
interest in Partnership, could at any time remove the general partner, and
either appoint herself or someone she chose to be the new general partner,
who could then distribute the income back to Mrs. Kimbell. Thus, Mrs.
Kimbell retained the right to the income from the property. Accordingly,
the district court found the transfer to be includible in Mrs. Kimbell's
estate under Code § 2036.
4.

The Fifth Circuit said that for Mrs. Kimbell's transfer to Partnership to
qualify as a bona fide sale, it had to be a sale in which she actually parted
with her interest in the assets transferred and the partnership/transferee
actually parted with the partnership interest issued in exchange. For the
sale to be for adequate and full consideration, the exchange of assets for
partnership interests must be roughly equivalent so the transfer does not
deplete the estate. In addition, when the transaction is between family
members, it is subject to heightened scrutiny to ensure that the sale is not a
sham transaction or disguised gift.

5.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that Mrs. Kimbell's transfer was for full and
adequate consideration because:

6.

a.

The interest credited to each of the partners was proportionate to
the fair market value of the assets each partner contributed to
Partnership,

b.

The assets contributed by each partner to Partnership were
properly credited to their respective capital accounts, and

c.

On termination or dissolution of Partnership the partners were
entitled to distributions from it in amounts equal to their respective
capital accounts.

The court in Kimbell noted with regard to the immediate decrease in value
of the decedent's assets after the partnership was formed that, "The
business decision to exchange cash or other assets for a transfer-restricted,
non-managerial interest in a limited partnership involves financial
considerations other than the purchaser's ability to turn right around and
sell the newly acquired limited partnership interest for 100 cents on the
dollar. Investors who acquire such interests do so with the expectation of
realizing benefits such as management expertise, security, and

preservation of assets, capital appreciation, and avoidance of personal
liability."
7.

C.

The sale was "bona fide" in Kimbell because:
a.

The transferor actually parted with his interest in property
transferred in exchange for a partnership interest. Put differently,
the transferor did not use partnership assets in the same way both
before and after the transfer.

b.

Mrs. Kimbell retained sufficient assets outside of the partnership
for her support. Partnership formalities were followed, and
partnership assets were not used for personal expenses.

c.

There were significant nontax reasons for the arrangement (and
therefore it was not a disguised gift or sham). These included: (a)
protection of Mrs. Kimbell from personal liability in connection
with working oil and gas interests; (b) partnership assets could
continue intact, and could be passed down to family members
without being broken up; and (c) the arrangement provided
centralized management and a mechanism to appoint successors to
the decedent's son, who was currently managing the partnership.

Turner v. United States, 382 F3d. 382 ( 3 rd Cir. 2004).
1.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the estate of an individual
who transferred $2.8 million in securities and other assets to two family
limited partnerships in exchange for pro-rata partnership interests had to
include the full date of death value of the transferred assets under Code §
2036.

2.

In 1993, Theodore Thompson, his daughter Betsy T. Turner, and her
husband George Turner, formed the Turner Partnership and Turner
Corporation. Mr. Thompson contributed $1,286,000 in securities, along
with notes receivable from Betsy's children totaling $125,000, in
exchange for a 95.4% limited partnership interest in the Turner
Partnership. George contributed $1,000 in cash and real property valued at
$49,000 in exchange for a 3.54% limited partnership interest. Turner
Corporation, the sole general partner, held the remaining 1.06% interest.
Shares in Turner Corporation were issued to Mr. Thompson (490 shares or
49%), Betsy (245 shares or 24.5%), George (245 shares or 24.5%), and an
unrelated tax-exempt entity (20 shares or 2%). Mr. Thompson and his son
Robert Thompson formed the Thompson Partnership on April 30, 1993,
and the Thompson Corporation on April 21, 1993. Mr. Thompson
contributed $1,118,500 in securities, along with notes totaling $293,000,
in exchange for a 62.27% limited partnership interest. Robert contributed

mutual funds worth $372,000, and a ranch property appraised at $460,000
in exchange for a 36.72% limited partnership interest. Thompson
Corporation, as general partner, held the remaining 1.01% interest. Mr.
Thompson and Robert each held 49% of Thompson Corporation and an
unrelated third party held the remaining 2% interest. As of July 1993, Mr.
Thompson, then age 95, had transferred $2.8 million in assets-$2.5
million in the form of marketable securities-to the Turner and Thompson
Partnerships. He retained $153,000 in personal assets, and received an
annual income of $14,000 from two annuities and Social Security. At the
time of transfer, he had annual expenses of $57,202, and an actuarial life
expectancy of 4.1 years.
3.

The Turner Partnership assets consisted primarily of marketable securities
contributed by Mr. Thompson, which the partnership continued to hold in
his brokerage account with minimal post-transfer trading. The Turner
Partnership engaged in several business transactions, although none
produced economic gains. The Turner Partnership also made loans to
members of the Turner family. Although the partnership formally charged
family members interest on these loans, interest payments were often late
or not paid at all, and loans were frequently reamortized. But the
partnership never pursued enforcement action against any of its debtors
nor made loans to anyone outside the Turner family. Like the Turner
Partnership, most of the Thompson Partnership assets consisted of
marketable securities contributed by Mr. Thompson and Robert Thompson
and there was little post-transfer trading. In 1993, each partnership made
cash distributions of $40,000 to Mr. Thompson which he used to provide
holiday gifts to family members. In 1995, the Thompson and Turner
Partnerships made cash distributions to him of $45,500 and $45,220
respectively. During the same time period, he made gifts of interests in
both partnerships to individual family members. In March 1995, the
Thompson Partnership distributed $12,500 to Mr. Thompson to pay for
some personal expenses.

4.

Mr. Thompson died on May 15, 1995. On May 27, 1995, the Turner and
Thompson Partnerships respectively sold $347,000 and $350,000 in
securities to partially fund bequests in his will and pay his estate taxes.
Mr. Thompson's estate tax return reported that he held a 87.65% interest
in the Turner Partnership and a 54.12% interest in the Thompson
Partnership valued at $875,811 and $837,691 respectively, and that his
shares in Turner Corporation and Thompson Corporation were worth
$5,190 and $7,888 respectively. The estate calculated these values by
applying a 40% discount rate to the net asset value of the partnerships and
corporations for lack of control and marketability.

5.

In January 1999, the Service issued a notice of deficiency in the amount of
$707,054, adjusting the taxable estate from $1,761,219 to $3,203,506 after

disallowing the claimed discounts. The estate went to Tax Court. In an
amended answer to the estate's petition, the Service contended that the full
fair market value of the assets transferred by Mr. Thompson to the
partnerships should be returned to his gross estate under Code § 2036(a)
because he retained control and enjoyment over the transferred assets
during his lifetime.
6.

The Tax Court found that the family partnerships were validly formed and
properly recognized for federal estate tax purposes but nevertheless
included the transferred assets in the estate under Code § 2036(a) . The
Tax Court found an implied agreement existed at the time of transfer that
Mr. Thompson would retain lifetime enjoyment and economic benefit of
the transferred assets. In support of this finding, the Court noted that both
Betsy and George Turner had sought assurances from financial advisors
that Mr. Thompson would be able to withdraw assets from the
partnerships to make gifts to family members, and that the partnerships in
fact made such distributions to him. The Tax Court also determined that
the transfers did not qualify for the full and adequate consideration
exception because the transactions were not motivated by legitimate
business concerns. According to the Tax Court, the family partnership was
a mere "recycling of value" and Mr. Thompson's receipt of a partnership
interest in exchange for his testamentary assets was not full and adequate
consideration.

7.

After reviewing the record, the Third Circuit found no clear error in the
Tax Court's finding of an implied agreement between Mr. Thompson and
his family that he would continue to be the principal economic beneficiary
of the contributed property, which was sufficient to trigger Code §
2036(a)(1) . The Third Circuit stressed that, as the Tax Court had found,
Mr. Thompson did not retain sufficient assets to support himself for the
remainder of his life, as calculated at the time of transfer. It said that this
fact supported the implied understanding with the children. The Third
Circuit said that Mr. Thompson's dejure lack of control over the
transferred property did not defeat the inference of an implied agreement
under the circumstances of the case.

8.

The Third Circuit also agreed with the Tax Court that there was no
transfer for consideration within the meaning of Code § 2036(a). The
Third Circuit stressed that neither partnership had engaged in any valid,
functioning business enterprise. Although the partnerships did conduct
some economic activity, these transactions did not rise to the level of
legitimate business operations.

9.

The Third Circuit also emphasized that the form of the transferred
assets-predominately marketable securities-was significant to its
holding. Other than favorable estate tax treatment resulting from the

change in form, the Court said that it is difficult to see what benefit could
be derived from holding an untraded portfolio of securities in a family
limited partnership with no ongoing business operations. In short, the
Third Circuit said that where the transferee partnership does not operate a
legitimate business, and the record demonstrates that the valuation
discount provides the sole benefit for converting liquid, marketable assets
into illiquid partnership interests, there is no transfer for consideration
within the meaning of Code § 2036(a).
10.

The Third Circuit also concluded that there was no bona fide sale within
the meaning of Code § 2036 because there was no discernible purpose or
benefit for the transfer other than estate tax savings.

11.

The Court implied that the case at hand was different from Kimbell, where
the Fifth Circuit found that there was both full and adequate consideration
and a bona fide sale for a transfer of assets to a family limited partnership
where the transferred assets were working oil and gas interests and the
transfer was motivated by a desire to achieve centralized management and
protection from personal environmental liabilities.

D.

Estate of Charles Porter Schutt, et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2005-126.
Code § 2036(a) and Code § 2038 didn't require inclusion in gross estate of stock
transferred by decedent through revocable trust to 2 Delaware business trusts
(DBTs): transfers qualified as bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration.
Bona fide sales finding was supported by credible evidence that DBTs were
formed by decedent and his related family trust co. primarily for legitimate nontax purpose of preserving decedent's "buy and hold" investment strategy and
protecting wealth tied up in core stockholdings. Other bona fide sales evidence
included facts that stock was actually transferred, negotiations were held at arm's
length, there was no commingling of assets, and decedent wasn't financially
reliant on DBT distributions. And, adequate/full consideration was also shown by
DBTs' foregoing non-tax purpose, plus facts that proportionate interests were
received, capital accounts were properly credited, distributions would require
negative capital account adjustments, and liquidating distributions would be made
in accord with capital account balances.

E.

See also, Mirowski v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 2008-74 (2008), in which the
Tax Court rejected the IRS's arguments under Code §§ 2036(a)(1), 2036(a)(2),
2038, and 2035.

XV.

FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP UPDATE - RECENT AND REALLY RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS.
A.

IRS Appeals Settlement Guidelines.
1.

In UIL No. 203 1.01-00 (Oct. 20, 2006), the Service issued Appeals
settlement guidelines on discounts and other key issues related to transfers
of family limited partnership and family limited liability company
interests ("FLP"). (The guidelines appeared in the January 31, 2007 issue
of BNA's Daily Tax Report.)

2.

Background. Many taxpayers have transferred passive assets (such as
marketable securities and cash) to FLP's and LLCs as a means to involve
younger generations in the investment decision-making process and to
protect these assets from creditors and spouses of the taxpayers' chosen
beneficiaries. Because of the significant valuation discounts associated
with FLP interests, the Service has aggressively challenged the use of
FLPs in this context with varying degrees of success.

3.

The Service initially challenged whether the FLP was a valid entity for tax
purposes. In doing so, it applied theories such as substance over form,
step-transaction analysis, and lack of business purpose to set aside the
transaction for estate and gift tax purposes and include the full value of the
assets in the decedent's gross estate. However, the Courts regularly
rejected these arguments unless the facts demonstrated that the taxpayers
had not respected the FLP as an independent legal entity or otherwise
treated the FLP assets if they belonged to the taxpayer.

4.

When the FLP could not be set aside for tax purposes, the Service shifted
its focus to lowering the valuation discounts claimed for lack of
marketability and minority interest attributes.

5.

The Service continues to be concerned with three areas of abusive
practices in connection with FLPs. These are: 1) cases where the taxpayer
treats the FLP assets as his own assets and/or pays personal expenses from
the partnership; 2) cases where the taxpayer fails to follow the formalities
of the FLP; and 3) cases where excessive discount is taken in valuing the
FLP, especially when the FLP's assets consist of stocks and bonds and
other passive assets. In the Service's view, "these practices are often taxavoidance in nature, and therefore looked upon as tax shelters."

6.

Summary of Issues. The settlement guidelines address four issues. For
each issue, the guidelines summarize the Service's position, the taxpayer's
position, and provide a detailed discussion of applicable case law.
Unfortunately, the specific criteria that the Appeals Officers are directed
to focus on in their analyses have been omitted from public disclosure.

Notwithstanding, the guidelines provide an excellent summary of the
current state of FLPs from the Service's perspective.
7.

B.

The four issues addressed in the guidelines are as follows.
a.

Whether the fair market value of transfers of FLP interests, by
death or gift, is properly discounted from the pro rata value of the
underlying assets.

b.

Whether the fair market value at date of death of Code § 2036 or
Code § 2038 transfers should be included in the decedent's gross
estate.

c.

Whether there is an indirect gift of the underlying assets, rather
than the FLP interests, where the transfers of assets to the FLP
(funding) occurred either before, at the same time, or after the gifts
of the limited partnership interests were made to family members.

d.

Whether an accuracy-related penalty under Code § 6662 is
applicable to any portion of a tax deficiency.

Estate of Korby. In Estate ofKorby v. Commissioner, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
30087 (Dec. 8, 2006), the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding that the
value of an FLP was included in the decedents' estates under Code § 2036(a)(1).
1.

Husband and wife funded an FLP with marketable securities worth
roughly $1,850,000 in return for a 98% limited partnership interest, which
they distributed equally to irrevocable trusts for the benefit of their four
sons. These assets represented almost all of the couple's assets, except for
their home, their right to receive social security checks, and various other
assets which they retained in a living trust. When the couple died (within
months of each other), the Service took the position that the full value of
the FLP assets was includible in the couple's estates, and a deficiency of
approximately $2.1 million was assessed.

2.

As one would expect, the Tax Court agreed with the Service, and the Eight
Circuit affirmed, based on the following factors:
a.

Despite the couple's increasing expenses (due to medical reasons),
they retained only their home and relatively few other assets. The
FLP paid some of the couple's living expenses directly, and made
significant payments to the living trust, which paid the balance of
the expenses. Neither the Tax Court nor the Eighth Circuit bought
the estates' argument that payments to the living trust were
"management fees."

b.

C.

The bona fide sale for full consideration exception to Code § 2036
did not apply. In affirming this conclusion of the Tax Court, the
Eight Circuit made the following statements (citing other Circuits):
i.

A transfer is typically not a bona fide sale when the
taxpayer stands on both sides of the transaction.

ii.

The transaction must be made in good faith, requiring an
examination as to whether there is potential benefit other
than the estate tax advantages that might result from
holding assets in a partnership.

iii.

If there is no discernible purpose or benefit of the transfer
other than estate tax savings, the sale is not "bona fide"
within the meaning of Code § 2036.

Estate of Erickson. In Estate of Hilda E. Erickson et al. v. Commissioner,T.C.
Memo 2007-107 (April 30, 2007), the Tax Court held that (1) the decedent had an
implied agreement with the partners of a family limited partnership ("FLP") that
decedent could retain the right to possess or enjoy assets transferred to the
partnership, and (2) the transfer of assets by decedent (acting through the
decedent's agent under a power of attorney) to the partnership in exchange for a
pro rata limited partnership interest was not a bona fide sale.
I1.

The decedent in Erickson suffered from Alzheimer' s. Four months prior to
decedent's death, the decedent's two daughters, as general partners, and
the decedent (acting through one of her daughters as the decedent's
attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney), the decedent's credit
shelter trust (with the decedent's daughter who was her attorney-in-fact
signing as a trustee) and the decedent's son-in-law, as limited partners,
executed a limited partnership agreement. The partners delayed in funding
the partnership. Shortly before the decedent's death and with the
decedent's health rapidly failing, her attorney-in-fact daughter rushed to
fund the partnership with most of the decedent's liquid assets.

2.

Decedent (acting through her daughter as her attorney-in-fact) made
substantial gifts to her grandchildren of limited partnership interests only a
few days before the decedent's death. Following the decedent's death, the
partnership (1) purchased the decedent's residence, (2) made loans to
some of its partners, and (3) "redeemed" the limited partnership interest
owned by the decedent's estate. The executor of the decedent's estate used
the proceeds from the purchase by the partnership of the decedent's
residence and limited partnership interest to pay the decedent's tax
liabilities and administration expenses.

3.

The Tax Court held that the value of the assets transferred to the
partnership by the decedent's daughter, as the decedent's attorney-in-fact,
were includible in the decedent's gross estate under Code § 2036(a)(1).
The Tax Court reasoned that the decedent made an implied agreement
with the other partners to retain possession and enjoyment of the assets
transferred to the partnership. The Court noted that the possession and
enjoyment of one's assets includes the assurance that the assets will be
available to pay debts and expenses after death. The Court found the
following facts especially troubling evidence of an implied agreement:
a.

The partners delayed transferring assets to the partnership.

b.

The estate needed liquid funds from the partnership to meet its
liabilities.

c.

The partnership had little practical effect during the decedent's life.

d.

The decedent made substantial gifts of limited partnership interests
a few days before her death.

e.

The decedent had declining health from the inception of the
partnership.

4.

The Tax Court also held that the transfer of assets to the partnership was
not a bona fide sale that would exempt it from inclusion under Code §
2036(a)(1).Although the Court noted that the decedent received a pro rata
partnership interest in exchange for the transfer of assets, it held that the
estate failed to show that the partnership was formed for a legitimate and
significant nontax reason. The estate offered the testimony of both
daughters to demonstrate the various non-tax purposes for the partnership
(creditor protection, centralized management, facilitating gift gifting, etc.).

5.

However, the Court rejected these reasons espoused by the daughters, in
light of 1) the delay in funding, 2) the estate's dependence on the
partnership to help pay the estate's liabilities and 3) the almost unilateral
nature of establishing the partnership (one of the two daughters acted in
various capacities in signing the partnership agreement).

6.

As with most 2036(a)(1) cases, Erickson presented "bad facts" that
ultimately led to estate tax inclusion. In that regard, its holding does not
add anything new to the 203 6(a)(1) line of cases. However, the Court's
reasoning for rejecting the creditor protection benefits of the partnership
merits a brief mention. The court held that "[a] creditor who sought funds
from the Partnership, however, would have a significant asset base from
which to recover from the Partnership, over $2 million." Yet, the creditor
protection at issue was not, as the Court suggested, for claims against the

partnership (which a creditor clearly could satisfy from the partnership
assets), but rather for claims against the individual partners (which, if the
partnership were structured appropriately, could not be satisfied from the
underlying assets of the partnership).
D.

E.

Estate of Gore. As in Erickson, the Tax Court in Estate of Sylvia Gore, et. al. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2007-169 (June 27, 2007) rejected a poorly funded
and administered FLP structure and included the assets transferred by the
decedent to the partnership in the decedent's gross estate.
1.

In Gore, the decedent purported to withdraw assets from a marital trust
established by her deceased husband and then transfer the assets to a
limited partnership. The capital accounts in the partnership were then to be
allocated in equal shares to the decedent's revocable trust and to
irrevocable trusts for the decedent's two children.

2.

Although the decedent executed an "assignment" document, the actual
titling of assets was not transferred to the partnership until after the
decedent's death. Moreover, the decedent continued to receive interest and
dividend income from the assets purportedly assigned to the partnership.

3.

The Court held that, under applicable state law, the decedent had
effectively withdrawn assets from the marital trust based on the execution
of the assignment document. However, the Court held that the decedent
had not effectively transferred to the partnership the assets that she had
withdrawn from the marital trust and, therefore, included the marital trust
assets under Code §§ 2033 and 2036(a). The Court reasoned that based on
the retention of powers and interest in these assets, the decedent continued
to exercise ownership, dominion, and control over the marital trust assets
until her date of death. The Court pointed to an unbelievable lack of
attention to the formalities in funding and administering the partnership
and rejected partnership accounting records prepared by the decedent's
C.P.A. long after the fact that attempted to "properly" characterize the
activities surrounding the partnership.

Estate of Bigelow. Similarly, in Estate of Bigelow v. Commissioner, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22030 (September 14, 2007), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's holding that real property transferred to an FLP was includable in the
gross estate of the decedent/transferor (the "decedent"), because an implied
agreement existed between the decedent and her children that the decedent would
retain income and economic enjoyment from the transferred asset.
1.

In affirming the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit also held that the
parenthetical "bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration"
exception in Code § 2036(a) did not apply.

2.

In Bigelow, the decedent created a revocable trust (the "trust") and
transferred her interest in her principal residence to the trust. The decedent
and her son (who also acted as her attorney-in-fact) were the trustees of
the trust. The trust then exchanged the residence for rental property. In
order to repay two existing mortgages on the residence, the trust obtained
a loan secured by the rental property (the "loan"). The trust also obtained a
line of credit (the "line of credit") secured by the rental property. The line
of credit subsequently was drawn down by the trust, in part to make cash
gifts to the decedent's children and grandchildren.

3.

The trust then contributed the rental property to an FLP; however, the
$450,000 in loan/line of credit liabilities were not transferred to the FLP
and remained liabilities of the trust, for which the decedent was personally
liable. Although the partnership agreement did provide that the transferred
rental property would be encumbered by the loan and line of credit, the
decedent agreed to hold the partnership harmless for these obligations.

4.

Despite decedent's personal obligation to make the loan payments, the
partnership made each payment (the trust made payments toward the line
of credit). The decedent's capital account, however, was not reduced to
reflect these payments until after her death, and at that time, the account
was reduced only to reflect the extent to which the payments were applied
to loan principal, even though most of the payments (especially in the
beginning) were applied to interest.

5.

The FLP also paid some of the decedent's living expenses, and there were
forty transfers of funds between the trust and the FLP within a 28 month
period. Furthermore, before creation of the FLP, the decedent's monthly
cash flow was $950. After creation of the FLP, the decedent had a
monthly shortfall of $1,200. This shortfall eventually grew to $4,800 per
month after the decedent's long-term care insurance expired.

6.

Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the decedent maintained
cognizable economic benefit from the property she transferred to the FLP,
because she and her children maintained an implied agreement that she
would have access to income from the property. The court based its
conclusion on the following bad facts:
a.

When the decedent transferred the rental property to the FLP, the
liabilities associated with the property (i.e., the loan and the credit
line), were not transferred;

b.

The FLP made payments on the loan and line of credit, but the
decedent's capital account was not debited until after her death,
and at that time, the payments applied to interest were not
reflected;

F.

c.

The decedent's children knew that her long-term care insurance
was set to expire. Further, the children testified that they never
intended to provide for the decedent with their own money, but
they were committed to her care and maintaining her standard of
living. In the absence of an expectation that the FLP would
supplement the decedent's monthly income as necessary, however,
the transfer of her major asset to the FLP would have impoverished
her; and

d.

The partnership formalities were not observed.

7.

The court then considered whether the transfer of the property to the FLP
was a "bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration" within the
meaning of Code § 2036(a). The decedent's estate urged the court to adopt
the three pronged test for "adequate and full consideration" set forth by the
Fifth Circuit in Kimbell, 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004): 1) whether the
interests credited to each of the partners was proportionate to the fair
market value of the assets each partner contributed to the partnership; 2)
whether the assets contributed by each partner to the partnership were
properly credited to the respective capital accounts of the partners; and 3)
whether on termination or dissolution of the partnership the partners were
entitled to distributions from the partnership in amounts equal to their
respective capital accounts.

8.

The Bigelow court conceded that the inter vivos transfer of real property to
an FLP that inherently reduces the fair market value of the resulting
partnership interests does not "per se" disqualify the transfer from the
Code § 2036(a) exception. The court, however, stated that the estate must
demonstrate more than a proportional exchange and show a "genuine"
pooling of assets. The court also emphasized that the question of whether
adequate and full consideration exists -cannot be gauged independently
from the non-tax-related business purpose involved in creating the FLP
(and of course, intra-family transfers automatically are subject to
heightened scrutiny). Ultimately, the transaction at issue in Bigelow was
not executed in good faith, because 1) the transfer resulted in the decedent
becoming impoverished; 2) the partnership formalities were not respected;
and 3) the transfer did not create a potential non-tax benefit for the
decedent. The lesson here is that if a client transfers his or her primary
income-producing asset to an FLP, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to
argue down the road that there was a legitimate, non-tax reason underlying
the transaction.

See also, Mirowski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2008-74 (2008), in which the
Tax Court rejected the IRS's arguments under Code §§ 2036(a)(1), 2036(a)(2),
2038, and 2035.

XVI.

OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN.
A.

Annual Exclusion Gifts - Hackl v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. No. 14 (2002).
1.

In 1995 and 1996 Albert and Christine Hackl gave their children and
grandchildren membership units in Treeco, a limited liability company
that Albert formed to hold and operate tree farming properties. When
Albert bought the timberland, he sought to provide investment
diversification in the form of long-term growth and future income. The
land he bought had little or no existing salable timber. Albert and
Christine gave interests in the company to family members in 1995. The
couple reported the gifts on their gift tax returns and elected to treat them
as made one-half each by Albert and Christine under Code § 2513. They
also treated the gifts as qualifying for Code § 2503(b)'s $10,000 annual
exclusion. The couple continued the gifting program in 1996, but
transferred membership units in Treeco to their minor grandchildren's
trust. The couple treated the 1996 gifts as they had the 1995 gifts. At the
time of the gifts, Albert correctly anticipated that Treeco and several
successor entities would generate losses and make no distributions for
many years. The IRS disallowed the exclusions for 1996.

2.

The Tax Court, deciding in the Service's favor, noted that the dispute
turned on whether the transfers amounted to gifts of a present or future
interest. Because the gifts failed to confer substantial present economic
benefit by reason of use, possession, or enjoyment of the property or the
income from the property, the court concluded that they failed to qualify
for the Code § 2503(b) exclusion. In reaching its decision, the court
rejected the Hackls' argument that when a gift takes the form of an
outright transfer of an equity interest in property, no further analysis is
needed or justified. The court held that to follow this logic was to sanction
exclusions for gifts based only on "conveyancing form," without inquiring
into whether the donees received rights that differed from those that would
have come from a traditional trust arrangement. In examining the facts and
circumstances of the Hackls' case, the court held that any economic
benefit the donees could have ultimately obtained from their receipt of
Treeco units was future, not present.

3.

The Tax Court based its decision primarily on the terms of the LLC
Operating Agreement. The terms discussed by the Tax Court included the
authority given to Mr. Hackl as manager, the inability of members to
withdraw their capital accounts, the inability of members to sell interests
to outsiders, and the inability of members to compel distributions. The
Court concluded, "...the terms of the Treeco Operating Agreement
foreclosed the ability of the donees presently to access any substantial

economic or financial benefit that might be represented by the ownership
units."
B.

Indirect Gifts.
I1.

In Senda, T.C. Memo 2004-160, the donors (a husband and wife) created
two FLPs (FLP I and FLP II). The donors signed the FLP I agreement on
April 1, 1998. The partnership agreement provided that a .01% limited
partnership interest was initially held in trust for each of the donors' three
minor children. On December 28, 1998, the donors contributed 28,500
shares of MCI WorldCom stock to FLP I by transferring the stock from
their joint brokerage account to the brokerage account of FLP I. By fax
dated December 28, 1998, the donors informed their accountant that they
had transferred stock to FLP I, and sought advice as to what percentage of
partnership interests they should transfer to the children. On that same
day, the husband gave each child (or trust for that child) a 29.94657%
limited partnership interest in FLP I, and the wife gave each child (or trust
for that child) a 0.0434% limited partnership interest in FLP I. The
certificates of ownership reflecting the transfers were not prepared and
signed until several years later.

2.

The donors signed the FLP II agreement on December 17, 1999. As with
FLP I, the partnership agreement provided that a .01% limited partnership
interest was initially held in trust for each of the donors' three minor
children. On December 20, 1999, the donors contributed 18,477 shares of
MCI WorldCom stock to FLP II by transferring the stock from their joint
brokerage account to the brokerage account of FLP II. On that same day,
the donors gave to each child, in trust, a 17.9% limited partnership interest
in FLP II. By fax dated December 22, 1999, the donors informed their
accountant that they had transferred stock to FLP II, and sought advice as
to the percentage of partnership interests they should transfer to the
children to maximize their annual gift tax exclusions and use all of their
remaining unified credits. On Jan. 31, 2000, the donors gave to each child,
in trust, an additional 4.5% limited partnership interest in FLP II.

3.

On their 1998, 1999, and 2000 gift tax returns, the donors reported the
transfers as gifts of partnership interests to their children. The values of
the partnership interests were determined by multiplying the value of the
transferred stock (as to which there was no dispute) by the percentage of
the partnership interests transferred to the children, and then applying lack
of marketability and minority interest discounts.

4.

The Service conceded that the Jan. 31, 2000 gifts were gifts of partnership
interests, not gifts of stock. But the Service argued that the December 28,
1998 transfer of stock to FLP I, and the December 20, 1999 transfer of
stock to FLP II, coupled with the transfer of limited partnership interests

to the donors' children, were indirect gifts of the stock to the children.
Thus, the Service argued that the stock, not the partnership interests, had
to be valued for gift tax purposes. According to the Service, "the transitory
allocations to [the donors'] capital accounts, if such allocations even
occurred at all, were merely steps in integrated transactions intended to
pass the stock to the [donors'] children in partnership form."
5.

The Tax Court agreed with the Service, saying that the donors had
presented no reliable evidence that they contributed the stock to the FLPs
before they transferred the partnership interests to their children. The court
said that the donors were "more concerned with ensuring that the
beneficial ownership of the stock was transferred to the children in taxadvantaged form than they were with the formalities of FLPs," and noted
that the husband, as general partner, did not maintain any books or records
for the partnerships other than brokerage account statements and
partnership tax returns. The tax returns were prepared months after the
transfers of the partnership interests, and thus were unreliable in showing
whether the donors transferred the partnership interests to the children
before or after they contributed the stock to the partnerships. The same
was true of the certificates of ownership reflecting the transfers of the
partnership interests, which were not prepared until at least several weeks
after the transfers. And the letters that the donors faxed to their accountant
after they had funded the partnerships did not establish-as the donors
contended-that the donors first funded the partnerships and then
transferred the partnership interests to their children. The faxes established
only that the donors had funded the partnerships; they did not show what
the partnership ownership interests were immediately before the funding,
or how the stock was allocated among the partners' capital accounts at the
time of the funding. The court concluded that the value of the children's
partnership interests was enhanced upon the donors' contributions of stock
to the FLPs. Thus, the transfers were indirect gifts of stock to the children.

6.

In Holman v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 12 (2008), the Tax Court rejected
the indirect gift theory advanced in Senda. In this case, gifts of LP
interests were gifted to children six days after the entity was formed. The
LP held stock of Dell Computer. The Court found that the stock transfers
were clearly made to the partnership in advance of the gift of the LP
interests; in addition, the Court declined to apply the step-transaction
doctrine to these transfers.

7.

In Gross v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2008-221 (2008), the Tax Court
again rejected the indirect gift theory. In this case, marketable securities
were contributed to the FLP and interests were transferred to the
taxpayer's daughters 11 days later. The Court focused on the real
economic change in value of the underlying securities during the
intervening 11 day period. It is noteworthy, that unlike marketable

securities, real estate or other long term assets may not change in value
quite so quickly.
XVII. OBTAINING FINALITY WITH RESPECT TO VALUATION ISSUES.
A.

Gift Tax Final Regulations.
I1.

2.

On December 3, 1999, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued final
regulations relating to changes made to the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
§§ 2001, 2504, and 6501 by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
regarding:
a.

The valuation of prior gifts in determining estate and gift tax
liability; and

b.

The period of limitations for assessing and collecting gift tax. 64
Fed. Reg. 67767 - 67773

The principal changes made to the proposed regulations, which were
issued on December 22, 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 70701), are:
a.

The adequate disclosure requirement is satisfied if the information
listed in the regulation is provided;

b.

If property is transferred to a trust, taxpayers may submit a
complete copy of the trust document in lieu of a description of the
trust terms;

c.

Only financial data that was used in valuing the transferred interest
must be submitted;

d.

A statement of the fair market value of 100% of the entity is not
required if the value of the interest in the entity is properly
determined without using the net asset value of the entire entity;

e.

Information on lower tiered entities must be submitted only if the
information is relevant and material in determining the value of the
interest in the entity;

f.

An appraisal satisfying specific requirements in the regulations
may be submitted in lieu of a detailed description of the method
used to determine the fair market value and in lieu of information
regarding tiered entities;

g.

The requirement of a statement of relevant facts that would apprise
the Service of the nature of any potential gift tax controversy

concerning the transfer or a concise legal description of the legal
issue presented by the facts is eliminated;

B.

h.

The taxpayer must only describe positions contrary to proposed,
temporary or final regulations published at the time the transfer
occurred;

i.

In the case of split gifts between spouses, gifts attributed to the
non-donor spouse are deemed to be adequately disclosed if the
gifts are adequately disclosed on the return of the donor spouse;

j.

Adjustments for legal as well as valuation issues are precluded
once the gift tax statute of limitations expires; and

k.

Completed transfers to members of the transferor's family in the
ordinary course of operating a business are deemed to be
adequately disclosed, even if not reported on a gift tax return, if the
item is properly reported by all parties for income tax purposes.

Gifts Before August 6, 1997.
1.

For estate tax purposes, in determining the amount of adjusted taxable
gifts (which is added to the taxable estate for purposes of determining the
estate tax), the value of a gift made before August 6, 1997 may be adjusted
at any time, even though the statute of limitations has run on the
assessment of a gift tax in connection with the gift.
a.

2.

This rule also applies to adjustments involving issues other than
valuation. Treas. Reg. § 20.2001-1(a).

For gift tax purposes, if a gift tax return is filed for a year, an assessment
of a gift tax for any gifts made during that year, whether disclosed or not
may not be made after the statute of limitations has run. Treas. Reg. §
25.2504-2(a).
a.

This rule only applies to gifts made before January 1, 1997. Treas.
Reg. § 301.6501(c)-I.

b.

However, an adjustment in the value of any gifts made before
August 6, 1997, whether or not disclosed, may be made in
determining the prior taxable gifts of the taxpayer for calculating
the gift tax on subsequent gifts unless a gift tax has been paid or
assessed for the calendar year in which the transfer occurred.
Treas. Reg. § 2 5.2504-2(a).

c.

In addition, adjustments involving issues other than valuation may
be made, whether or not a gift tax has been paid. Treas. Reg. §
25.2504-2(a).

C.

Gifts After August 5, 1997.

1.

In determining the amount of a decedent's adjusted taxable gifts for estate
tax purposes, a gift made after August 5, 1997 that was adequately
disclosed on a gift tax return may not be revalued.
a.

2.

3.

While the proposed regulations limited this rule to adjustments
involving valuation, and not adjustments involving other issues,
such as whether the gift qualified for the annual exclusion, the final
regulations apply this rule to all issues relating to the gift,
including valuation issues and legal issues involving the
interpretation of the gift tax law. Treas. Reg. § 20.2001-1(b).

For gift tax purposes, the value of a gift made after August 5, 1997 may
not be adjusted after the statute of limitations has run if the transfer was
adequately disclosed on a gift tax return. Treas. Reg. § 25.2504-2(b).
a.

While the proposed regulations limited this rule to adjustments
involving valuation, and not adjustments involving other issues,
such as whether the gift qualified for the annual exclusion, the final
regulations apply this rule to all issues relating to the gift,
including valuation issues and legal issues involving the
interpretation of the gift tax law. Treas. Reg. § 25.2504-2(b).

b.

A gift made after December 31, 1996 but before August 6, 1997 is
subject to the adequate disclosure requirements relating to the
running of the statute of limitations, but is still subject to the rule
that the gift can be revalued for determining adjusted taxable gifts
even if a gift tax had been paid for a gift reported on a gift tax
return for 1997.

The value of a gift is finally determined for gift tax purposes if:
a.

The value is shown on a gift tax return, or on a statement attached
to the return, and the Service does not contest the value before the
statute of limitations has run;

b.

The value is specified by the Service before the statute of
limitations has run with respect to the gift and such specified value
is not timely contested by the taxpayer;

c.

The value is finally determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction; that is, when the court enters a final decision,
judgment, decree or other order passing on the valuation that is not
subject to appeal; or

d.

The value is determined pursuant to a settlement agreement
entered into between the taxpayer and the Service that is binding

on both. A settlement agreement includes a closing agreement, a
compromise agreement, or an agreement entered into in settlement
of litigation involving the amount of the taxable gift. Treas. Reg. §
20.2001-1(c), (d).
D.

Disclosure Requirements.
I1.

A transfer will be adequately disclosed on a gift tax return with respect to
a transfer made after December 31, 1996, only if it is reported in a manner
adequate to apprise the Service of the nature of the gift and the basis for
the value so reported. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-1(f)(2).

2.

Transfers reported on the gift tax return as transfers of property by gift
will be considered adequately disclosed if the return or a statement
attached to the return provides the following information:
a.

A description of the transferred property and any consideration
received by the transferor;

b.

The identify of, and relationship between, the transferor and the
transferee;

c.

If the property is transferred in trust, the trust's tax identification
number and a brief description of the terms of the trust or a copy of
the trust instrument;

d.

A detailed description of the method used to determine the fair
market value of property transferred, including:
(1)

Any relevant financial data.

(2)

A description of any discounts, such as discounts for
blockage, minority or fractional interests, and lack of
marketability, claimed in valuing the property.

(3)

In the case of a transfer of an interest that is actively traded,
the exchange where the interest is listed, the CUSIP
number of the security, and the mean between the highest
and lowest quoted selling prices on the applicable valuation
date.

(4)

In the case of a transfer of an interest in an entity (e.g., a
corporation or partnership) that is not actively traded, a
description of any discount claimed in valuing the entity or
any assets owned by such entity.

(5)

If the value of the entity or interests in the entity is properly
determined based on the net value of the assets held by the

entity, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the fair market
value of the entity is properly determined by a method
other than a method based on the net value of the assets or
furnish:
(a)

A statement regarding the fair market value of
100% of the entity (determined without regard to
any discounts in valuing the entity or any assets
owned by the entity);

(b)

The pro rata portion of the entity subject to the
transfer; and

(c)

The fair market value of the transferred interest as
reported on the return.

(6)

If the entity that is subject to the transfer owns an interest in
another non-actively traded entity (either directly or
through ownership of an entity), the same information is
required for each entity, if the information is relevant and
material in determining the value of the interest.

(7)

In lieu of the above information an appraisal of the
transferred property that meets the following requirements:
(a)

The appraisal is prepared by an appraiser who
satisfies all the following requirements:
i)

The appraiser is an individual who holds
himself or herself out to the public as an
appraiser or performs appraisals on a regular
basis;

ii)

Because of the appraiser's qualifications, as
described in the appraisal that details the
appraiser's background, experience,
education, and membership, if any, in
professional appraisal associations, the
appraiser is qualified to make appraisals of
the type of property being valued; and

iii)

The appraiser is not the donor or the donee
of the property or a member of the family of
the donor or donee, as defined in Code
§2032A(e)(2), or any person employed by
the donor, the donee, or a member of the
family of either; and

(b)

e.

3.

The appraisal contains all of the following:
i)

The date of the transfer, the date on which
the transferred property was appraised, and
the purpose of the appraisal;

ii)

A description of the property;

iii)

A description of the appraisal process
employed;

iv)

A description of the assumptions,
hypothetical conditions, and any limiting
conditions and restrictions on the transferred
property that affect the analyses, opinions,
and conclusions;

v)

The information considered in determining
the appraised value, including in the case of
an ownership interest in a business, all
financial data that was used in determining
the value of the interest that is sufficiently
detailed so that another person can replicate
the process and arrive at the appraised value;

vi)

The appraisal procedures followed, and the
reasoning that supports the analyses,
opinions, and conclusions;

vii)

The valuation method utilized, the rationale
for the valuation method, and the procedure
used in determining the fair market value of
the asset transferred; and

viii)

The specific basis for the valuation, such as
specific comparable sales or transactions,
sales of similar interests, asset-based
approaches, merger-acquisition transactions,
etc.

A statement describing any position taken that is contrary to any
proposed, temporary or final Treasury regulations or revenue
rulings published at the time of the transfer.

Completed transfers to members of the transferor's family, as defined in
Code § 2032A(e)(2) for purposes of the special valuation rules under Code
§ 2032A, that are made in the ordinary course of operating a business are
deemed to be adequately disclosed, even if not reported on a gift tax

return, if the transfer is properly reported by all parties for income tax
purposes.
4.

Completed transfers, all or a portion of which are reported as not
constituting a transfer by gift (other than a transaction in the ordinary
course of business), will be considered adequately disclosed if the same
information is provided as is required for a transfer that is treated as a gift,
plus an explanation as to why the transfer is not a transfer by gift.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-1(f)(2), (3), (4).

5.

Adequate disclosure of a transfer that is reported as a completed gift on
the gift tax return will start the running of the statute of limitations for
assessment of gift tax on the transfer, even if the transfer is ultimately
determined to be an incomplete gift.
a.

For example, if an incomplete gift is reported as a completed gift
on a gift tax return and is adequately disclosed, the period of
assessment of the gift tax will begin running when the return is
filed.

b.

On the other hand, if the transfer is reported as an incomplete gift,
whether or not adequately disclosed, the period for assessing a gift
tax with respect to the transfer will not commence to run even if
the transfer is ultimately determined to be a completed gift.
(1)

In that situation, the gift tax with respect to the transfer may
be assessed at any time, up until three years after the donor
files a return reporting the transfer as a completed gift with
adequate disclosure.

Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-i(f)(5).
6.

E.

If a husband and wife elect split-gift treatment, the disclosure
requirements are satisfied for the gift deemed made by the consenting
spouse if the return filed by the donor spouse satisfies the disclosure
requirements. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-i(f)(6).

Adequate Disclosure of Compensation to Family Members.
1.

Completed transfers to members of the transferor's family that are made in
the ordinary course of operating a business are deemed to be adequately
disclosed, under Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-1(f)(2), even if the transfer
isn't reported on a gift tax return, if the transfer is properly reported by all
parties for income tax purposes.

2.

For example, in the case of salary paid to a family member employed in a
family-owned business, the transfer will be treated as adequately disclosed
for gift tax purposes if the item is properly reported by the business and
the family member on their income tax returns. See, Treas. Reg §
301.6501(c)-l(f)(4).

3.

The exception only applies to transactions conducted in the ordinary
course of operating a business. It doesn't apply, for example, in the case of
a sale of property (including a business) by a parent to a child.

4.

For example, A owns 100% of the stock of X Corporation, a company
actively engaged in a manufacturing business. B, A's child, is an employee
of X and receives an annual salary paid in the ordinary course of operating
X Corporation. B reports the annual salary as income on B's income tax
returns. During the year, A transfers property to family members and files
a gift tax return reporting the transfers. But A doesn't disclose the salary
payments made to B. Because the salary payments were reported as
income on B's income tax return, the salary payments are deemed to be
adequately disclosed. The transfer of property to family members, other
than the salary payments to B, reported on the gift tax return must satisfy
the adequate disclosure requirements under Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)1(f)(2) in order for the statute of limitations to begin to run with respect to
those transfers.

XVIII. DEFINED VALUE GIFTS.
A.

The Internal Revenue Service will almost always scrutinize significant transfers
of "hard-to-value" assets. Reasonable people (and, of course, unreasonable
people) can differ on the value of certain assets (e.g., a family limited partnership
interest). From the Service's point of view, scrutiny of those assets may represent
a significant revenue opportunity.

B.

One approach that may reduce the chance of an audit of a transfer of a hard to
value asset, or a gift tax surprise if an audit does occur is to utilize a formula
defined value transfer. A formula defined value transfer may increase the retained
interest of the donor (as in the case of a grantor retained annuity trust); may define
the portion of the property interest that is transferred or may provide that a
defined portion of the property transferred passes to a "tax sheltered recipient."

C.

For example, a transfer may provide that an undivided part of a "hard-to-value"
asset, which exceeds a defined value of the transferred entity interest, will pass
either to a grantor retained annuity trust, the transferor's spouse, charity or a trust
in which the grantor has retained an interest that makes the gift incomplete.

D.

The IRS argues that such clauses should not be respected because they would
make fair administration of the gift tax difficult, given the Service's limited
resources available for gift tax audits, especially considering the finality that now
can be obtained through gift reporting with adequate disclosure under Code §
6501(c)(9).

E.

"Formula defined value" clauses should be distinguished from "price adjustment"
clauses like the ones discussed in Revenue Ruling 86-41, 1986-1 C.B. 442 and in
Commissionerv. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944). In Rev. Rul. 86-41, the
IRS said that a clause that increased the consideration to be paid for the
transferred property or that caused a portion of the transferred property to revert
to the transferor were conditions subsequent that are not effective to avoid a
taxable gift from being made on the transfer of the property. By contrast, formula
clauses defining the amount of the transfer or the identity of the transferee are
ubiquitous in the transfer tax context. In fact, such arrangements are specifically
permitted in the tax law. If an adjustment occurs in a formula defined value
clause, a change in the identity of the transferee may occur (e.g., the credit shelter
trust owns less of the asset and the marital trust owns more of the asset). If an
adjustment occurs in a price adjustment clause, the initial transfer is partially
unwound and the identity of the transferee does not change (e.g., the transferee
pays an additional amount for the asset). Price adjustment clauses were found to
be against public policy in Procter because, if such clauses were effective, the
result of an audit of the gift tax return could never result in a deficiency. Although
the same public policy argument applies to formula defined value clauses, they
are so commonly used that an argument that they are void is not persuasive.

Moreover, the public policy argument could be addressed by deliberately
structuring the formula to produce a small deficiency on audit.
F.

In FSA 200122011, the IRS attacks a defined value clause that it assumes was
executed without "[any] evidence of arm's length negotiations" and which the IRS
assumes" the transactional documents were accepted by charity as presented". The
IRS concludes the possibility of "any additional transfer to charity under the
formula clause was illusory." The IRS also states that
Though Procterinvolved a savings clause as opposed to a formula clause,
the principles of Procterare applicable to this case. If formula clauses like
the one at issue actually function to require payment of any increased
value to the charitable donee, these clauses would be similar in effect to
savings clauses in that they re-characterize the transaction in a manner that
would render any adjustment nontaxable. A valuation increase resulting
from an examination would serve only to increase the charitable
deduction, but would not otherwise generate any gift tax deficiency.
Moreover, the adjustment would substantiate a claim for an increase in the
income tax charitable deduction claimed by the donor. The sole
justification for the Commissioner's examination would be to insure that
charity received all that it was entitled to under the transfer documents.
This would place federal tax administrators in the position of policing
charitable transactions, a role more appropriately performed by the states'
attorneys general.

G.

Commentators, like Stacy Eastland, have argued that the IRS analysis misses
several key points, including: (i) the IRS does have a "revenue incentive" to
examine a charity's actions in agreeing to the amount of a formula gift, because
the charity and the "offending" individual will be subject to IRS sanctions (which
potentially increases Treasury revenue), if there is any excess benefit to that
individual; (ii) state attorney generals do have a duty to enforce the formula; (iii)
the charity has a fiduciary duty under state property law to enforce the formula
(and, as noted above, it is clear law that federal gift tax consequences follow state
property law); (iv) assuming the charity does engage in arms length negotiations,
it is irrelevant whether the formula clause "works," because under gift tax
valuation cases and the IRS's own regulations, it is clear arms length negotiations
are the best evidence of value; (v) as noted above, the IRS itself mandates formula
clauses for charitable split interest trusts and grantor retained annuity trusts, both
of which involve the same public policy considerations; (vi) as noted above, the
IRS has long accepted formula marital deduction clauses and formula pecuniary
disclaimers, which have no more (or less) public policy considerations than
formula gifts to charity; and (vii) there is a key distinction between price
adjustment clauses such as the one discussed in Procterand defined value
formula clauses (e.g. marital deduction clauses). One distinction is that the price
adjustment clause involves a condition subsequent. In addition, in some defined
value formula clauses, the identity of the recipient could change (which is clearly

not in the donor's best interest.)
H.

Defined Value Clauses in the Charitable Context.
I1.

Christiansenv.Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 1 (2008), concerned a
defined-value disclaimer. The decedent left her estate to her daughter.
Under the will, 75% of any disclaimed assets would pass to a charitable
lead annuity trust (CLAT) and 25% to a private foundation (the
"Foundation"). The principal assets of the estate were 99% limited
partnership interests in two partnerships. The daughter disclaimed a
fractional share of the estate exceeding $6.35 million, based on values "as
finally determined" for estate tax purposes.

2.

The IRS challenged both the valuation of the partnership interests and the
effect of the formula disclaimer on the size of the charitable deduction the
estate was entitled to receive. Before trial, the parties reached agreement
on the values of the limited partnership interests. The agreement increased
the gross estate from $6.51 million to $9.6 million and increased the value
of the properties passing to the CLAT and the Foundation. The issue for
the court was whether a charitable deduction would apply to the additional
value passing to charity.

3.

A majority of the Tax Court held that the disclaimer was not qualified for
the 75% passing to the CLAT because the daughter was a contingent
remainder beneficiary of the CLAT. Judge Swift and Judge Kroupa (the
trial judge) dissented from this portion of the opinion. Both believed the
disclaimer was qualified. Regarding the 25% passing to the Foundation,
the Tax Court unanimously validated the formula disclaimer and allowed a
charitable deduction. The court noted that the transfer was the result of a
disclaimer governed by Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(c), which relates back to
the decedent's death as if it had been part of the will. The court also stated:
The regulations speak of the contingency of "a transfer" of
property passing to charity. The transfer of property to the
Foundation in this case is not contingent on any event that
occurred after Christiansen's death (other than the execution of the
disclaimer)-it remains 25 percent of the total estate in excess of
$6,350,000. That the estate and the IRS bickered about the value of
the property being transferred doesn't mean the transfer itself was
contingent in the sense of being dependent for its occurrence on a
future event. Resolution of a dispute about the fair market value of
assets on the day Christiansen died depends only on a settlement or
final adjudication of a dispute about the past, not the happening of
some event in the future. Our Court is routinely called upon to
decide the fair market value of property donated to charity-for
gift, income, or estate tax purposes. 130 T.C. No. 1, at 30.

4.

The court rejected the IRS's public policy argument, noting that it was
"hard pressed to find any fundamental public policy against making gifts
to charity-if anything the opposite is true. Public policy encourages gifts
to charity, and Congress allows charitable deductions to encourage
charitable giving." Id. at 32-33. Rejecting the IRS's Procter analogy, the
court noted:
This case is not Procter The contested phrase would not undo a
transfer, but only reallocate the value of the property transferred
among Hamilton, the [CLAT], and the Foundation. If the fair
market value of the estate assets is increased for tax purposes, then
property must actually be reallocated among the three
beneficiaries. That would not make us opine on a moot issue, and
wouldn't in any way upset the finality of our decision in this case.
Id. at 33-34

5.

The court added that a charity's directors, as well as executors of an estate,
owe fiduciary duties that are enforceable by the IRS and the state's
Attorney General.

6.

Although sound arguments exist for a taxpayer to assert that the public
policy holding in Procterand its progeny should not be followed in
today's world given the broad approval granted to a variety of formula
clauses in IRS pronouncements, practitioners should be cautious when
using adjustment clauses that cause property to be returned to the donor
(or deemed never transferred) similar to those used in Procterand Ward.
Defined-value planning, however, involves a different structure than
addressed by the courts in Procterand its progeny because no condition
subsequent is present.

7.

Practitioners should be aware that the charitable techniques of McCord
and Christiansenare different from each other in terms of the effect of a
successful IRS challenge to value. A McCord-type of defined-value
formula (a transfer of interests of a specific dollar value to noncharity
donees with the remainder to charity, not based on values as finally
determined for transfer tax purposes) turns on the state law property rights
transferred. If, after the transfer, the donees reach an arm's length
agreement regarding the allocation of the interests among themselves
under the formula, a successful IRS challenge to the value of the interests
transferred does not change that allocation. On the other hand, a
Christiansen-typeof defined-value formula (a transfer of interests of a
specific dollar amount to noncharity donees with the remainder to charity,
based on values as finally determined for transfer tax purposes) is affected
by a successful IRS challenge to the value of the interest transferred.
Under that type of a clause, if the value of the interest transferred is

increased, the size of the interest passing to charity is likewise increased.
That increase applies for state law purposes whether or not an additional
charitable deduction is ultimately allowed. For a McCord-type of definedvalue formula, both the IRS and the courts will examine any pre-transfer
dealings with the charity. It is important for the taxpayer to be able to
demonstrate that the transaction with the charity was at arm's length and
that there was no pre-arranged deal between family members and the
charity providing that the charity would receive a specific interest in the
entity transferred. As the Fifth Circuit noted in McCord:
Neither the Majority Opinion nor any of the four other opinions
filed in the Tax Court found evidence of any agreement-not so
much as an implicit, "wink-wink" understanding-between the
Taxpayers and any of the donees to the effect that any exempt
donee was expected to, or in fact would, accept a percentage
interest in MIL with a value less than the full dollar amount that
the Taxpayers had given to such a donee two months earlier.
McCord, 461 F. 3d at 620.
8.

In this regard, it is also helpful for the charity to have its own counsel
review the transaction and, if the charity deems appropriate, obtain its own
valuation analysis.

9.

With testamentary defined-value transfers involving charities, it is often
difficult to set a formula in the will because the value of the estate is a
moving target. Thus, clients may prefer dollar value formula disclaimers
like the one used in Christiansen.This type of formula allows, but does
not require, the children to disclaim assets to a charity selected by the
decedent in his or her will. Charitable disclaimer planning like
Christiansengenerally requires all beneficiaries of the estate to act
together. If all do not disclaim, the defined-value structure will have a
"leak" that leads to estate tax if valuation is successfully challenged by the
IRS, because not all of the increase in value passes to charity. Careful
consideration should also be given to the drafting of debts, expenses, and
tax allocation provisions, because the boilerplate of many wills simply
allocates those obligations to the residue of the estate.

10.

For clients without the requisite charitable intent, or worried about family
members negotiating with the charity over the percentage interests
received by each donee in a McCord-type transaction, a defined-value
transfer using a GRAT might be considered. The structure would consist
of a transfer of interests equal to a specific dollar amount to non-GRAT
donees, with the remainder passing to a GRAT based on values as finally
determined for transfer tax purposes. In the event of a successful valuation
challenge by the IRS, the increased value would result in a larger transfer
to the GRAT and, as required by Code § 2702, increase the annuity owed

to the donor. This type of transaction is similar to the consideration
adjustment structure used in King. The difference is that, in a King
transaction, the property transferred to each recipient does not shift as it
would in the case of a GRAT; rather, the amount the recipient is required
to pay is based on the value of the property as finally determined for
transfer tax purposes. What might make the GRAT more desirable than
the consideration adjustment provision in King is that the Regulations
under Code § 2702 offer some comfort if faced with a Procterargument.
In addition, if the GRAT is not a "zeroed-out" GRAT, a successful IRS
challenge would result in some additional tax being due, which would
make it difficult for the IRS to argue, as it did in Procter,that the clause
violated public policy.
11.

XIX.

See, Porter and Dyer, Defined-Value Transfer PlanningAfter McCord and
Christiansen, 22 PROBATE & PROPERTY No. 5 (September/October 2008).

FREEZING - LOANS, INSTALLMENT SALES, ANNUITIES, AND PARTNERSHIP
FREEZES.
A.

Loans.
I.

A loan from a business to a shareholder, employee, or other person is
subject to scrutiny under Code § 7872, which provides rules applicable to
"below market loans" (BML). Code § 7872 requires the imputation of
interest in the case of certain loans where stated interest is less than the
applicable federal rate (AFR) appropriate to the loan. Code § 7872 was
enacted to block perceived loopholes which the IRS had been only
partially successful in closing.

2.

The first of these was the gift loan. Persons of means had been making
interest-free loans to the objects of their bounty. While the donees often
used the loan proceeds to purchase homes or other items, they were free to
invest the proceeds and to retain the after-tax income. In view of the fact
that there were no specific Code provisions addressing such transactions
(since they did not involve the sale or exchange of property), the donors
for many years contended that these transactions did not give rise to any
gift tax even though the donees received a direct and measurable
economic benefit from the interest-free use of the money. Economically,
these transactions were indistinguishable from arrangements under which
the donor directs the payment of the income from property owned by the
donor to designated persons. In this type of situation, the assignment of
income doctrine requires that the income from the property be taxed to the
property owner, or, where a grantor trust is used, to the grantor. In a series
of cases culminating in Dickman v. Comr., the IRS persuaded the courts
that interest-free loans of this type resulted in gifts, measured generally by
the amount of interest that could have been derived from investing the

loan proceeds at market rates. In these cases, however, the IRS did not
raise the question of whether the donor, in addition to the gift tax, should
also be subject to tax on the income arising, or deemed to have arisen,
from the use of the loan proceeds. In these circumstances, there was no
question as to whether the donee was entitled to deduct any deemed
interest payments to the lender.
3.

Another perceived loophole was presented in cases involving interest-free
loans from corporations to their shareholders. In these cases, the IRS
focused on the economic benefit enjoyed by the borrower which it sought
to characterize as equivalent to a distribution with respect to stock. In
these cases, the IRS was unsuccessful primarily because it was unable to
counter the argument that if the borrower were to be treated as receiving
income in the amount of the interest forgone by the corporate lender, the
borrower also must be allowed an equivalent deduction for the interest that
would have been payable had such interest been charged. In these cases,
the IRS apparently never sought to impose a tax on the corporate lender on
the theory that the transaction was the equivalent of a distribution of the
interest from funds invested at the corporate level. In one case, the IRS
successfully contended that a corporate distribution resulted from the sale
of corporate assets to shareholders where the funds to make the purchase
were made available to the shareholder by an interest-free term loan. The
Tax Court held that the amount of the distribution was equal to the excess
of the property's fair market value over the present value of the payments
due under the loan terms discounted at market interest rates.

4.

Finally, interest-free loans made by an employer to an employee (or made
to an independent contractor by a person for whom the contractor
performs services) could be used as a means of compensation. In such
cases, which seem largely to have escaped concerted IRS scrutiny, the
result is generally relatively tax neutral. The payment of compensation in
this form, however, avoids the payment of employment taxes. Further, as
pointed out in the DEFRA Bluebook, where such a loan is a term loan, the
borrower receives the benefit in the year of the loan, but any deemed
interest payments would be deductible over the term of the loan in which
case there would not be a matching offset of income and deductions.

5.

Code § 7872 was enacted to close these perceived loopholes by
recharacterizing any interest-free or below market loan of the types
discussed above, together with any other such loan which was or could be
availed of to avoid tax, as an arm's-length transaction in which the lender
made a loan to the borrower in exchange for a note requiring the payment
of interest at the applicable federal rate. Specifically, Code § 7872 results
in the parties being treated as if:

a.

The borrower paid interest to the lender that may be deductible by
the borrower and is included in income by the lender; and

b.

The lender 1.

Made a gift subject to the gift tax (in the case of a
gratuitous transaction),

2.

Paid a dividend or made a contribution to capital (in the
case of a corporation/shareholder loan),

3.

Paid compensation (in the case of a loan to a person
providing services), or

4.

Made some other payment characterized in accordance
with the substance of the transaction.

B.

Installment Sale.
I1.

A simple alternative to an outright gift or a private annuity transaction is a
sale of the business owner's entire interest in the business in exchange for
an installment note.

2.

If the business owner's basis in the transferred interest is significantly
lower than its fair market value, recognition of capital gain can be deferred
over the entire period of the installment note under Code § 453.

3.

A major advantage of the installment sale technique is the ability to set a
relatively low interest rate on the promissory note payments and avoid the
possibility that the transaction will be re-characterized as a bargain sale.
In Frane,98 T.C. 554 (1992), the Tax Court held that the Code § 7872
rates will apply to determine whether or not an installment note will be
valued at less than face value for the purposes of the application of the gift
tax.

4.

If the installment sale technique is utilized, care must be taken to
coordinate the balance of the transferor's estate plan with the installment
note technique. For example, upon the transferor's death, the fair market
value of the note will be included in his or her estate. Assuming that the
note is left to the obligor under the note, the tax apportionment provisions
of the estate plan might provide that the obligor bear the transfer tax
liability attributable to the note.

5.

If the property transferred has a fair market value significantly in excess of
its basis, the untaxed portion of the gain will be taxed to the transferor's
estate (and reportable on the fiduciary income tax returns filed for the

estate or trust) if the installment note is forgiven upon the transferor's
death, or transferred to the obligor as a consequence of transferor's death.
Frane v. Commissioner_,98 T.C. 341 (1992), reversed in part and
affirmed inpart,998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993). The capital gain so
recognized will constitute an item of income in respect of a decedent
under Code §§ 453B(f)(1) and 691(a)(2).
6.

The transferor may desire to elect out of the installment method at the time
the sale is consummated, and recognize all capital gain liability in the year
of sale. This will eliminate the future taxation of the unrecognized gain as
income in respect of a decedent. Effectively, if the transferor is in the
55% estate tax bracket, the government will be paying 55% of the income
tax liability attributable to the gain recognized in the year of sale.

7.

If the transferor desires, he may utilize the $ 10,000 gift tax annual
exclusion to forgive a portion of the installment note payments each year
(up to $20,000 per year if the transferor is married and the gift splitting
election under Code § 2513 is made for all gifts made during the
applicable calendar year). However, if the forgiveness of the note
payments is part of a prearranged plan, the Service could argue that the
transaction constitutes a bargain sale. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-299, 1977-2
C.B. 343. The forgiveness of payments will cause recognition for income
tax purposes of the gain element inherent in the forgiven payment

8.

Assuming that the purchaser of the business interest materially participates
in the business, and that the business is carried on as a partnership or S
corporation, it is likely that the purchaser will be able to deduct the interest
paid on the promissory note, and will not be subject to the investment
interest limitations of Code § 163(d). See Code § 163(d)(5)(A); Priv. Ltr.
Rul 9037027.

9.

Advantages.
a.

All future appreciation in the value of the property sold is removed
from the transferor's estate.

b.

Assuming that the purchaser remains solvent, the transferor is
guaranteed a fixed revenue stream for the term of the installment
note.

c.

The purchaser of the stock immediately receives a basis in the
stock equal to the purchase price, even though the payment of the
purchase price will be deferred over the period of the note. If the
sale is structure as a sale to a "defective" grantor trust, however,
the trust will assume the seller's basis in the stock.
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10.

C.

In the current low interest rate environment, the interest rate
payable under the note need not exceed the applicable rate under
Code § 7872. This results in minimizing the growth of the
transferor's estate from his or her receipt of interest payments. In
addition, when the transferor dies, the appraised value of the
installment note should reflect a significant discount for the low
interest rate payable under the note, provided that the note is left to
someone other than the obligor.

Disadvantages:
a.

The transferor's estate will forego a basis step-up on the
transferor's death in the installment note received in exchange for
the stock.

b.

The purchaser must continue to make the installment payments,
even if the value of the purchased asset declines in the period
following the sale.

c.

If the transferor is dependent upon the installment note payments,
and the purchaser subsequently is unable to make the payments, or
receives a discharge in bankruptcy, the transferor may not have
any recourse other than a security interest in the assets sold which
may have become worthless.

Self-Canceling Installment Note.
1.

A self-canceling installment note (SCIN) is defined as a debt obligation
that by its terms is extinguished at the death of the seller-creditor, with the
remaining note balance cancelled automatically. The primary advantage of
a SCIN over a straight installment sale is that if the seller dies prior to the
expiration of the installment term, the remaining value of the installments
are totally excluded from the seller's estate. Moreover, the SCIN provides
an advantage over a private annuity in that the seller does not incur the tax
risk of living well beyond the installment term, thereby increasing the
seller's gross estate by continued annuity payments.

2.

To compensate the seller for the risk of cancellation, the SCIN must
contain a "risk premium," which may be reflected either in the purchase
price of the assets or the interest rate of the note. Consequently, for the
SCIN to be beneficial from an estate planning standpoint, either of the
following must occur:
a.

The return on the asset that is sold must exceed the interest rate on
the SC1N.

b.

The seller must die before his or her life expectancy.

3.

SCIN may be classified as either an installment sale or a private annuity
for income tax treatment and valuation purposes. If the maximum term of
the SCIN exceeds the life expectancy of the seller (as determined under
Reg. 1.72-9), the SCIN is classified as a private annuity. If the installment
term does not exceed the seller's life expectancy, the SCIN is classified as
an installment sale. The differences between these two methods are
discussed below. In most situations, the preference is to structure the
SCIN so that it is treated as an installment sale.

4.

IRS Rulings and case law have attempted to clarify some of the issues
with respect to the income tax treatment and valuation of SCINs. Many of
the uncertainties have been addressed in the last few years, creating the
need to review the usefulness of SCINs in light of recent developments
and current interest rates.

5.

Estate tax consequences.
a.

The primary advantage of a SCIN for estate tax purposes is that the
cancelled notes or contract payments are not included in the estate
of the seller. Therefore, if the seller suffers a premature death, the
SCIN may provide substantial estate tax savings. Also, even if the
seller lives for the entire installment period, the sale of the property
freezes the value of the asset and removes any appreciation on
such property from the estate of the seller.

b.

Because current interest rates are relatively low from a historical
perspective (even after allowing for an interest rate risk premium),
the use of a SCIN with an asset that has the potential for
substantial appreciation may provide significant estate tax savings.

c.

Moreover, in April 1999 the IRS issued proposed and temporary
regulations revising the actuarial tables to reflect longer life
expectancies. Because the longer life expectancies reduce the
likelihood of a seller dying before the end of the installment term,
the risk premium required should be less. An exception to the use
of the mortality tables applies in the event of a "terminal illness."
A person is defined as terminally ill if the probability of death
within one year is at least 50%. On the other hand, if the
individual survives for at least 18 months, he or she is presumed
not to have been terminally ill unless the contrary is established by
clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, a SCIN is ideal for
someone in poor health-but not terminally ill-who is not likely
to live out the life expectancy indicated in IRS tables.

6.

7.

Gift tax consequences.
a.

GCM 39503 states that the sale for a SCIN is not subject to gift tax
if the sales price and length of payment are reasonable when
compared with the value of the property transferred. The SCIN
must contain a risk premium reflected as either an increase in the
sales price or a higher interest rate in order to account for the
possibility that the seller will die prior to the end of the installment
term. If the fair market value of the property exceeds the SCIN's
value, the seller has made a gift of the excess.

b.

When valuing a SCIN classified as a private annuity, the IRS has
taken the position that the transfer tax mortality tables and discount
rates determine the value of the SCIN and whether a gift has been
made. This valuation method is relatively simple as the IRS
provides actuarial tables for the shorter of one life or a term of
years.

c.

On the other hand, if the SCIN is classified as an installment sale,
GCM 39503 states that the facts-and-circumstances approach may
be used. This implies that some flexibility may be allowed in
valuing the SCIN for gift tax purposes. From a transfer tax
standpoint, this flexibility may allow the installment payments to
be less than under the transfer tax tables. The downside to this
approach, however, is the subjectiveness of the valuation, and the
corresponding possibility that the IRS may object to such
valuation.

Income Tax Treatment.
a.

Transferor's treatment of gain. Assuming the SCIN is treated as an
installment sale, gain recognized by the transferor who receives the
SCIN is reported over the period during which payments are
received. Each payment is divided into a return of basis, capital
gain (assuming capital asset), and interest income. The amount of
each item is determined by assuming that the maximum price will
be received and by allocating these amounts proportionally to each
installment payment. This method of reporting effectively allows
the seller to defer capital gain over the period payments are
received. Any gain remaining at the seller's death, however, is
recognized by the decedent's estate.

b.

Capital gain on cancellation. Assuming the SCIN is treated as an
installment note, recent case law and IRS rulings clearly indicate
that based on Code § 453B(f), capital gain is recognized at death
when a self-cancellation provision becomes operative. Historically,

there was a question as to whether the gain is recognized on the
decedent's final return or by the decedent's estate.
c.

The Eighth Circuit, in Estate of Frane, held that the capital gain
should be treated as income in respect of a decedent (IRD) under
Code § 691(a)(5)(A)(iii), which provides that "any cancellation of
such an obligation occurring at the death of a decedent shall be
treated as a transfer by the estate of the decedent ...." Therefore, the
gain is recognized on the estate income tax return and the tax
liability resulting from the cancellation of the SCEN cannot be
deducted as a debt of the estate on the estate tax return. In addition,
losses from the decedent not used during his or her lifetime cannot
be used to offset the gains realized by the decedent's estate on the
cancellation of the SCIN.

d.

Basis of property. The law is not entirely clear with respect to the
buyer's basis in the property, as the installment sale rules do not
address this issue with respect to a SCIN. GCM 39503, however,
concludes that the buyer's basis in property acquired in an
installment sale is the full face value of the note. This appears to be
the correct result as the decedent must recognize capital gain on
the SCIN. The courts, however, have not specifically addressed
this issue.

e.

Based on GCM 39503, installment treatment is advantageous to
private annuity treatment for purposes of determining the buyer's
basis. If the SCIN is treated as an annuity, the buyer's basis for
determining gain during the seller's lifetime is only the present
value (using IRS tables) of the right to receive payments. Thus, the
basis should initially equal the purchase price of the asset. The
buyer's basis increases only when the aggregate annuity payments
exceed the projected present value of the payments. Accordingly,
on the cancellation of a SCIN treated as an annuity, the buyer's
basis is fixed. On the other hand, if the SCIN is treated as an
installment sale, the buyer's basis is the face amount of the note.

f.

Buyer's interest deduction. GCM 39503 also provides that, subject
to other limitations, the interest paid by the buyer is fully
deductible. These other limitations, however, apply to the type of
property used in a SCIN transaction. For instance, if a SCIN is
used to purchase investment property, the interest may be deducted
only to the extent of the buyer's net investment income from all
sources, unless a passive activity is involved. Investment income is
defined as income from dividends, annuities, or royalties not
derived in the ordinary course of a trade or business. Any
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investment interest not deductible may be carried forward to the
following year.

D.

g.

Passive Activity. If the investment is also a passive activity, the
interest deduction is generally limited to investment income of the
particular investment. The passive loss rules in Code § 469 provide
that the losses and credits from a passive activity cannot be used to
offset income from nonpassive activities. Passive activities are
defined as trades or businesses in which the taxpayer does not
materially participate, including all rental activities. In contrast, if
the SCIN is treated as an annuity, the purchaser gets no interest
deduction.

h.

Security or guarantees. In addition to the differences between
SCINs and annuities discussed above, an advantage to a SCTN is
that the transferor may take certain security or guarantees without
jeopardizing the installment sale treatment. If a transferor receives
security for a private annuity, the entire gain is taxable at the time
of the transfer.

i.

Sale of marketable securities. The sale of marketable securities is
not eligible for installment reporting for income tax purposes. The
sale of a partnership interest that owns marketable securities for a
SCIN, however, should qualify for installment treatment if the
selling partner could not have sold or caused the sale of the
publicly traded securities.

Private Annuities.
1.

A private annuity is a transfer of property from an annuitant (the
transferor) who is not in the business of issuing annuities, to an obligor
(the transferee) in exchange for the obligor's promise to make periodic
payments of fixed amounts for the remainder of the annuitant's life or
other specified period. Private annuities also can be structured to have a
joint and survivor provision.

2.

The annuitant purchases the annuity by transferring money or other
property to the obligor. The obligor may be an individual, corporation,
trust, foundation, or other entity.

3.

The most advantageous and common use of private annuities is for
intrafamily transfers with the annuitant being the parent and the child
being the obligor. Other common private annuity situations involve the
redemption of stock by a closely held corporation in exchange for the
annuity. Private annuities may, however, also be established between
unrelated parties.

4.

The tax consequences of private annuities are described in Rev. Rul. 6974. The gain realized on a private annuity is the excess of the present
value of the annuity over the annuitant's basis. The annuitant's income tax
treatment is governed by Code § 72. Part of each annuity payment is a taxfree return of capital, while the remainder is subject to taxation.

5.

Capital asset property. If the property used to fund the annuity is a capital
asset, the gain (e.g., excess present value of annuity over basis in asset) is
capital gain. Any excess FMV over the present value of the annuity
received is a taxable gift to the obligor. Gain is reported over the term of
the annuity or the annuitant's life expectancy. Tables containing life
expectancy factors are in Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9.

6.

All annuity transfers after 1986 may not exclude more than the annuitant's
investment in the contract as tax-free return of income. Once the annuitant
fully recovers his or her investment in the contract, the balance of the
payments received are fully taxable as ordinary income. Before 1987,
there was no limitation on the exclusion ratio, i.e., if the annuitant outlived
his or her actuarial life expectancy, a portion of the payments would still
be tax-free. For annuity transfers taking place after 7/1/86, if the annuitant
dies before recovering his or her full investment in the contract, Code §
72(b)(3) provides that the unrecovered amount can be taken as a deduction
on the decedent's final return. There was no such rule for transfers before
7/2/86.

7.

Depreciable property. If depreciable personal property used in a trade or
business is transferred instead of capital gain property, the depreciation
must be recaptured under Code § 1245. If real property is transferred, the
recapture must be reported under Code § 1250. These provisions require
income recognition of the depreciation recapture in the year the property is
first transferred in exchange for the annuity. The obligor's basis for
depreciating the property received in exchange for the annuity can change
as annuity payments are made. Prior to the annuitant's death, the property's
unadjusted basis starts at the value of the prospective payments. Once
payments equal the value of the annuity on the date of the transaction,
additional payments are added to basis. After the annuitant's death,
however, the obligor's unadjusted basis is the total of annuity payments
actually made.

8.

Unfortunately for the obligor, the actual price paid for the annuity property
cannot be determined until the annuitant's death. Thus, payments made by
the obligor during the annuitant's life are treated as capital expenditures
for tax purposes. The obligor cannot deduct any part of the payment as
interest, even though the annuitant must pay tax on the interest part of
each payment. The obligor can, however, increase his or her basis in the

transferred property as payments are made. If the obligor disposes of the
property after the annuitant's death, the obligor's unadjusted basis in the
property is the total payments made. If the property used to fund the
annuity is sold before the annuitant's death, the obligor has a "split" basis
for determining gain or loss. The unadjusted basis for determining gain is
the total annuity payments made up to the time of disposition and the
present value of the prospective payments still to be made (as determined
under Code § 7520). The unadjusted basis for determining loss is the total
payments made up to the time of sale. If the sale price is less than the
adjusted basis for gain and more than the adjusted basis for loss, neither
the gain nor the loss is recognized.
9.

Gift taxes. One of the more common uses of private annuities for family
transfers is to include a gift element in the annuity contract. This allows
parents, grandparents, or other relatives to transfer property to children,
make gifts, and still ensure their own financial well being. When property
is transferred for less than its full consideration, the Service treats the
portion of the transfer that is less than the property's FMV as a gift. If a
gift is not intended, the FMV of the transferred property must equal the
present value of the annuity. Thus, the property should be appraised if it is
not easily valued on public markets. Further, consulting with an actuary
can help avoid any surprise partial gifts and tax penalties. When part of a
private annuity transaction is treated as a gift, the donor-annuitant's basis
(i.e., investment in the contract) cannot exceed the present value of the
prospective annuity payments that will be made. If depreciable and
nondepreciable property are used, the basis for the gift portion is allocated
between the two properties proportionally. Suppose the obligor is the one
making the gift. The obligor's basis is limited to the value of the property
received for purposes of determining both depreciation and gain or loss
(i.e., the obligor gets a zero basis for the gift portion of the property).

10.

Estate taxes. To avoid inclusion of the transferred property in the
annuitant's gross estate, an annuitant must not retain a security interest in
the transferred property. If an annuitant retains a security interest that
allows repossession of the property on the obligor's default, the annuitant
may have this property included in his or her estate under Code § 2036, as
a transfer with a retained life estate.

11.

Advantages. For annuitants who die prematurely, private annuities are a
low transfer tax way to avoid having property taxed in the estate under
Code § 2036. Aside from this (and for those who expect to live out their
life expectancies), the greatest benefit of a private annuity is to a transferor
(the annuitant) who wants to keep ownership of certain property within the
family, while having the security of a fixed income for life. Further, the
annuitant can remove any future appreciation on the transferred property
from his or her gross estate. Property transferred within three years of the

109

annuitant's death should not be included in the annuitant's gross estate,
provided a life estate or security interest was not retained that would cause
inclusion under Code §§ 2036, 2037, 2038 or 2042.
12.

Disadvantages. The most precarious aspect of entering into a private
annuity agreement is the annuitant's life expectancy. The uncertainty of
death may cause difficulties. If the annuitant dies prior to his or her
actuarial life expectancy, the obligor's basis may be lower than it would
have been had the property been inherited. In the alternative, if the
annuitant outlives his or her actuarial life expectancy, the annuity
payments may exceed the value of the contract or the estate tax value
assigned to the assets had it been retained by the estate. An annuitant who
outlives his or her actuarial life expectancy will have to pay income tax on
the entire realized gain. Further, if the annuitant does not spend the
payments, they will increase his or her estate, perhaps by more than the
underlying property would be worth if the annuitant outlives his or her life
expectancy. An additional risk to the annuitant is that the obligor may
predecease him or her-jeopardizing the receipt of future payments.
Because annuity payments are usually made from after-tax dollars, with
part of the payments being included in the annuitant's income as interest, a
private annuity may increase the overall tax burden to the parties involved.
Even though the annuitant receives interest income, the obligor cannot
take the interest expense deduction for any portion of the annuity payment.
If the property used to fund the annuity is of a very high economic value,
it may place a financial burden on the obligor to make such high annuity
payments.

13.

On October 18, 2006, the Department of Treasury issued Prop. Regs. §
1.72-6 and Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-1 that eliminate the income tax
advantages of selling appreciated property in exchange for a private
annuity. The proposed regulations require the seller's gain to be
recognized in the year the transaction is effected rather than as payments
are received. The proposed regulations generally would apply for
transactions entered into after Oct. 18, 2006, but certain transactions
effected before Apr. 19, 2007 would continue to be subject to the current
rules. Under the proposed regulations, the following would occur when an
annuity contract is received in exchange for property (other than money):
a.

The amount realized attributable to the annuity contract would be the
FMV (as determined under the valuation tables issued under Section
7520) of the annuity contract at the time of the exchange;

b.

The entire amount of the gain or loss, if any, would be recognized at
the time of the exchange, regardless of the taxpayer's method of
accounting; and

c.

For purposes of determining the initial investment in the annuity
contract under Section 72(c)(1) , the aggregate amount of premiums
or other consideration paid for the annuity contract would equal the
amount realized attributable to the annuity contract (the FMV of the
annuity contract).

For an exchange of property for an annuity contract that is in part a sale
and in part a gift, the Proposed Regulations apply the same rules that apply
to any other such exchange under Section 1001 . Prop. Regs. § 1.10011(j)(1). The Proposed Regulations provide that, for purposes of
determining the investment in the annuity contract under Section 72(c)(1),
the aggregate amount of premiums or other consideration paid for the
annuity contract would be the portion of the amount realized on the
exchange that is attributable to the annuity contract (which is the FMV of
the annuity contract at the time of the exchange). (Reg. § 1.72-6(e)(1) )
The annuitant's investment in the contract would be reduced in subsequent
years under Section 72(c)(1)(B) for amounts already received under the
contract subsequent to the exchange and excluded from gross income
when received as a return of the annuitant's investment in the contract.
The Proposed Regulations do not distinguish between secured and
unsecured annuity contracts, or between annuity contracts issued by an
insurance company and those issued by a taxpayer that is not an insurance
company. Instead, they provide a single set of rules that leave the
transferor and transferee in the same position before tax as if the transferor
had sold the property for cash and used the proceeds to purchase an
annuity contract. The Proposed Regulations apply for exchanges of
property for an annuity contract after October 18, 2006. Thus, they
wouldn't apply to amounts received after October 18, 2006, under annuity
contracts that were received in exchange for property before that date. For
a certain transactions, the Proposed Regulations apply for annuity
contracts received in exchange for property after Apr. 18, 2007. The
delayed effective date would apply for transactions in which (i) the issuer
of the annuity contract is an individual; (ii) the obligations under the
annuity contract are not secured, either directly or indirectly; and (iii) the
property transferred in the exchange is not subsequently sold or otherwise
disposed of by the transferee during the two-year period beginning on the
date of the exchange.
E.

Partnership Freezes
I1.

Section 2701 was enacted in 1990 as a part of Chapter 14 and addresses the
technique of partnership freezes between family members. On the most basic
level, a partnership freeze (prior to 1990) was a technique wherein two classes of
partnership interests would be issued; one of which carried a non-cumulative
preferred return on what was most often the partner's capital account (but had no
rights to participate in the growth of the entity) and the other, a non-preferred
interest, carried the remaining value of the entity, taking into account the entity's

requirement to pay the preferred return. Prior to 1990, when these interests were
valued, the majority of the value was found to be in the preferred interest and the
non-preferred interest had no (or little) value. As a result, the non-preferred
interest could be transferred at little or no gift tax cost, and the future appreciation
in the entity would thereafter be in the donee's hands, while the donor continued
to receive a stream of income from the entity, through its payment of the preferred
return. Upon the death of the donor, the only asset includible in his or her estate
was the value of the preferred return, which was discounted in light of its noncumulative nature. All of the appreciation in the entity would therefore escape
inclusion in the donor's estate because it was in the hands of the donee in the form
of the non-preferred interest.
2.

Section 2701 provides that if the preferred interest does not meet certain
requirements set forth in the Section, then such interest will be valued at zero.
Thereafter, if any transfer is made of any non-preferred interest, the value deemed
to have been transferred shall be based on the "subtraction method" of valuation,
calculated as follows:
a.

The value of all property contributed to the partnership (or the
value of all interests in the partnership) is determined (as though it
were held by one individual).

b.

The value of the preferred interest is subtracted from the value
determined above:
(1)

If the preferred interest does not meet the requirements of
Section 2701, the value is deemed to be zero.

(2)

If the preferred interest meets the requirements of Section
2701, the value is determined based on normal valuation
methodology, with the exception that any value attributable
to most liquidation, put, call or conversion rights (other
than rights that must be exercised at a specific time and at a
specific amount) attached to the preferred interest, are
valued at zero.

c.

The remaining value (after the subtraction) is allocated
proportionately among the non-preferred interests (including the
non-preferred interests held by holders of preferred interests).

d.

In a transfer subject to Section 2701, the value of all non-preferred
interests, together, must equal at least 10% of the value of all
partnership interests, plus the value of any, indebtedness of such
entity to the family. Accordingly, notwithstanding the valuation of
preferred interests that meet the requirements of Section 2701, if
such interests make up more than 90% of the value of the entire
entity, the excess of such value over the 90% amount must be

allocated proportionately to the non-preferred "junior" entity
interests.
e.

3.

If the value allocated to each non-preferred interest is greater than
the amount contributed (or the consideration paid) by the owner of
the non-preferred interest, a gift has been made.

Accordingly, to avoid the gift that would result from the value of the
preferred interest to be deemed to have been zero, the preferred interest
should either meet the requirements of Section 2701 or the transaction
must fit into one of the Section's exceptions, which are as follows:
a.

If market quotations for the preferred interest is readily
ascertainable, Section 2701 does not apply.

b.

If the transferor transfers interests (i) in the same class or (ii) is
proportionately the same as the interests retained by the transferor,
Section 2701 does not apply.

c.

Section 2701 only applies when (i) there is a transfer, to or for the
benefit of a member of the transferor's family who is in the same
or lower generation as the transferor, of an equity (non-preferred)
interest in the entity, (ii) after the transfer, the transferor or a
family member who is in the same or higher generation as the
transferor holds retains a "distribution right" (the payment of
which is in the discretion of the entity), and (iii) the entity is
controlled by the family (pursuant to the application of certain
attribution rules set forth in the Section). For this purpose,
"control" means either holding 50% of the capital or profits of the
entity or holding the general partner or the manager interest in the
entity.

d.

Qualified Payments
(1)

If the distribution right is deemed to be a "qualified
payment" then it will be valued at its fair market value,
rather than zero, for purposes of these rules. A qualified
payment is one that is paid on a periodic basis that is
cumulative and determined at a fixed rate.

(2)

If the distribution right is deemed not to be a "qualified
payment", the transferor or family member holding the
right may elect to treat the right as a qualified payment and
the election is irrevocable.

(3)

Once a payment is deemed (or elected) to be a qualified
payment, there is an additional consequence to such
characterization. If the payments are in arrears by four

years or more, then the payments shall be deemed to have
been made when due and such payments shall be deemed
to have been reinvested as of such date at the discount rate
used in determining the value of interest. Such deemed
amount will be a deemed transfer subject to estate or gift
taxes, either when the transferor makes a gift (or sells) his
or her interest in the entity or at his or her death.
e.

4.

XX.

If the distribution right is a right to receive a guaranteed payment
(pursuant to Section 707(c)) of a fixed amount, then such rights are
not subject to the rules of Section 2701.

See Private Letter Ruling 200114004 for a partnership freeze using a
FLLC that was approved by the Service.

FREEZING - GRATS, SALES TO DEFECTIVE GRANTOR TRUSTS, AND QPRTS.
A.

Grantor Retained Annuity Trust.
I1.

A Grantor Retained Annuity Trust or "GRAT" is an irrevocable trust into
which the client makes a gift of property and retains an annuity payable
for a term of years. If the client survives the term, any property remaining
in the trust passes without any additional gift tax to the remaindermen, or
to trusts for their benefit.

2.

For gift tax purposes, the value of the gift upon creation of a GRAT is
determined by subtracting the value of the retained interest from the value
of the property gifted to the GRAT. The retained interest is valued using
the "Applicable Federal Rate" ("AFR") promulgated by the Treasury
pursuant to Code § 7520 for the month in which the gift is made. If the
client has enough remaining applicable exclusion, no gift tax will be due.
Generally, if the assets transferred to the GRAT appreciate or produce
income at a rate higher than the AFR, the transaction will successfully
leverage the gift tax exemption.

3.

For purposes of valuing a gift to a GRAT, Code § 2702 provides that if a
person transfers an interest in trust to or for the benefit of a member of his
or her family and the transferor or an "applicable family member" retains
an interest in the trust, then for purposes of determining the value of the
interest transferred, any retained interests in the trust that are not
"qualified interests" are valued at zero. An "applicable family member"
includes the transferor's spouse, an ancestor of the transferor or the
transferor's spouse, and the spouse of any such ancestor. Both the annuity
for a fixed term of years retained by the client and the remainder
transferred to the remaindermen are qualified interests. However, the
reversion retained by the client is not a qualified interest, and therefore its
value is treated as zero. Because the value of the gift upon creation of a

GRAT is determined by subtracting the value of the qualified interests
retained by the client, the value of the reversion is effectively reflected in
the remainder value transferred to the remaindermen. In effect, the value
of the reversion is subject to gift tax as if it had been transferred to the
remaindermen, although it was actually retained by the client. Thus, the
gift to the remaindermen is the present value of the amount actuarially
expected to remain in the GRAT at the end of the term, plus the value of
the reversion.

B.

4.

Notwithstanding the benefits of the GRAT technique, there are two
negative features. First, if the client dies prior to the end of the GRAT
term, some or all of the trust assets are included in the client's estate. The
client typically retains a reversionary interest in the GRAT so that the
property will pass as part of his or her estate if he or she does not survive
the GRAT term. Second, the client cannot allocate generation-skipping
transfer ("GST") tax exemption to the trust until the end of the GRAT
term, thus precluding use of the GRAT to leverage the GST tax
exemption.

5.

The Walton case, Walton v. Comm 'r., 115 T.C. No. 41 (2000), held that
Ex. 5 of the Treasury Regulations is an invalid interpretation of Code §
2702. This case opens the door to creating GRATs with unlimited amounts
of value without a gift tax.

6.

When considering the transfer of a closely held business interest to a
GRAT, consider the collateral valuation issues associated with
contribution and distribution of those business interests. For example,
client contributes 100% of the stock of a closely held business, valued at
$10 million, to a 3 year Walton style GRAT in March 2008 (3.6% Code §
7520 rate). The GRAT, by its terms must distribute 35.76154% of the
initial value of the assets contributed to the GRAT. Here is a situation
(somewhat analogous to the Ahmanson Foundationand Chenoweth line of
cases), where the taxpayer can potentially get whipsawed on the valuation.
A contribution of 100% of the stock of company to the GRAT will not
generate a discount for lack of control, but an in-kind distribution of a
35.76154% interest in the same shares will certainly generate such a
discount. The result being that more shares need to be distributed out of
the GRAT, thereby negating its efficacy.

7.

Also, when considering a GRAT funded with an interest in a pass-through
entity, such as an S corporation or an LLC, consider providing for
quarterly GRAT payments, which will allow the grantor to receive
distributions from the GRAT that parallel the grantor's estimated tax
payment obligations.

Sale to "Defective" Grantor Trust.
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1.

The sale to a grantor trust, also commonly referred to as a "defective"
grantor trust, has become one of the primary leveraging techniques in the
estate planning lawyer's arsenal. A defective grantor trust is a trust that
Subpart E of Subchapter J of the Code treats as being owned by the
grantor but that is not included in the grantors gross estate. It is also
possible to draft and fund a trust so that the beneficiary is the owner of the
trust for income tax purposes under Code § 678, but this article does not
discuss the use of that technique. Because the grantor is the owner of the
trust for income tax purposes, he or she must report all trust income,
deductions and credits on his or her personal income tax return. Code §
671-677.

2.

A defective grantor trust has three primary benefits.
a.

First, the grantor's payment of income taxes on income earned by
the trust is the functional equivalent of a tax-free gift to the trust by
the grantor.

b.

Second, because the trust pays no income taxes while the grantor is
living, its assets accumulate income tax-free. For example,
assuming a 40% income tax rate, a defective grantor trust that
earns income at a rate of 10% per year would have the entire
amount of this income remaining in the defective grantor trust. On
the other hand, if the trust were not a defective grantor trust, it
would have only 6% of the earnings remaining in the trust after
taxes.

c.

Finally, because the Code treats the grantor as the owner of the
trust for income tax purposes, the IRS disregards transactions
between the grantor and the trust for income tax purposes. Rev.
Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.

3.

Before the client sells the discounted assets to the defective trust, it is
important that he or she give assets to the trust that have a fair market
value of at least 10% of the value of the assets that the client plans to sell
to the trust. The purpose for independently funding at least 10% is to
decrease the likelihood that Code § 2036(a)(1) will apply to the sales
transaction and cause those assets to be returned to the client's taxable
estate. If the trust owns little or no assets independent of the sales
transaction, there is a greater danger that the IRS could recast the
transaction as a disguised transfer with a retained interest.

4.

The client should file a gift tax return allocating GST exemption to the
trust so that it is wholly exempt from generation-skipping taxes. If the gift
is less than the client's applicable exclusion amount under Code § 2505, no
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gift tax will be due. After the gift, the client enters into a sales agreement
with the trustee of the trust whereby the trustee agrees to purchase limited
partnership interests or other assets subject to a valuation discount, such as
minority interests in a business. The client conveys those assets to the trust
in exchange for a promissory note with a face value equal to the fair
market value of the assets. If the purchase price equals the fair market
value of the purchased assets, there will be no taxable gift or transfer
subject to the GST tax. Thus, no additional gift or GST exemption must be
allocated to the trust.
5.

The parties will structure the promissory note to pay the client interest for
a term of years with a balloon payment of principal at the end of the term,
using the Code § 1274 interest rate for the month of the sale so that there
is no imputed gift under Code § 7872. The payments from the trust to the
client are usually very low in comparison to the income earned by the
asset being sold to the trust. The Code § 1274 rate is typically low, and
that low rate applies to the discounted value of the asset sold rather than
against the pro rata value.

6.

In Revenue Ruling 2004-64, the Service discusses the estate tax effect of a
tax reimbursement clause contained in a defective grantor trust - i.e., a
trust that is treated as owned by a grantor for income tax purposes, but
whose assets are excluded from the grantor's estate for estate tax purposes.
a.

Situation 1- No Right to Income Tax Reimbursement. Payment of
income tax by grantor will not be a gift to trust or trust
beneficiaries.

b.

Situation 2 - Mandatory Income Tax Reimbursement Clause Will
Cause Estate Tax Inclusion Under Code § 2036. IRS will not apply
this to Trusts created before October 4, 2004.

c.

Situation 3- Discretionary Reimbursement Provision (Whether
Exercised or Not) Will Not Cause Estate Tax Inclusion Under
Code § 2036.

This ruling confirms a position which many taxpayers and practitioners
believed to be correct. This ruling is the first formal pronouncement by the
IRS which confirms this view.
7.

In Revenue Ruling 2007-13, the Service addressed the transfer for value
issues when a life insurance policy is transferred to a defective grantor
trust. This Ruling addresses the question of whether the transfer of a life
insurance contract on the grantor's life to a grantor trust is a transfer for a
valuable consideration within the meaning of Code § 101 (a)(2) of the
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Internal Revenue Code, and if so, is a transfer to the insured within the
meaning of Code § 101 (a)(2)(B)?
a.

The facts of the Ruling are fairly straightforward. In Situation 1,
Trust I and Trust 2 are grantor trusts, both of which are treated as
wholly owned by the Grantor under subpart E of Part I of
subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code. Trust 2 owns a life
insurance contract upon the life of the Grantor. Trust 2 transfers
the life insurance contract to Trust 1 in exchange for cash. In
Situation 2, the facts are the same as in Situation 1, except that
Trust 2 is not a grantor trust.

b.

Code § 101 (a)(1) provides that, except as otherwise provided in §§
101(a)(2), 101(d), and 101(f), gross income does not include
amounts received under a life insurance contract if such amounts
are received by reason of the death of the insured. Code §
101 (a)(2) provides, generally, that if a life insurance contract, or
any interest therein, is transferred for a valuable consideration, the
exclusion from gross income provided by § 101 (a)(1) shall not
exceed an amount equal to the sum of the actual value of the
consideration and the premiums and other amounts subsequently
paid by the transferee. The term "transfer for a valuable
consideration" is defined for purposes of § 101 (a)(2) in § 1.101 I(b)(4) of the Income Tax Regulations as any absolute transfer for
value of a right to receive all or a part of the proceeds of a life
insurance policy. Code § 101 (a)(2)(B) provides that § 101 (a)(2)
does not apply to a transfer of a life insurance contract or any
interest therein to the insured, to a partner of the insured, to a
partnership in which the insured is a partner, or to a corporation in
which the insured is a shareholder or officer.

c.

In Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, a grantor acquired the corpus
of a trust in exchange for the grantor's unsecured promissory note.
The ruling concludes that the grantor is considered to have
borrowed the corpus of the trust and, as a result, is treated as the
owner of the trust under § 675(3). Because the grantor is treated as
the owner of the trust, the grantor is deemed the owner of the trust
assets for federal income tax purposes. In addition, because the
grantor is therefore considered to own the purported consideration
both before and after the transaction, the exchange of a promissory
note for the trust assets is not recognized as a sale for federal
income tax purposes.

d.

The Ruling concludes that, in Situation 1, because the Grantor is
treated as the owner of both Trust 1 and Trust 2 for federal income
tax purposes, the Grantor is treated as the owner of all the assets of

both trusts, including both the life insurance contract and the cash
received for it, both before and after the exchange. Accordingly, in
Situation 1 there has been no transfer of the contract within the
meaning of Code § 101(a)(2).
e.

In Situation 2, because the Grantor is treated as the owner of all the
assets of Trust 1 but not of Trust 2 for federal income tax purposes,
the Grantor is treated as the owner of the cash (but not the life
insurance contract) before the exchange, and as the owner of the
life insurance contract (but not the cash) after the exchange.
Accordingly, in Situation 2 there has been a transfer of the life
insurance contract for a valuable consideration within the meaning
of § 101 (a)(2). Nevertheless, the transfer for value limitations of §
101(a)(2) do not apply, because the transfer to Trust 1 is treated as
a transfer to the Grantor, the insured, within the meaning of §
101 (a)(2)(B).

f.

This ruling is consistent with Private Letter Rulings issued by the
IRS, including, Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 200636086 ( September 8, 2006);
200606027 (February 10, 2006 ); 200518061 ( May 6, 2005);
200514001 and 200514002 ( April 8, 2005 ); 200247006 (
November 22, 2002 ), and 200228019 (April 10, 2002 ).

g.

The benefit of this planning is two-fold. First, as the Ruling clearly
states, the transfer of a policy to a grantor trust will qualify for the
exception to the transfer for value rules. The second, more
interesting planning implication, is that the policy can be sold to a
grantor trust for full and adequate consideration and escape the
three-year rule of Code § 2035.

h.

Consider the following situations where this type of planning may
be useful:
1. Grantor owns a policy on her life, whether issued yesterday or
10 years ago, and sells it to her grantor trust to avoid the threeyear rule. How so? The three-year rule does not apply to
transfers for adequate and full consideration. Code § 2035(d).
No transfer-for-value problem because the sale is disregarded.
2. Grantor Trust 1 owns a policy on grantor's life, but planning is
better served if the policy is in Grantor Trust 2. Sell the policy
to Trust 2, either for cash or a promissory note. If both trusts
are grantor trusts, there are no income tax consequences
whatsoever. If only Trust 2 is a grantor trust, there is no
transfer-for-value violation because the transfer-to-insured
exception is met (although there may be taxable gain when
Trust I is not a grantor trust).
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3. Grantor-insured's employer or qualified plan owns a policy on
grantor's life. In both cases, taxable income to the grantoremployee and the three-year rule can be avoided with a sale of
the policy to the grantor trust (adequate and full consideration
exception). In addition, there is no transfer-for-value problem
because it is a transfer to the insured.
4. A and B own policies on the other's life for cross purchase
buy-sell purposes. When the arrangement is terminated, A can
sell the policy on B's life to B's grantor trust, and vice versa.
No three-year rule (adequate and full consideration exception)
and no transfer-for-value (transfer-to-insured exception)
although there may be taxable gain on the sale.
8.

In Notice 2007-73, the IRS described two "transactions of interest"
involving a grantor trust where the grantor trust status was "toggled" off
and then "toggled" on. The IRS and Treasury Department believe this
transaction has the potential for tax avoidance or evasion, but lack
sufficient information to determine whether the transaction should be
identified specifically as a tax avoidance transaction. The notice identifies
this transaction, and substantially similar transactions, as transactions of
interest for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(6) and Code §§ 6111
and 6112. The notice also alerts persons involved with these transactions
to certain responsibilities that may arise from their involvement with these
transactions. It does not appear that turning off the grantor trust status of a
trust is affected.

9.

A power that is often used to cause a trust to be a grantor trust is a is a
nonfiduciary power in the grantor to substitute assets of equivalent value
with the trust under Code § 675(4)(c). In Revenue Ruling 2008-22, 200816 I.R.B. _ (April 21, 2008), the IRS provided guidance under section
2036 regarding the tax consequences of a retained power to substitute
assets in a trust. This ruling is immensely important to sophisticated estate
planning, and it deserves close scrutiny by estate planning practitioners.
a.

Under the facts of the Ruling, a U.S. citizen funded an irrevocable
inter vivos trust for the benefit of his descendants and named
another person as the trustee. The trust instrument specifically
prohibited the grantor from serving as trustee and granted the
grantor the power, exercisable at any time, to acquire any property
held by the trust - by substituting other property of equivalent
value. The substitution power was exercisable by the grantor in a
non-fiduciary capacity, without the approval or consent of any
person acting in a fiduciary capacity. The trust did, however,
require that in order to exercise the substitution power, the grantor
must certify in writing that the substituted property and the trust
property for which it is substituted are of equivalent value. Local

law, furthermore, imposed upon the trustee a fiduciary obligation
to ensure that the properties being exchanged are of equivalent
value. Also, local law imposed upon the trustee of a trust that has
two or more beneficiaries, a duty to act impartially in investing and
managing the trust assets, taking into account any differing
interests of the beneficiaries. Without restriction in the trust
instrument, the trustee has the discretionary power to acquire,
invest, reinvest, exchange, sell, convey, control, divide, partition,
and manage the trust property in accordance with the standards
provided by law. The grantor died after the trust was created and
funded, and the IRS raised the question of whether the trust assets
should be includible in the grantor's gross estate under Section
2036(a) or 2038(a), on account of the reserved nonfiduciary power
to substitute trust assets.
b.

c.

The IRS ruled that the substitution power will not, by itself, cause
the value of the trust corpus to be includible in the deceased
grantor's gross estate, as long as the trustee has a fiduciary
obligation (under local law) to ensure the grantor's compliance
with the terms of this power by satisfying itself that the properties
acquired and substituted by the grantor are in fact of equivalent
value, and that the substitution power cannot be exercised in a
manner that can shift benefits among the trust beneficiaries. The
IRS reviewed the operation of Sections 2036(a) and 2038(a) on
property transferred by a decedent during his or her lifetime.
Section 2036(a) includes in the value of a decedent's gross estate
the value of all property transferred by the decedent at any time
(other than by a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration
in money or money's worth), whether by trust or otherwise, if the
decedent has retained for life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to the decedent's death or a period that does not
in fact end before the decedent's death, if:
(1)

the decedent retained the possession or enjoyment of the
property or the income from the property; or

(2)

the decedent retained the right, either alone or in
conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who
shall possess or enjoy the property or the income from the
property.

Section 2038(a)(1) includes in the value of a decedent's gross
estate the value of all property transferred by the decedent at any
time (other than by a bona fide sale for full and adequate
consideration in money or money's worth), whether by trust or
otherwise, where the enjoyment of the transferred property was, on

the date of the decedent's death, subject to any power held by the
decedent (in whatever capacity, alone or in conjunction with any
other person) to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the transfer, or
where any such power is relinquished during the three-year period
ending on the date of the decedent's death.
d.

The IRS also reviewed the Tax Court's decision in Estate of
Jordahlv. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 92 (1975), acq. in result, 1977-2 C.B.
1, in which the Tax Court held that, because the decedent was
bound by fiduciary standards and was accountable in equity to the
succeeding income beneficiary and remainder beneficiaries, the
decedent could not exercise the reserved substitution power to
deplete the trust or to shift trust benefits among the beneficiaries.
The court held that the substitution power was not, therefore, a
power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust under Section 2038, even
though the decedent reserved the power to substitute other
securities or property for those held in trust (provided the
substituted property was equal in value to the property replaced).
In Jordahl the IRS argued that the trust assets were includible in
the decedent's gross estate under Section 2038, because the
decedent's power to substitute assets of equal value could be
exercised to alter the beneficial interests in the trust. The court
disagreed, noting that the decedent's fiduciary duty to the
beneficiaries stood between him and the ability to treat the
property as his own and thus fell outside the scope of Section
2038.

e.

Under the facts in Jordahl,the trust instrument in Revenue Ruling
2008-22 stated that the grantor's power to substitute assets of
equivalent value was held in a non-fiduciary capacity. Thus, the
grantor was not subject to the rigorous standards attendant to a
power held in a fiduciary capacity. The trust instrument also
expressly prohibited the grantor from serving as trustee. The IRS,
however, focused upon the duties imposed upon the actual trustee
of the trust. Generally, a trustee has a fiduciary duty to the trust
and its beneficiaries and is held to a high standard of conduct with
respect to the administration of the trust. A trustee has a duty to
the beneficiaries of the trust to administer the trust solely in their
interest, which, in turn, requires the trustee to act fairly, justly,
honestly, in the utmost good faith, and with sound judgment and
prudence. The trustee also has a duty of impartiality that requires
the trustee to take into account the interests of all the beneficiaries
for whom the trustee is acting. Thus, for example, a sale,
encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or
management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the
trustee's own personal account or which is otherwise affected by a

conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests is
usually voidable by any affected beneficiary.
The trustee
furthermore must act impartially as to multiple beneficiaries, in
investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due
regard to the beneficiaries' respective interests.
f.

C.

In situations like that of Revenue Ruling 2008-22, where the
grantor of a trust holds a non-fiduciary power to replace trust
assets with assets of equivalent value, the grantor is not subject to a
fiduciary duty, but the trustee is and the trustee has a duty to ensure
that the value of the assets being replaced is equivalent to the value
of the assets being substituted. A trustee who knows or has reason
to believe that the exercise of the substitution power does not
satisfy the terms of the trust instrument because the assets being
substituted have a lesser value than the trust assets being
reacquired, has a fiduciary duty to prevent the exercise of the
power. The IRS was thus assured in the facts of the ruling that the
trustee's fiduciary duty would preclude the grantor from
exercising the power to substitute assets in a manner that would
reduce the value of the trust corpus or increase the grantor's net
worth, or cause any shifting of benefits between or among the
beneficiaries occur. Therefore, it ruled that the grantor's retained
power will not cause the value of the trust corpus to be included in
his/her gross estate under either Sections 2036 or 2038.

Qualified Personal Residence Trusts.
1.

A Qualified Personal Residence Trust or "QPRT" is an irrevocable trust
that holds a personal residence for a term of years. At the end of the trust
term, the residence is distributed to the beneficiaries named in the trust typically children. For example, John creates a QPRT and transfers his
residence to the QPRT for a term of 12 years, with the remainder passing
to his children. John has the right to live in the residence and to use the
residence for the next 12 years. At the end of the 12-year term, the
residence passes to John's children.

2.

There are several tax and economic benefits associated with a QPRT.
QPRTs are especially well suited at leveraging a client's estate and gift tax
credit. A transfer of property to a QPRT is currently treated as a taxable
gift. The value of the gift is based on the present value of the remainder
beneficiary's right to receive the property at the end of the QPRT term.
For example, John, age 65, creates a QPRT and transfers his residence to
the Trust for a term of 12 years, with the remainder passing to his children
at the end of the 12-year term. Assuming the residence is valued at
$1,000,000 and the transfer is made in September 2006, based on IRS
tables, John is treated as having made a gift to his children valued at
$346,060. This is the first place where there is a significant tax savings.

John has effectively transferred an asset worth $1,000,000 to his children
by using only $346,060 of his $1,000,000 gift tax exemption equivalent.
3.

Another tax and economic benefit is that all of the future appreciation of
the residence will be transferred to the children estate and gift tax-free. A
QPRT, as a result, is a powerful estate freezing tool. Based on the prior
example, assuming that the $1,000,000 residence appreciates at 4% per
year for the 12-year term, the residence will be valued at $1,601,032. All
of the appreciation during the 12-year term inures to the benefit of the
children. Therefore, by making a gift, valued for estate and gift tax
purposes at $346,060, John will effectively transfer an asset worth
$1,601,032. Assuming John's estate is in the 45% estate tax bracket, this
produces an estate tax savings of $564,737.

3.

A gift to a QPRT is a gift of afuture interest and does not qualify for the
gift tax annual exclusion, currently $12,000 per person per year. Only gifts
of a present interest qualify for the $12,000 gift tax annual exclusion. A
gift to a QPRT is subject to an ETIP (estate tax inclusion period) during
which GST exemption cannot be allocated. GST exemption can be
allocated at the expiration of the QPRT, but the value may be uncertain
and the GST exemption may be insufficient to cover the full amount of the
transfer. Therefore, QPRTs are not terribly effective for GST type
transfer. In drafting the QPRT, it is important to structure the remainder
interest so that it passes to non-skip persons only.

4.

The term of the QPRT is an important factor in determining the tax
consequences of a QPRT. As the QPRT term grows longer, the gift to the
remainder beneficiaries grows smaller, and the tax savings is greatly
improved. The table below shows the tax results and savings for a
$1,000,000 residence transferred to a QPRT, in September 2006, for
varying terms:

QPRT for Client Age 65, $1,000,000 Residence,
September 2006 Transfer, 4% Annual Appreciation, 45% Estate Tax Bracket
Potential Estate
Future Value at End
Current Value
Tax Savings
of Term
of Gift
QPRT Term
$245,742
$1,216,653
$670,560
5 years
$475,094
$1,480,244
$424,480
10 years
$699,243
$1,800,944
$247,070
15 years
5.

The value of the retained interest is valued based on the Code § 7520 rate
in effect for the month in which the QPRT is created and funded. When
interest rates are higher, the value of the retained interest is higher and,
thus, the value of the remainder is lower. Therefore, QPRTs are especially
effective when interest rates are high. The following chart illustrates the
effect of interest rates

QPRT Term
5 years
10 years
15 years

OPRT for Client A~e 65. $1.000.000 Residence
4%
6%
8%
Code § 7520 Rate
Code § 7520 Rate
Code § 7520 Rate
$737,560
$670,560
$610,730
$513,550
$424,480
$352,110
$328,780
$247,070
$186,660

6.

If the client dies during the term of the QPRT, the residence is included in
your estate at its full fair market value at the time of year death. The
benefit of the transaction is lost, but you are no worse off than if you did
not create a QPRT, other than transactional costs in establishing the
QPRT. For example, Mary, age 50, creates a QPRT with a 15 year term
and transfers her $1,000,000 house to the QPRT. Mary dies 14 years and
11 months later when the residence is valued at $1,800,944. The value of
the residence is included in Mary's estate at $1,800,944. However, she
does receive a credit for the initial gift to the QPRT.

7.

The term is selected by the client/donor. Because of the negative tax
consequences of dying before the expiration of the QPRT term, we will
typically review the actuarial tables and life expectancy of the client and
use approximately 2 / 3 rds of the client's life expectancy. For example, an
average individual age 65 has a life expectancy of 17.2 years. As a result,
we will use a QPRT term of no greater than 12 years. Obviously, we
discuss any known health problems and family history with the client and
may make adjustments to the QPRT term, as appropriate, based on those
discussions.If you outlive the term of the QPRT, the residence passes to
the remainder beneficiaries. They are the owners of the property. You can,
however, lease the property back from the remainder beneficiaries at a fair
market value rent. The obligation to rent your residence back from your
children can be viewed, by some, as a negative feature; however, many
clients view it as an opportunity to transfer additional assets, via rent
payments, to their children. IRS Private Letter Rulings have sanctioned
QPRTs which included mandatory fair market lease provisions at the end
of the QPRT term. See, e.g, PLR 9249014, PLR 9827037, and PLR
199918042.

8.

One can minimize the income tax consequences associated with the
payment of rent by using a grantor trust. Upon the expiration of the QPRT
term, the residence can pass into a trust, structured as a grantor trust for
income tax purposes under the grantor trust rules of Code § 671-677, to
cause the client/grantor to be treated as the owner of the trust. The effect
is that when the client pays rent to the trust, the rent is non-taxable, since
the client is paying rent to himself/herself. See Rev. Rul. 85-13.

9.

You are allowed to transfer your principal personal residence and one
vacation home to a Qualified Personal Residence Trust. You are allowed
to have only one principalresidence, but you can have two personal
residences (one of which is your principal residence).Yes. If you own two
personal residences, you can transfer each residence to a QPRT. In
addition, you can transfer fractional interests in your personal residence to
multiple QPRTs. This can be used to hedge against the possibility of a
premature death. For example, Steve creates four QPRTs with terms of 4,
8, 12, and 16 years. Steve transfers a 25% interest in his residence to each
of the QPRTs. If Steve dies after 14 years, only the 25% interest in the
last QPRT (with the 16 year term) is included in his estate.

10.

It is not uncommon for a husband and wife to own their property jointly or
as tenants by the entirety with the right of survivorship. In this case, we
will divide the property into two 50% tenant in common interests. Each
spouse will create a QPRT and will transfer his or her 50% interest to the
QPRT. The Courts have consistently upheld valuation discounts for
fractional interests in real estate and it is not uncommon to receive
discounts of 20% or more. Under these facts, each of the 50% interests
valued at $500,000 would be discounted to $400,000 and would produce
an even better tax result. The chart below compares the tax savings of the
transfer of 2 50% interests with a 100% interest.

12 Year QPRT for Husband and Wife Both Age 65, $1,000,000 Residence,
September 2006 Transfer, 4% Annual Appreciation, 45% Estate Tax Bracket,
20% Valuation Discount for Fractional Interest
Initial Value of
Current Value
Future Value at End
Potential Estate
Asset
of Gift
of Term
Tax Savings
$1,000,000
$346,060
$1,601,032
$564,737
$800,000,
$276,848
$1,601,032
$595,883
Two 50% interests each valued at $500,000 and discounted by 20%. 2 x ($500,000 x (1 - 20%))

=

$800,000

11.

Only a personal residence can be transferred to a QPRT. If there is
substantial excess acreage that is not related to the residence, the
additional land and buildings may not qualify as a QPRT. The IRS has
ruled in several Private Letter Rulings that estate-type residences and the
attendant outbuildings, guest cottages, and acreage may qualify as a
personal residence. The rationale is that a person who purchases an estate
type residence normally expects to have the attendant acreage,
outbuildings, etc. and, thus, gave these favorable rulings. Each property
should be determined on a case by case basis. See, e.g., PLR 9817004,
PLR 9818014, PLR 9827037, PLR 200617035, and PLR 200626043.

12.

Ordinary and recurring expense associated with the residence, such as real
estate taxes, hazard insurance premiums, and minor repairs may be paid

by the client/donor. The client can deposit the funds necessary to pay these
amounts with the Trustee. The Trustee is permitted in a QPRT to retain
sufficient funds to pay these amounts. A QPRT is treated as a grantor trust
for income tax purposes and, thus, the client/donor can deduct the real
estate taxes paid on his or her personal income tax return. In the event a
capital improvement is made to the residence by the client/donor, this will
be treated as an additional gift to the QPRT and the amount of the gift will
be based on the value of the capital improvements and the remaining term
of the Trust.
13.

If the residence is sold while held in the QPRT, the proceeds can be
reinvested in a new residence. Since a QPRT is a grantor trust, any gain
recognized on the sale of a principal residence should qualify for the
$250,000/$500,000 exclusion of gain from the sale of a principal
residence, provided all of the other Code § 121 requirements are met. The
exclusion of gain does not apply to the sale of a personal residence that is
not a principalresidence, such as a vacation home. If the proceeds of sale
are not reinvested in a personal residence, the QPRT will convert to a
Grantor Retained Annuity Trust or "GRAT" and will pay an annuity to the
client/donor for the balance of the QPRT term.

14.

Several years ago, the IRS issued regulations which prohibit the
client/donor or their spouse from purchasing the residence from the
QPRT. The benefit of this type of transaction is that (i) it avoids the loss of
the step up in basis, and (ii) the client is not required to rent the residence
from his or her children. Before the issuance of the regulations, a
client/donor could purchase the residence back from the QPRT shortly
before the expiration of the QPRT term for its then full fair market value.
As a result, the remainder beneficiaries would receive cash equal to the
purchase price paid and the client/donor would receive the residence back
in his or her own name. The QPRT Regulations now require that the trust
instrument specifically prohibit a donor or their spouse from re-acquiring
the residence.

XXI.

STATUTORY ESTATE TAX RELIEF.
A.

Alternate Valuation.
1.

General Provisions. Code § 2031 provides that the value of a decedent's
gross estate is the fair market value of all of the decedent's property as of
the date of his or her death, unless the "alternate valuation method" under
Code 2032 is elected. Code § 2032 provides that "the value of the gross
estate may be determined, if the executor so elects, by valuing all the
property included in the gross estate.... as of the date 6 months after the
decedent's death."

2.

Exceptions. There are two exceptions to this rule:
a.

If the decedent's property that is distributed, sold, exchanged or
otherwise disposed of within six months after date of death, such
property is valued as of the date of such distribution, sale,
exchange or other disposition, and

b.

If any interest in the decedent's estate which is affected "by mere
lapse of time," such interest is valued as of the decedent's date of
death with adjustments for any valuation differences not due to
mere lapse of time as of the appropriate alternate valuation date.

3.

Distributed, Sold, Exchanged. The phrase "distributed, sold, exchanged,
or otherwise disposed of' includes all possible ways by which property
ceases to be part of a decedent's gross estate, but does not include
transactions which are mere changes in form.

4.

Mere Lapse of Time. Property interests that may be affected by a mere
lapse of time include "patents, estates for the life of a person other than the
decedent, remainders, reversions, and other like properties, interests or
estates." Any interest or estate which is affected by mere lapse of time
shall be included at its value as of the time of death (instead of the later
date) with adjustment for any difference in its value as of the later date not
due to mere lapse of time. Life estates, remainders and other similar
interests are valued for alternate valuation purposes using (1) the age of
the person whose life may affect the value of the interest as of the
decedent's date of death, and (2) the value of the property as of the
alternatevaluation date, so that the mere lapse of time does not affect the
value of the interest.

B.

5.

Deductions. If alternate valuation is elected, deductions will not be
allowed with respect to an asset to the extent that such deductions are
already taken into account in determining the alternate value of that asset.
Additionally, charitable and/or marital deduction(s) are valued as of the
decedent's date of death and are adjusted for any differences in value
(other than changes due to mere lapse of time) as of the earlier of the date
of disposition or six months after date of death.

6.

Reduction of Gross Estate and Estate Tax. The election is available only
when both the values of the gross estate and the estate tax (after allowable
credits) are reduced. Code § 2032(c). This provision was added to
discourage the executor's election of an alternate valuation date merely to
reduce a beneficiary's income tax liability upon a later sale of the property.
In such instances, the election was an abuse of the underlying purposes of
Code § 2032 to reduce the overall estate tax liability when assets had
declined in value after the decedent's death.

7.

Must File Return. The election is not available if a federal estate tax
return is not required to be filed. If no federal estate tax return is required,
determine whether an alternate valuation election is allowable under local
law. The election is not available if the "optimum" marital deduction
formula clause is used, since there would be no tax to be reduced.

8.

Making the Election. The election may be made on an estate tax return
filed any time within one year after the time prescribed by law (including
extensions) for filing such returns. Code § 2032(d)(2). Thus, the election
can be made up to 27 months after death. The election is irrevocable. §
2032(d)(1). The election is made by checking "Yes" to the box on line 1,
page 2 of the Form 706 under the "Elections by the Executor."

Code § 6166 - Installment Payment of Estate Tax.
1.

To ease some of the financial hardship created when a closely held
business constitutes the majority of the decedent's estate, an executor may
elect to pay the estate tax owed over a 14-year period, if certain
requirements are met. See Code § 6166.

2.

The executor of the estate may elect to completely defer the estate tax for
a period of up to five years and subsequently pay the tax in up to ten
annual installments. Code § 6166(a).

3.

For estates of a decedent dying after December 31, 1997, the estate must
pay interest at the rate of two percent per year on the portion of the
deferred tax attributable to the first $1 million ($1,280,000 in 2008;
$1,330,000 in 2009) of closely held business property. Code § 66010().

However, the interest paid on the deferred estate tax is not deductible.
Code §§ 163(k), 2053(c)(1)(D), 66010)(1)(A).
4.

Where an executor of an estate of a decedent who died prior to January 1,
1998, has made an election under Code § 6166, the executor can elect to
have the new 2% rate applied to the remaining payments. Revenue
Procedure 98-15 sets forth the procedure for making an election to have
the lower interest rate apply to the remaining payments. The interest rate
imposed on the amount of the deferred estate tax attributable to the taxable
value of closely held business property in excess of $1 million is 45
percent of the rate generally applicable to underpayments of tax, and this
amount is also not deductible. Code §§ 163(k), 2053(c)(1)(D),
6601 (j)(1)(B).

5.

Beginning in 1999, the $1 million ceiling on the taxable value of closely
held business property eligible for the two-percent rate will be indexed
annually for inflation. Code § 66010)(3). For decedents dying in calendar
year 2008, the ceiling has been raised to $1,280,000; this amount is
$1,330,000 in 2009. Any remaining interest is charged to the estate at the
rate typically charged for estate tax deficiencies. This rate is adjusted
quarter-annually and is based on the short-term federal rate plus three
percentage points. Code § 6621 (a), (b). An estate planner should consider
these changes when determining the liquidity needs of a closely held
business owner.

6.

In order to be eligible for the tax deferral election, the value of the interest
in the closely-held business must be at least 35 percent of the value of the
gross estate reduced by the expenses, indebtedness and losses of the estate.
If the estate owns at least a 20 percent interest in more than one business,
these interests may be aggregated for the purpose of satisfying the 35
percent test. Code § 6166(c). The tax deferral allowed by Code § 6166
applies only to interests in closely-held businesses as defined by the
section. A decedent owns an interest in a closely-held business under this
section if the decedent is one of the following:
a.

A sole proprietor; or

b.

A partner in a partnership with no more than 15 partners, or where
20 percent or more of the total capital interest in such partnership
is owned by the decedent; or

c.

A shareholder who owns 20 percent or more in value of the voting
stock of a corporation, or such corporation has 15 or fewer
shareholders. Code § 6166(b)(1).

C.

7.

When determining whether there are 15 or fewer shareholders or partners
in a corporation or partnership respectively, all stock or partnership
interests owned by the decedent's brothers, sisters, spouse, ancestors, and
lineal descendants are deemed to be owned by the decedent. Code
§ 6166(b)(2)(D). Likewise, in determining whether the 20 percent value
test is met, the decedent not only owns his or her own stock or partnership
interest, but is also deemed to own the interests held by his or her brothers,
sisters, spouse, ancestors and lineal descendants. Code § 6166(b)(7).

8.

In addition, the decedent must have been engaged in an active trade or
business, not a passive investment activity. The management of
investment type assets does not qualify as a trade or business. See Rev.
Rul. 75-365, 1975-2 C.B. 471; Rev. Rul. 75-366, 1975-2 C.B. 472; Rev.
Rul. 75-367, 1975-2 C.B. 472; Letter Rul. 8240055.

9.

The tax deferral election to pay the estate tax in ten installments must be
made within the time allowed for filing the estate tax return, which is, nine
months from the decedent's death, including any extension of time granted
for the filing of the return. Code § 6166(d).

Service Must Exercise Discretion in Requiring Bond or Special Lien.
1.

In Estate ofEdwardP. Roski Sr. et al. v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. No. 10
(Apr. 12, 2007), the Tax Court held 1) that it has jurisdiction to review an
IRS determination denying an estate's election under Code § 6166 to pay
its taxes in installments, and 2) that the IRS abused its discretion in
making that determination, because the IRS does not have authority to
require a bond or special lien in every case under Code § 6166.

2.

The executor of the Roski estate (the "Estate") filed a timely estate tax
return and attached a notice of election under Code § 6166 to defer
payment of the tax owed. The IRS notified the Estate that because of the
election, it would be required to either post a bond or provide a special
lien under Code § 6324A. The Estate responded by requesting that the
IRS exercise its discretion and not require the Estate to post a bond or
provide a special lien. In support of this request, the Estate cited the
following facts:
a.

the Estate was unable to find a company to post the bond;

b.

the well-established business that was part of the Estate provided
assurance that adequate funds would be available to pay the Estate
tax liability, thereby mitigating any default risks;

c.

the executor was a highly respected businessman who at all times
had fulfilled his tax obligations;

d.
e.

3.

Nonetheless, the IRS issued a notice of determination denying the
election, because the Estate failed to provide the bond or special lien. The
Estate filed a petition with the Tax Court for a re-determination and
judgment that it was entitled to the election. The IRS filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that Code § 7479 does not give the Tax Court
jurisdiction to review the IRS' denial of the election. The Estate objected
to this motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing 1)
the IRS' refusal to exercise its discretion by requiring a bond in every case
was an abuse of discretion and 2) the undisputed facts established that if
the IRS had properly exercised its discretion, no bond or special lien
would have been required.

4.

The Tax Court denied the IRS' motion for summary judgment. In support
of its decision, the Court pointed to the "strong presumption that the
actions of an administrative agency are subject to judicial review." The
Tax Court also rejected the IRS' argument that Code § 7479 only provides
for review of the eligibility requirements for a Code § 6166 election, and
not the actual bond requirement of Code § 6165, finding that Code § 6165
is included by reference in Code § 6166.

5.

The Tax Court then determined that the IRS had abused its discretion in
applying a bright-line rule that an estate must provide a bond or special
lien. In support of this conclusion, the Tax Court noted the following:

6.

D.

the government already had security under the Code § 6324 lien;
and
the imposition of a special lien would have negative effects on the
Estate's business.

a.

the IRS has changed its position four times in the last 15 years
regarding the bond requirement under Code § 6166; and

b.

neither the plain language nor the legislative history of Code §§
6166 and 6165 indicate that a bond is mandatory.

The Court, however, refused to grant the Estate's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the facts on the record were insufficient to allow it
to make such a determination.

Notice 2007-90: 2007-46 IRB 1.
I1.

In response to Roski, the IRS issued Notice 2007-90 in which it provided
interim guidance that would set standards to be applied on a case-by-case
basis for determining whether security will be required when an estate
elects to pay the estate tax in installments. The Treasury Department and

the IRS are in the process of establishing standards to be applied on a
case-by-case basis in the future to identify those estates making an
election under section 6166 in which the government's interest in the
deferred estate tax and the interest thereon is deemed to be sufficiently at
risk to justify the requirement of a bond or special lien. The Treasury
Department and the IRS intend to issue regulations implementing those
standards and related procedures. Until those regulations are issued,
however, the IRS will evaluate the factors described below and all other
relevant facts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether, at any time
and from time to time during the deferral period, the government's interest
in the estate tax deferred under section 6166 and interest thereon is
sufficiently at risk to justify the requirement of a bond or special lien.
2.

In order to determine whether the government's interest in the deferred tax
is adequately secured up to the amount allowed under sections 6165 and
6324A, the IRS will consider information contained in the estate tax
return, attachments to the return, information obtained during examination
in audited cases, and any other relevant information. Estates that have
filed returns that do not contain adequate information to make this
determination may be contacted and required to provide additional
financial information to the IRS for purposes of making this
determination. The IRS may terminate an estate's election for failure to
respond to such requests within a reasonable timeframe. If, after this
individual evaluation and analysis, the IRS determines there is a sufficient
credit risk regarding the government's collection of the estate tax
payments deferred under section 6166 and the interest thereon, the IRS
will notify the estate that it must provide a bond or elect to provide a
section 6324A special lien in lieu of a bond. If the estate then refuses to
provide a bond or a section 6324A special lien, the IRS will terminate the
estate's section 6166 election. The estate may then seek reconsideration of
the termination by the Office of Appeals and, if the Office of Appeals
upholds the IRS's determination, the estate then will have the opportunity
to petition the Tax Court under section 7479 for a declaratory judgment
with regard to whether its section 6166 election may be continued. I.R.C.
§ 7479; Rev. Proc. 2005-33, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1231. The factors the IRS will
consider in determining whether deferred installment payments of estate
tax under section 6166 pose a sufficient credit risk to the government to
justify the requirement of a bond or special lien are described below. In
making this determination, the IRS will consider all relevant facts and
circumstances, in addition to the factors identified in the following, nonexclusive list. No single factor will be determinative, and not all factors
may be relevant to every estate.
a.

Duration and stability of the business. This factor considers the
nature of the closely held business on which the estate tax is
deferred under section 6166 and of the assets of that business, the

relevant market factors that will impact the business's future
success, its recent financial history, and the experience of its
management, in an effort to predict the likelihood of its success
and survival through the deferred payment period. Facts relevant to
this factor are likely to appear primarily in the appraisal and the
financial statements that accompany the estate tax return.
Information regarding any outstanding liens, judgments, or
pending or anticipated lawsuits or other claims against the
business, if any, that are not disclosed in that documentation
should be provided by the estate with the election. The estate may
be required to furnish such information in response to an inquiry
by the IRS.

4.

b.

Ability to pay the installments of tax and interest timely. This
factor considers how the estate expects to be able to make the
annual payments of tax and interest as due, and the objective
likelihood of realizing that expectation. Facts relevant to this factor
may include the nature of the business's significant assets and
liabilities, and the business's cash flow (both historical and
anticipated). If not sufficiently disclosed in the documents attached
to the estate tax return, the estate should submit relevant
information with the election under section 6166. The estate may
be required to furnish such information in response to an inquiry
by the IRS.

c.

Compliance history. This factor addresses the business's history
regarding compliance with all federal tax payment and tax filing
requirements, in an effort to determine whether the business and its
management respect and comply with all tax requirements on a
regular basis. This factor also addresses the estate's compliance
history with respect to federal tax payment and filing requirements.
The estate may use a sworn affidavit or other probative documents
to provide this information.

The notice is applicable to each estate: (1) that timely elects to pay the
estate tax in installments under section 6166 and that timely files a return
on or after November 13, 2007; (2) whose return was being classified,
surveyed or audited by the IRS as of April 12, 2007; or (3) that is currently
in the deferred payment period but that has not yet provided a bond or
special lien if (a) the general federal estate tax lien will expire within two
years from November 13, 2007 or (b) the IRS reasonably believes that the
government's interest in collecting the deferred estate tax and interest
thereon in full is sufficiently at risk to require a bond or special lien.
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E.

Special Use Valuation.
1.

Code § 2032A provides an alternative method of valuing real estate used
in a farming business or other closely-held business if such property
constitutes a substantial part of the estate's total assets. See Code §
2032A. If this "special use" valuation method is elected, the value of the
real property included in the estate under this method may be up to
$750,000 less than the property's fair market value. See Code §
2032A(a)(2). The $750,000 amount is indexed for inflation and in 2004,
the limit is $850,000; in 2005, the limit is $870,000; in 2006, the limit is
$900,000; in 2007, the limit is $940,000; in 2008, the limit is $960,000; in
2009, the limit is $1,000,000.

2.

The real estate in question must pass from the decedent to a "qualified
heir." This heir can either inherit it or buy it from the estate. Qualified
heirs include the decedent's ancestors (parents, grandparents), spouse, and
lineal descendants (children, grandchildren). They also include the lineal
descendants of the decedent's spouse or parents, and the spouses of the
lineal descendants.

3.

For five of the eight years leading up to the decedent's death, the realty
must have been used in a farm or family business on or in which the
decedent or a family member worked ("materially participated").

4.

The real and personal property in the business or farm included in the
decedent's estate has to comprise at least 50% of the gross estate, and the
real property in the business or farm included in the decedent's estate has
to comprise at least 25% of the gross estate. (For these purposes, the realty
is valued at its "high" value, e.g., $1 million in the example given in the
first paragraph above.) In meeting these tests, two or more qualifying
businesses can be combined as long as they all have real estate included in
the decedent's estate.

5.

The qualified heir must consent (with IRS) to be liable for all of the estate
taxes saved if, within ten years, the property is transferred to anyone other
than a qualified heir (of the first qualified heir) or if the property stops
being used for the qualified purpose (for example, if it's sold to an outsider
or is developed by the family as a shopping mall).

6.

Even if the property qualifies for special use valuation, the property's
value can't be reduced by more than $960,000 (for estates of decedents
dying in 2008) and 1,000,000 (for estates of decedents dying in 2009).

XXII. FINANCING THE PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX.
A.

Graegin Loans.
1.

Code § 2053 provides, that the value of the taxable estate shall be
determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate amounts for
administration expenses.

2.

Treas Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) provides that items may be entered on the
return as a deduction even if the exact amount is not then known provided
it is ascertainable with reasonably certainty, and will be paid. Treas Reg. §
20.2053-3(a) provides that "amounts deductible from a decedent's gross
estate as administration expenses [and are] limited to such expenses as are
actually and necessarily incurred in the administration of the decedent's
estate". A loan obtained by an estate may be necessary to pay
administration expenses of the estate in limited circumstances. Below is a
summary of the authority regarding loans obtained by an estate to pay
estate taxes and other expenses of estate administration.

3.

Graeginv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1988-477, concerned a loan taken
out by the estate from a wholly-owned subsidiary of the closely-held
company in which the decedent held stock. The decedent's son was
president of both companies. The term of the loan ran for fifteen (15)
years at 15% simple interest (which was the prime rate on the day the loan
was taken out), and the loan provisions contained a provision against early
repayment. A 15 year loan term was selected because 15 years was the
actuarial value of the life expectancy of the widow, whose estate would
have contained enough assets to repay the loan in full. The Tax Court
held in Graeginthat the interest on the loan was deductible as an
administrative expense when the debt was incurred. The deductions for
interest amounts paid on the loan were limited to amounts that were
certain to be paid.

4.

Loan terms that have passed scrutiny for the same purpose have
consistently had the following features (1) the loan was necessary due to
the illiquidity of the estate, (2) the interest expense was subject to
reasonable estimation, (3) the loan was bona fide in the sense that it had an
economic impact, (4) the lender was accruing interest so that both parties
were treating it consistently, and (5) the ability to borrow the funds was
authorized by local law. In determining whether the loan is necessary, the
decedent's estate could not obtain operational lines of credit because of
the tax lien under Code § 6166, and determined it was in the best interest
of the closely-held company of which the decedent owned to take out a
loan. The loan was secured, and taxes paid, and the Service allowed the
estate and lender to amend the loan documents to provide the loan could
not be prepaid. Additionally, the Service noted that the loan, while
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benefiting a beneficiary of the estate, was necessary to preserve a
significant asset of the estate. Priv. Ltr. Rul 200020011.
5.

Examples of permissible terms are contained in Priv. Ltr. Rul 199952039
where the Executor took out a ten (10) year fixed interest loan from a
commercial lender, the terms of the loan did not allow for prepayment,
and there was a balloon payment feature.

6.

In Priv. Ltr. Rul 200449031, the Executor took out a commercial loan
with terms that provided prepayment as an option feature (which the
Executor could and did opt out of) and the estate was allowed the
deduction for the principal and interest amounts.

7.

In Priv. Ltr. Rul 199903038, the Executor took out a fixed-interest rate
loan for a term of seven (7) years with no prepayment ability and the
estate was allowed a deduction for both principal and interest subject to
prior approval of the loan by the state court as required by local law.

8.

A California state court case, Klein v. Hughes, 2004 WL 838198 (Cal.
Rptr. 2004) involved an estate with an estimated tax liability of
$212,460,485. The executors of the estate negotiated with the Service a
proposal that would have allowed the estate to obtain a loan in the amount
of $49 million, that would carry an interest rate of 8.75%, with all unpaid
principal and interest due on December 31, 2027 (a 25 year term). No
interest payments would be required for the loan aside from a $10 million
payment due in September, 2005, and prepayment of the amounts were
prohibited. It was determined the trust would incur a total of $309 million
in deductible interest expense by the due date, which would reduce the
estate's liability for estate tax by $166.5 million. The assets in the gross
estate were limited liability companies from which the estate had no
power to compel cash distributions and which were subject to stringent
restrictions on transfer. The Service approved the structure of the loan
informally in a Closing Agreement, with the stipulation that the lender was
not a related entity or and entity controlled or owned by the estate. The
case did not discuss whether the proposed structure was permissible under
applicable tax law, but whether the petition to the court for permission to
engage in the transaction was to be granted over the objection of the
parent of the minor beneficiary of the estate and therefore is not an
example of a fact pattern that can be modeled without obtaining prior
approval from the Service.

9.

Factors that lead to negative rulings or increased scrutiny in this area are
(1) a relationship between the estate and the lender, (2) use of the funds, or
a portion thereof, for a purpose other than payment of estate tax or state
tax liability, (3) and failure to show the loan was necessary to preserve an

asset of value of the estate. These are not always determinative factors,
but their presence will cause the closer scrutiny by the Service.
10.

The IRS has issued a Litigation Guideline Memoranda (LGM) discussing
their position on these loans, which is reflected in the arguments presented
by the Service before the Tax Court in the Gilman and McKee cases as
discussed below. The LGM concedes the position taken by the court in
Graegin,but directs agents to examine the substance of a loan between
related parties and the treatment by the lender of the interest. The
taxpayer must show that the interest is certain to be paid and that the
lender is accruing the interest. Additionally, the taxpayer must show facts
that indicate the loan is necessary and the terms of the loan are reached at
arms-length. The Service is directed to examine "unusual financing
techniques" such as "unsecured loans, high rates of interest, long terms,
... and whether less expensive lending alternatives were available from
third party sources."

11.

In Tech. Adv. Mem. 200513028 the estate was not allowed to deduct the
principal and interest of the loan as an administrative expense because the
Service did not think the loan payments would ever be paid to the lender,
thereby causing no economic impact. The facts presented in Tech. Adv.
Mem. 200513028 had the estate executing a promissory note which would
allow the estate a line of credit up to a designated amount, with a fixed
interest rate (which was at least one percent (1%) above the then existing
prime rate) and a term of 10 (ten) years, with no prepayment allowed.
However, the lender was a family limited partnership ("FLP") in which
the estate was a ninety-seven percent (97%) partner and the decedent's
child was the remaining partner and co-executor of the estate. The Service
determined that this arrangement did not have an economic impact on the
parties and was not necessary to preserve an estate asset because the FLP
was not engaged in any active business that would necessitate the
retention of liquid assets available to use to pay the estate tax.

12.

In McKee, et al v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1996-362, the Tax Court
determined the estate could deduct the interest on loans it obtained from
the decedent's closely-held corporation to pay estate taxes as an
administrative expense. The executors of the estate were also the directors
of the closely-held company. The executor in this case borrowed an
amount from the closely-held corporation in exchange for an unsecured
demand note bearing an interest rate of eleven percent (11%) for a term of
eight-five (85) days. These proceeds were applied with assets that were
disclaimed by the surviving spouse toward the payment of the estate tax
due. The intention was for the executors to repay the loan as soon as the
buy-sell agreement could be amended to enable the pledge of the company
shares in connection with a loan having a longer term obtained from a
third party. A complicated series of transactions occurred that involved a

third party loan, a redemption of the company stock, and two more
subsequent loans from the company. The Court determined that all
interest expenses on the four loans were deductible as administration
expenses because the executors were faced with a liquidity problem and
would otherwise have been forced to sell a large block of stock to pay the
estate tax. While the Court decided the case in favor of the estatetaxpayer, the facts presented by this case demonstrate the burden an
executor must prove if the loan used to pay the estate tax is from a closelyheld company or between related parties.
13.

The Service recently challenged a loan taken out by an estate when the
interest payment was larger than necessary due to the amount borrowed
and due to a term that was deemed to be unreasonably long. In Estate of
Gilman, et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2004-286, the estate borrowed
money to pay estate tax under a loan with a term often (10) years, a fixed
interest rate, and no ability to prepay. The executors of the estate were also
the managers of the decedent's limited liability company, officers of the
decedent's closely-held corporation and members of the board of directors
of the charitable foundation set up by the decedent. The Court determined
that the loan's necessity was short-term in length, and disallowed
deductions taken for the loan amounts used to compensate the executors in
their capacity as directors and officers. The decedent's will expressly
prohibited compensation for the executors. The executors elected to pay
the estate tax in full, rather than make a Code § 6166 election based on tax
advice from counsel. The Court agreed that the amount borrowed to pay
the estate tax was necessary due to the reduction in cash flow of the
businesses during the course of the administration of the estate and the
liquidity of the estate, but the funds borrowed to pay the compensation of
business consultants, the officers of the company or other administration
expenses were not necessary as estate administration expenses and
therefore not eligible to be deducted. Principal and interest amounts
relating only to the portion of the loan related to payment of the estate tax
were permitted as a deduction.

14.

If an estate is presented with a liquidity problem, the principal and interest
on a loan obtained by the estate to pay for estate tax may be deductible if
the following facts or factors can be shown:
a.

The loan is a necessary expense of the estate due to the nature of
the asset contained in the estate or the liquidity of the estate.

b.

The loan term is not unreasonably long.

c.

The amount of interest claimed as a deduction is within the
parameters of a loan that is commercially available to the estate
considering the date, term, and security offered.

d.

15.

B.

The loan is a bona-fide arms-length arrangement that will have an
economic impact on the lender and the estate.

Related party loans have been allowed, but they will likely require the
estate to bear a greater burden in proving the necessity of the loan. The
structure of the loan can be either annual payments of principal and
interest for a fixed term or contain a balloon payment, as long as the
amount of the interest claimed as a deduction is readily ascertainable. The
term of the loan should reflect a business reason for the selection of the
length of the term, such as when the executor reasonably expects to have
funds to pay the loan due to expected cash flow, life expectancy or the
timing of a business transaction concerning an asset of the estate.

Life Insurance.
1.

Many clients are unwilling to undertake the uncertainty or complexity
associated with the tax benefits associated with Code §§ 303, 2032A,
former 2057, or 6166. As a result, they will plan to ensure estate liquidity
through the purchase of life insurance.

2.

In many cases, the insurance policy will be purchased through an
irrevocable life insurance trust. The trust will be designed to avoid the
business owner-insured's retention of any incidents of ownership over the
insurance policy. If properly drafted and structured, the trust will receive
the insurance death benefits estate tax free.

3.

Typically, the business owner will gift premiums to the trust. The
beneficiaries of the trust will have Crummey withdrawal powers, designed
to qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion. Assuming the Crummey
withdrawal powers are not exercised, the Trustee of the trust will use the
gifted funds to pay the premiums on the life insurance policies.

4.

In drafting the trust agreement, it is important not to obligate the trustee to
use funds in the trust to pay any of the costs of administration or federal
estate taxes or state death taxes owed by the estate of the insured (or the
estate of the survivor of the husband and wife in the case of a second-todie policy). However, the trustee can and should be given the right either
to lend money to or to purchase assets from the estate of the insured and
the estate of the insured's spouse. The agreement should provide that any
loan to the estate of the insured or the insured's spouse be properly
secured and adequate interest be paid and that the purchase of assets be
made for full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth.

5.

The purchase of assets by the irrevocable trust from the estate should
result in little or no taxable income to the estate, since the estate will

receive a step-up in basis for income tax purposes for assets included in
the decedent's gross estate.
XXIII. CHARITABLE GIFTS OF REAL ESTATE AND REAL ESTATE INTERESTS.'
A.

B.

Introduction.
1.

Real estate owners may wish to contribute real property to charity, either
in the form of gifts of fee simple interests in land and buildings or gifts of
partial interests such as conservation easements. Charitable gifts of real
property or interests in real property must meet specific guidelines in order
to qualify for income, gift and estate tax deductions.

2.

When making charitable gifts of real estate (or interests in real estate),
either directly or through entities, the taxpayer should be aware of both the
opportunities and the pitfalls that arise as a result of the unique nature of
real estate.

3.

In general, a donation of property to a charitable organization will give
rise to a tax deduction for the donor; however, the amount of the deduction
available to the donor, for income and gift tax purposes, or for estate tax
purposes, depends upon the nature and value of the property being
transferred.

4.

Certain sale transactions may also be governed by the rules for charitable
contributions if the sale price is less than the fair market value of the
property.

5.

What follows will be a summary of the rules regarding the making of taxdeductible charitable contributions and the tax deductions that are
available to a taxpayer, as well as some of the charitable giving techniques
which can benefit the charity, the taxpayer and the taxpayer's family.

Requirements for a Charitable Contribution. There are two elements to be
considered in determining whether a transfer of property is a charitable
contribution.
1.

First, the property must be transferred to a charitable entity to be used for
charitable purposes as set forth in the Internal Revenue Code. Reg.
§1.170A-7(c).

This section on charitable gifts of real estate and real estate interests is derived from Mary Ann Mancini and Stefan
F. Tucker's outline entitled, "Estate Planning for Real Estate Owners." I am deeply indebted and grateful to Mary
Ann and Stef for sharing this portion of their excellent materials with me.

2.

Second, the transfer must be intended as a gratuitous gift. The rules
regarding whether a gift of property is gratuitous have been developed
mainly through court decisions.

3.

In order for a charitable contribution to be deductible, it must be a gift,
contributed out of a "detached and disinterested generosity, out of
affection, respect, admiration, charity and like impulses." Reg.
§1.1 70A-7(c). A transfer which lacks donative intent is not a charitable
contribution. A transfer lacks donative intent if it is a contribution made
pursuant to a moral or legal duty or in order to receive an economic
benefit. Reg. §1.170A-7(c). In Stubbs v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
found that the taxpayers did not make a charitable contribution where they
deeded property to the City of Tucson for a public road with the
expectation that they would receive favorable zoning (otherwise uncertain)
and that their remaining property would have guaranteed public access and
public street frontage. In a similar case, a conveyance lacked donative
intent where, in return for the conveyance, the taxpayers received some
cash, other land, relief from an assessment, dismissal of pending
condemnation suits and a variance in zoning with respect to their
remaining property. Reg. §1.1 70A-7(c).

4.

A contingent transfer, such as a contribution conditioned upon some future
occurrence, generally lacks the requisite current donative intent. Reg.
§1.1 70A-7(c).
a.

The Regulations specifically disallow deductions for the transfer of
a future interest to a charity where a charity's interest is dependent
upon the performance of some act or the happening of a precedent
event in order to become effective, unless the possibility that the
charitable transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be
negligible.

b.

Similarly, a deduction is disallowed if a transfer of a present
interest to a charity could be defeated by the subsequent
performance of some act or the happening of some event, unless
the possibility of the event occurring is so remote as to be
negligible.

c.

For example, if a taxpayer transfers land to a city government for
as long as the land is used by the city for a public park, and if, on
the date of the gift, the city plans to use the land for a park, and the
possibility that the city will not use the land for a public park is so
remote as to be negligible, then the taxpayer is entitled to a
deduction for his charitable contribution.

C.

Tax Consequences of a Charitable Contribution.
Non-recognition of Gain or Loss upon Charitable Contribution. When a
taxpayer makes a charitable contribution, within the meaning of Section
170(c), of an interest in appreciated real property to a charitable entity, in
addition to being allowed a charitable income tax deduction, as described
below, the taxpayer does not recognize any ordinary income or capital
gain upon the transfer of the property.
2.

Similarly, if the contributed property is loss property, the taxpayer does
not recognize any loss on the disposition. As a result of this rule, it is
generally more advantageous for a taxpayer who wishes both to dispose of
loss property and make a charitable contribution, to sell the loss property
in order to recognize the loss and then make a contribution of the
proceeds.

3.

Whether, and to what extent, a charitable contribution is deductible
depends on (i) the timing of the contribution, (ii) general statutory
percentage limitations, (iii) specific statutory rules regarding contributions
of appreciated property, (iv) the type of interest in the property
contributed, and (v) the value of the property contributed.

4.

a.

A charitable contribution, as defined above, is deductible in a
taxable year if it is made during that year. For a corporation that
reports its income on the accrual basis, a charitable contribution is
deductible in a taxable year if it is authorized by the board of
directors of the corporation during that year, and the actual
contribution is made on or before the 15th day of the third month
following the end of such taxable year.

b.

There are percentage limitations on the amount of the income tax
deduction a taxpayer may take each year for his or her charitable
contribution.

Fifty Percent Limitation. The basic limitation is that a taxpayer cannot
take a charitable contribution greater than 50% of his or her adjusted gross
income ("AGI"), computed without any net operating loss carryback. A
charitable deduction of 50% of the donor's AGI is allowed only as
follows:
a.

The gift may be in the form of cash or property; however, if a gift
of property is made, the deduction will be limited to the property's
cost basis, subject to the provisions below.

b.

In addition, the gift may be made only to a public charitable
organization described in Section 170(b)(1)(A), which includes

churches, educational organizations, affiliated support
organizations of educational organizations, medical organizations,
governmental units, publicly supported charities (including
supporting organizations) and certain private foundations
(including private operating foundations).
5.

Thirty Percent Limitation. The second percentage limitation on the
taxpayer's charitable income tax deduction is that a taxpayer cannot take a
charitable contribution larger than 30% of his or her AGI under the
following circumstances:
a.

If the taxpayer makes a charitable contribution to organizations
that are not described in Section 170(b)(l )(A);

b.

If the taxpayer makes a charitable contribution that is "for the use
of' any charitable organization; or

c.

If the taxpayer makes a charitable contribution of appreciated
property, which is "capital gain property", to a charity described in
Section 170(b)(1)(A) and bases his or her contribution on the fair
market value of such property, rather than the taxpayer's cost basis
in the property.

6.

Twenty Percent Limitation. The last percentage limitation on the
taxpayer's charitable income tax deduction is that a taxpayer cannot take a
charitable contribution larger than 20% of his or her AGI if the taxpayer is
gifting certain appreciated property to a charitable organization that is not
described in Section 170(b)(1)(A) (that is, a private foundation).

7.

Carry-forward of Contribution. Gifts in excess of the applicable limitation
amounts can be carried forward and deducted in future years until (i) the
amount of the contribution is exhausted; (ii) the end of five years
following the year of the gift or (iii) the taxpayer dies, whichever occurs
first. Secs. 170(d)(1), (b)(1)(B), (C)(ii) and (D)(ii). But see Section
170(b)(1)(E)(ii) for a temporary 15-year carryover period for qualified
conservation contributions of real property in 2006 and 2007.

8.

Percentage Limitations - Corporations. A corporation may deduct
charitable contributions up to 10% of its taxable income, computed
without regard to charitable deductions, corporate deductions (except
organizational expenditures under Section 248), any net operating loss
carryback and any capital loss carryback. Section 170(b)(2).
a.

Like individuals, corporations may carry forward excess charitable
contributions for five years.

b.

9.

Limitations Based on the Type of Property Contributed.
a.

D.

The charitable deduction for corporations is not subject to the
distinctions, described above, between types of property and
categories of organizations.

Certain "Capital Gain Type" Property. Section 170(e) provides for
a reduction in either (i) the value of a charitable contribution made
by an individual to the individual's cost basis in the property, or
(ii) the percentage limitation of the individual's AGI from 50% to
30% (or 20% if the charitable organization is not described in
Section 170(b)(1)(A)), for the following type of property:
i.

Property, the sale of which would have generated ordinary
income or short-term capital gain if it were sold for fair
market value on the date of contribution.

ii.

Tangible personal property, which if sold for fair market
value would generate long-term capital gain, and which a
charitable (tax- exempt) donee uses for purposes unrelated
to its charitable (tax- exempt) purpose.

iii.

Property (other than publicly traded stock) which, if sold
for fair market value on the date of contribution, would
generate long-term capital gain, and is contributed to a
private foundation which is not a public charity.

b.

For contributions of property to which Section 170(e) applies, the
amount of each contribution for purposes of claiming a deduction
is reduced by (1) the amount of ordinary income or short-term
capital gain which would have been realized had property
described in (a) been sold; (2) the amount of long- term capital
gain which would be realized if tangible personal property
described in (b) were sold for fair market value on the date of
contribution; or (3) the amount of long-term capital gain that
would be realized on property described in (c).

c.

This reduction must be made prior to applying the percentage
limitations of Section 170(b).

Transfers of Encumbered Property.
1.

In general, when a taxpayer contributes encumbered property to a
charitable donee, thereby discharging his outstanding obligation, the
amount of the discharged obligation is treated as a cash payment from the
charitable organization to the taxpayer. See Estate of Levine v. Comm 'r, 72
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T.C. 780, affd 46 AFTR2d 80-5349 (2nd Cir. 1980) (taxpayer recognized
taxable gain where contributed property was encumbered beyond
taxpayer's basis).
2.

3.

The amount of the charitable deduction for such a transaction is the fair
market value of the property contributed less the amount of the obligation
from which the taxpayer was discharged.
When a taxpayer makes a contribution of appreciated encumbered
property, the transaction may be treated as if the taxpayer sold the
property to the charitable organization for less than its fair market value.
For example, in Ebben v. Comm'r, 783 F2d 906 (1986), a transfer of
encumbered property was recharacterized as a bargain sale. The Tax Court
reasoned that, because the taxpayer was relieved of his outstanding
obligation when the encumbered property was transferred to the charitable
organization, the transaction had the same effect as if the donor had
received cash from the organization in return for a portion of the property,
making the transfer a deemed sale to the extent of the discharged
obligation, and a charitable contribution only with respect to the remaining
value of the property.

4.

The problem of gain to the donor may be avoided by coupling the transfer
with a formal undertaking, by the donor, to satisfy the debt on the property
given to the charity as installments come due, thus relieving the donee of
the obligation. This would enable the donor to increase his or her
charitable contribution to the full fair market value of the property without
any reduction for the outstanding debt.

5.

Where the property contributed is subject to an outstanding obligation,
which is assumed by the donee, and the taxpayer pays interest on the
obligation with respect to a period following the date of the contribution,
the amount of the charitable contribution is further reduced by the amount
of the interest which has been or will be paid by the taxpayer with respect
to the obligation and which is attributable to any period after the date of
the contribution. This rule was added to the Code in order to prevent the
taxpayer from taking both an interest deduction under Section 163 and a
charitable deduction under Section 170 with respect to the amount of the
interest payments. Example. On January 1, 2004, Alex contributes to a
charitable organization real estate having a fair market value and adjusted
basis of $100,000. In connection with the contribution, the charitable
organization assumes Alex's $80,000 mortgage on the property. On
December 31, 2003, Alex prepaid one year's interest on the indebtedness
for 2004, amounting to $9,600, and took an interest deduction of $9,600
for the amount. The amount of the contribution without any reduction for
interest is $29,600 ($100,000 less $80,000, the outstanding indebtedness,
plus $9,600, the amount of prepaid interest). In determining the amount of
the deduction for the charitable contribution, the value of the contribution
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($29,600) must be reduced by the amount of the prepaid interest ($9,600)
to eliminate from the computation of the deduction that portion of the
contribution for which Alex has already been allowed a deduction. Reg.
§1.170A-3(d), Example (1).
E.

Bargain Sales.
I1.

A bargain sale is a transfer of property which is partly a sale or exchange
of the property and partly a charitable contribution. Reg. §1.170A4(c)(2)(ii). Typically, a bargain sale occurs when an owner of property
sells the property to a charitable organization for less than its fair market
value. A bargain sale may also be deemed to occur when encumbered
property is contributed. In the event of a bargain sale, the seller may be
entitled to a charitable contribution deduction based on the difference
between the purchase price and the fair market value. See Knott v.
Comm 'r, 67 T.C. 681 (1977); Waller v. Comm 'r,39 T.C. 665 (1963).
However, as with any other charitable contribution, the seller must have
the proper intent to benefit the buyer. In general, the rules for determining
the deductible amount of a contribution which is made through a bargain
sale are the same as for any contribution of a partial interest, which are
described below. However, since the taxpayer may be recognizing gain on
the sale portion of the transfer, a few additional rules apply.

2.

Allocation of Basis. In the case of a bargain sale, the taxpayer's adjusted
basis in the property is determined according to the rules for contribution
of a partial interest. See Reg. §1.1011-2(b). Since the transfer is partly a
sale, the taxpayer recognizes ordinary income or gain on the portion of the
property sold, based on the taxpayer's basis in the portion of the property
sold. In addition, the portion of the ordinary income or gain which would
have been recognized had the contributed property been sold at its fair
market value on the date of contribution, but which is not recognized by
reason of the bargain sale, is applied against the amount of the charitable
contribution in accordance with Section 170(e)(1). Reg. §1.1 70A4(c)(2)(i).
Example. Debbie has a parcel of undeveloped real estate
worth $500,000 for which she paid $100,000, that she wishes to donate to
a charity. However, Debbie is illiquid and cannot afford to part with the
entire value of the asset. Therefore, she sells the property to the charity
for $250,000 in cash. Debbie's basis of $100,000 will be allocated
$50,000 to the sale part and $50,000 to the gift part of the transaction.
Upon receipt of the $250,000 from the charity, Debbie will have a
$200,000 capital gain to report, as well as a $250,000 charitable
contribution deduction. Furthermore, in the case of a bargain sale,
although the charity's basis in the purchased property is the fair market
value of the property (as is true of any sale), the charity's basis in the
contributed portion of the property is the same as the donor's adjusted
basis in the contributed portion of the property (as is true of any gift).

3.

F.

Application of Reduction under Section 170(e)(1). When property is
contributed as part of a bargain sale, Section 170(e)(1) applies to reduce
the amount of the contribution by the amount of ordinary income or gain
realized on the transfer. For purposes of making the reduction, the amount
of ordinary income or gain realized on the transfer must be calculated, by
allocating first the taxpayer's basis in the property and then the fair market
value of the property. Reg. §1.1 70A-4(c)(1)(i). The fair market value of
the contributed portion of the property is the difference between the fair
market value of the entire property and the purchase price of the property.
Reg. §1.170A-4(c)(3). The amount of ordinary income or gain realized for
purposes of Section 170(e)(1) is then the difference between the fair
market value of the contributed portion of the property and the taxpayer's
basis in such portion of the property.
a.

Example. Bob transfers property with a fair market value of
$100,000 to Charity. Bob has owned the property for 10 years,
and his adjusted basis is $40,000. Charity pays Bob $40,000 in
accordance with an agreement whereby Charity acknowledged that
the property is worth more than $40,000, and that Bob intends to
make a charitable contribution of the value of the property in
excess of $40,000. Bob's adjusted basis in the non-contributed
portion of the property is $16,000 ($40,000 basis X ratio of
$40,000 purchase price over $100,000 fair market value), and Bob
recognizes long term capital gain of $24,000 on the portion of the
property sold ($40,000 purchase price - $16,000 basis). Bob's
adjusted basis in the contributed portion of the property is $24,000
($40,000 entire basis less $16,000 basis in portion sold).
Assuming Section 170(e)(1)(B) does not apply, the amount of
Bob's charitable contribution is $60,000, the fair market value of
the contributed portion.

b.

Same facts, except that the transferred property had been held for
less than one year, so Section 170(e)(1)(A) applies. The amount of
Bob's charitable contribution will be reduced by $36,000, the
amount of ordinary income which would have been realized had
the contributed portion been sold ($60,000 fair market value less
$24,000, Bob's adjusted basis in the contributed portion of the
property). Thus, the amount of Bob's contribution will be
$24,000.

Transfers of Partial Interests in Real Estate.
1.

In general, a gift of less than a donor's entire interest in property does not
qualify as a charitable contribution under Section 170. Section 170(f)(3);
Reg. §1.170A-7(a)(1). There is, however, an exception where the donor

contributes his or her entire undivided fractional interest to the charity.
But, a taxpayer may not divide his property in such a way as to render his
entire interest in the property a partial interest in order to circumvent the
statute's requirement. Reg. §1.170A-7(a)(2)(i). For example, a taxpayer
who owns land in fee simple and who conveys a life estate to his son may
not deduct the subsequent contribution of his remainder interest (his entire
interest as of that point) to a charitable organization.
2.

Certain exceptions exist to the rule stated above. A deduction is permitted
for a contribution of a partial interest that is (1) an undivided portion of the
donor's entire interest, Section 170(f)(3)(B)(ii); Reg. §1.170A-7(b)(1), (2)
an interest which would be deductible if made in trust, Section
170(f)(3)(A); Reg. §1.1 70A-7(b) (2), (3) a remainder interest in a personal
residence or a farm, Section 170(f)(3)(B)(i); Reg. §1.170A-7(b)(3), (4),
and (4) a qualified conservation interest, Section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii); Reg.
§1.170A-7(b)(5). In addition, a deduction is allowed for contributions of
partial interests that are made to more than one charitable organization if
the aggregate contribution is of the taxpayer's entire interest in the
property. Reg. §1.1 70A-7(a)(2)(ii). For example, if a taxpayer transfers a
life interest in property to one charitable organization and transfers the
remainder interest to another charitable organization, the taxpayer will
have made a charitable contribution equal to the fair market value of the
entire property. Where a deduction for a charitable contribution of a partial
interest is allowed, the value of the contribution is equal to the fair market
value of the partial interest at the time of contribution. Reg.
§1.1 70A-7(b)(1)(i). A contribution of an undivided portion of an entire
interest in which the taxpayer retains an insubstantial right will still
qualify as such because the IRS will treat it as if the taxpayer contributed
the entire interest. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9729023 (April 17, 1997), where the
IRS found that a contribution of an undivided portion of an entire interest
in land by a taxpayer, who retained an easement to use the land's driveway
in order to get to his other property, qualified as a charitable contribution
under §170 because the easement he retained was so insubstantial as to
make the contribution in essence one of the entire interest. However,
because the charity agreed to maintain the driveway, the taxpayer had to
deduct the value of the maintenance from his charitable contribution
deduction as consideration received. See also Rev. Rul. 75-66, 1975-1 CB
85, finding an easement to train a dog on contributed land was not
substantial enough to affect the classification of the contribution.

3.

Undivided Portions of Entire Interests. An undivided portion of a donor's
entire interest in property consists of a fraction or percentage of the
donor's interest, or each and every substantial interest or right owned by
the donor in the property, and it must extend over the entire term of the
donor's interest in the property and in any other property into which the
property is converted. Reg. §1.170A-7(b)(1)(i). A contribution of an

undivided portion of an entire interest in which the taxpayer retains an
insubstantial right will still qualify as such because the IRS will treat it as
if the taxpayer contributed the entire interest. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9729023
(April 17, 1997), where the IRS found that a contribution of an undivided
portion of an entire interest in land by a taxpayer, who retained an
easement to use the land's driveway in order to get to his other property,
qualified as a charitable contribution under §170 because the easement he
retained was so insubstantial as to make the contribution in essence one of
the entire interest. However, because the charity agreed to maintain the
driveway, the taxpayer had to deduct the value of the maintenance from
his charitable contribution deduction as consideration received. See also
Rev. Rul. 75-66, 1975-1 CB 85, finding an easement to train a dog on
contributed land was not substantial enough to affect the classification of
the contribution.

4.

a.

Example 1. Ted owns 100 acres of land with a fair market value
of $1 million and contributes one-half or 50 acres to a charitable
organization. Since this represents an undivided portion of Ted's
entire interest in the property, Ted will be allowed a deduction of
$500,000, the fair market value of one-half of the property.

b.

Example 2. Same facts as Example 1, except that Ted instead
contributes to the charitable organization an undivided one-half
interest in the land, so that they will hold the property as tenants in
common. If the present value of the property is $1 million, Ted
will be entitled to a deduction of the present value of the
contributed portion of the property or $500,000.

Interest Which Would Be Deductible in Trust. In general, the value of a
partial interest which is transferred in trust is deductible as a charitable
contribution only if the trust is a pooled income fund, a charitable
remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust. In addition, no
deduction is allowed for an income interest in property which is a partial
interest and which is contributed in trust unless the interest is either a
guaranteed annuity interest or a unitrust interest, and the grantor is treated
as the owner of such interest. The value of a contribution of a partial
interest which would be deductible under Section 170(f)(2) if transferred
in trust is also deductible if not contributed in trust.
a.

Example 1. Ann places property in a charitable remainder unitrust,
which provides for an income interest to Bill, an individual, and a
remainder interest to Charity, a charitable organization. Ann may
deduct the value of Charity's interest.

b.

Example 2. Same facts as above except that instead of placing the
property in trust, Ann conveys a life estate to Bill and a remainder

interest to Charity. Ann may not deduct the value of Charity's
interest, because a remainder interest following a life estate could
not have been transferred through a charitable remainder unitrust, a
charitable remainder annuity trust or a pooled income fund.
5.

G.

Remainder Interests.A charitable contribution of an irrevocable remainder
interest in a personal residence or a farm is deductible even if the
contribution is not in trust, and the remainder interest is not the donor's
entire interest in the property. A "personal residence" must be property
used as the donor's personal residence, but need not be his principal
residence. A "farm" must be property used by the donor or his tenant for
the production of agricultural products or the sustenance of livestock. An
inter vivos gift of a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm
requires a reduction for depreciation on the portion of the property given
(excluding land). In addition, it may be possible for the donor to retain an
easement in gross over the underlying land upon which the residence sits
when giving a remainder interest to the charity. As long as the residence
is used for charitable purposes, the charity is considered to have the use of
the underlying land as well. After the donor gives the remainder interest in
the personal residence to charity, additions or improvements are also
deductible as contributions for the use of the charitable remainderman.
a.

Example 1. Dan contributes to a charitable organization a
remainder interest in his vacation home, retaining a life estate for
himself. Dan may claim a deduction equal to the present value of
the remainder interest.

b.

Example 2.
Dan conveys a remainder interest in his personal
residence as follows: 90 percent to Ed, an individual, and 10
percent to Charity, a charitable organization, as tenants in
common. The transfer is subject to Dan's retained life estate. Dan
may claim a charitable contribution deduction with respect to the
value of Charity's interest. See Rev. Rul. 87-37, 1987-1 CB 295.
This contribution is permitted, although a split interest between a
charity and a noncharity is often disallowed where there is
potential for the noncharity interest to act in such a way as to
diminish or eliminate the charity's interest.

Conservation Easements.
I1.

In General. Contributions of certain partial interests in, and certain rights
attaching to, real property are deductible if they constitute "qualified
conservation contributions." Section 1206(a)(1) of the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 added Section 170(b)(1)(E) to the Code to increase the
percentage limitations and carryover period applicable to qualified
conservation contributions made in taxable years beginning after

December 31, 2005, and before January 1, 2008. Under Section
170(b)(1)(E)(i), an individual may be allowed a deduction for any
qualified conservation contribution to an organization described in Section
170(b)(1)(A) to the extent the aggregate of such contributions does not
exceed the excess of 50 percent of the individual's contribution base over
the amount of all other charitable contributions allowed under Section
170(b)(1) (the 50 percent limitation). Thus, the 30 percent limitation
applicable to contributions of capital gain property under Section
170(b)(1)(C) does not apply to qualified conservation contributions. If the
aggregate amount of qualified conservation contributions exceeds the 50
percent limitation, Section 170(b)(1)(E)(ii) provides that the excess will be
treated (consistent with Section 170(d)(1)) as a charitable contribution to
which Section 170(b)(1)(E)(i) applies in each of the 15 succeeding years
in order of time.
2.

Rev. Proc. 2007-50 provides the following example:
"...in taxable year 2007 individual B, a calendar year taxpayer ... has a
contribution base of $100. During 2007 B makes $60 of cash contributions
to organizations described in § 170(b)(1)(A) (that is, contributions to
which the 50 percent limitation of § 170(b)(1)(A) applies), and a qualified
conservation contribution of capital gain property under § 170(b)(1)(C)(iv)
with a fair market value of $80. Assuming all other requirements of § 170
are met, in 2007 B may deduct $50 of the cash contributions. The unused
$10 of cash contributions is carried forward for up to 5 years. No current
deduction is allowed for the qualified conservation contribution, but the
entire $80 qualified conservation contribution deduction is carried forward
for up to 15 years." The 50 and 100 percent limitations in § 170(b)(1)(E)
apply only to qualified conservation contributions, defined in § 170(h)(1)
as a contribution of a qualified real property interest to a qualified
organization, exclusively for conservation purposes. A qualified real
property interest is defined in § 170(h)(2) as any of the following interests:
A) the entire interest of the taxpayer other than a qualified mineral
interest; B) a remainder interest; and C) a restriction (granted in
perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property.

3.

There are separate rules for the treatment of conservation easements under
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 for farmers and ranchers. Section
170(b)(1)(E)(iv) provides a special rule for a qualified conservation
contribution taken into account by an individual who in the taxable year of
the contribution is a qualified farmer or rancher, defined in §
170(b)(1)(E)(v) as a taxpayer whose gross income from the trade or
business of farming (within the meaning of § 2032A(e)(5)) is greater than
50 percent of the taxpayer's gross income for the taxable year. For such an
individual, § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv)(I) provides a general rule that the 50 percent
limitation described above is increased to 100 percent (the 100 percent

limitation). However, for any contribution of property made after August
17, 2006, that is used or available for use in agriculture or livestock
production, the 100 percent limitation applies only if the contribution is
subject to a restriction that the property remain available for agriculture or
livestock production. If the contribution is not subject to such a restriction,
the 50 percent limitation applies. Section 170(b)(1)(E)(iv)(II) provides
that the percentage limitations applicable to qualified conservation
contributions taken into account by a qualified farmer or rancher are
applied in the following order: First, contributions of property to which the
50 percent limitation applies are taken into account; then contributions of
property to which the 100 percent limitation applies are taken into
account. In the example above, if the individual were a qualified farmer
or rancher, eligible for the 100 percent limitation in Section
170(b)(1)(E)(iv) in 2007, the Rev. Proc. explains that B may deduct $50
for the qualified conservation contribution in addition to the $50 deduction
for cash contributions. As in A-i, the unused $10 of cash contributions is
carried forward for up to 5 years. The unused $30 of the qualified
conservation contribution is carried forward for up to 15 years. An
individual is a qualified farmer or rancher if the individual's gross income
from the trade or business of farming (as defined in § 2032A(e)(5)) in the
taxable year of the contribution is greater than 50 percent of the
individual's total gross income for the taxable year of the contribution.
Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived, except as
otherwise provided. Section 61(a); § 1.61-3. Gross income from the trade
or business of farming is the gross income from activities described in §
2032A(e)(5). Such activities include cultivating the soil; raising or
harvesting any agricultural or horticultural commodity; raising, shearing,
feeding, caring for, training, and management of animals; handling,
drying, packing, grading, or storing on a farm any agricultural or
horticultural commodity in its unmanufactured state but only if the owner,
operator, or tenant of the farm regularly produces more than one-half of
the commodity; and the planting, cultivating, caring for, or cutting of
trees, or the preparation (other than milling) of trees for market. The Rev.
Proc. makes clear that only an individual may be a qualified farmer or
rancher.
4.

A contribution is a "qualified conservation contribution" if(1) the interest
contributed is a "qualified real property interest, (2) the contribution is
made to a "qualified organization," and (3) the contribution is made
"exclusively for conservation purposes."

Appendix A

Sample Carve Out in Loan Documents
for Estate Planning Related Transfers
provided, however, that a change of Control shall not be deemed to have occurred under this
subsection with respect to the transfer by an individual, by lifetime sale, gift, bequest at death
under such individual's last will and testament or any other means, and upon any terms dictated
by such individual, all or any portion of his/her stock of Borrower to (A) a member of such
individual's Immediate Family (as defined below), (B) any trust the sole beneficiaries of which
are the individual and/or members of the individual's Immediate Family (as defined below), or
(C) any entity the sole owners of which are the individual and/or members of the individual's
Immediate Family (as defined below), on the condition that one or more of the current owners of
such stock shall retain at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the voting rights of Borrower at all times;
provided further that, without prior consent of the Bank (i) the Borrower shall be expressly
permitted to recapitalize the common stock of the Borrower into two classes of stock with the
existing common stock converted into Class A voting stock and the creation of a new class of
Class B non-voting stock, and (ii) the Borrower and it shareholders shall be permitted to cause
the Borrower to issue a stock dividend or share exchange of Class A and Class B stock to the
current holders of the common stock of the Borrower. As used herein, the term "Immediate
Family" shall mean spouse, lineal descendant, father, mother, brother or sister of the transferring
stockholder, including in-laws and adopted children.

Sample Permitted Transferee Language
A.
Permitted Transfers. Notwithstanding the above, any Member (the "Transferring
Member") may transfer all or any portion of the Member's Interest at any time to any of the
following, hereinafter referred to as "Permitted Transferees":
1.

In the case of a trust that is a Member, to a sub-trust created under the terms
of the trust that is the Transferring Member;

2.

In the case of an individual Member, the children, other descendants of any
such Member; or,

3.

A trustee who holds such Membership Interest in trust for the exclusive
benefit of any one or more of such persons listed in paragraph C.2. of this
Article VII (a "Permitted Trust").

4.

A trustee of an inter vivos or testamentary trust for the lifetime benefit of a
Member's spouse, with the remainder being distributed, upon the death of
the Member's spouse (i) outright to the Member's children or descendants
or (ii) to a Permitted Trust.
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